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ABSTRACT
Massimiliano Pisani
In this thesis I address three stylized facts widely debated in international economics. 
The first is the positive correlation between macroeconomic volatility and degree of 
) international financial openness in developing countries. The second is the huge and
7 persistent increase in U.S. trade deficit. The third is the real exchange rate volatility, 
'J  persistence and the disconnection with other macroeconomic variables. I investigate the 
three issues by elaborating three dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In the 
first chapter I develop a small open economy model to show how higher but imperfect 
financial integration can induce macroeconomic instability. The imperfect nature of 
financial integration is captured through a constraint on international borrowing, that 
affects expenditure decisions of private agents; the degree of financial openness is mea­
sured by the amount of borrowing for a given value of the collateral. In the second 
chapter I explain the deterioration of the US trade balance in terms of the positive 
collateral effect of increases in U.S. house prices on private consumption: I develop a 
model to reproduce the positive relationship - found by estimating a structural vector 
autoregressive model - between real estate prices, private consumption and trade bal­
ance deficit. The key feature of the model is a borrowing constraint, in which real estate 
is the collateral, that affects the consumption choices of U.S. households. In the third 
chapter I empirically investigate the determinants of the real exchange rate dynamics 
by estimatingvtHree new open economy macroeconomics modelsT)I find that shocks to 
the uncovered interest parity and international price discrimination, due to local cur­
rency pricing and distribution costs, are crucial features to replicate the dynamics of 
the real exchange rate.
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Introduction
In this thesis I analyze three stylized facts of the international business cycle. The 
first is the increase in volatility of consumption that systematically characterize emerg­
ing market economies when they increase the openness of their financial markets to 
international capital flows. The second stylized fact is the huge and persistent trade 
balance deficit of the U.S. economy, which is at the root of the trade and financial im­
balances that currently characterize the global economy. The third is the high volatility 
and persistence of the real exchange rate and its disconnection with respect to the ‘fun­
damental’ variables (the volatility of the real exchange rate is much higher than that 
of the other main macroeconomic variables).
The three stylized facts are puzzling.
According to standard theory, greater access to international financial markets 
should reduce the volatility of consumption in a small open economy, such as the typical 
emerging market country. In fact, from a theoretical point of view the greater avail­
ability of financial flows should improve the capability of smoothing consumption over 
time and across states of nature.
Regarding the U.S. trade deficit, there is lack of consensus on its causes, its (long- 
run) sustainability, the mechanism of adjustment. Explanations rely on several aspects: 
the fiscal deficit of the U.S. government and its effect on the behavior of the U.S. 
households; the excess of savings in the rest of the world that finances U.S. investment; 
the effects of changes in the relative prices of goods and U.S. assets and liabilities.
Finally, standard models of international business cycle have troubles in replicating 
the stylized facts of the real exchange rate. In fact, both the alternative assumptions of 
complete and incomplete international financial markets create a tight link between the 
real exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables; as a consequence, the volatility 
of the former cannot be much higher than that of the latter.
I address the three issues by developing open economy dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models with financial frictions. For the analysis of the U.S. trade balance 
deficit and of the real exchange dynamics, I also assume nominal rigidities.
Specifically, the structure of the thesis is the following.
In the first chapter I analyze the positive relationship between the volatility of 
consumption and the degree of financial openness in an emerging country. I develop a 
small open economy real business cycle model whose main feature is the presence of a 
borrowing constraint. Agents can borrow from the rest of the world a constant fraction
4
5m  of a collateral. This feature is consistent with empirical evidence, suggesting that 
access to international financial markets for emerging markets is usually in the form of 
short-term and conditional (to some form of guarantee) borrowing. A regime of financial 
openness is characterized by a higher value of m : for a given value of the collateral, 
the amount of borrowing is higher. I calibrate the model using data /diMalaysiV a 
country that during the mid 1980s adopted measures to open its financiahjnarket to 
international capital flows. The main result is that, consistently with the empirical 
evidence, in correspondence of a higher value of m  the volatility of consumption is 
higher in absolute terms and as a ratio to the volatility of domestic output (the ratio, 
in disagreement with the prediction of standard business cycle models, is higher than 
one both in the data and in the simulations of the model).
In the second chapter I investigate the relationship between the price of the real 
estate and the trade balance in the U.S. economy. Unconditional evidence suggests there 
is a positive association between increases in the price of the real estate and external 
deficit. I search for (conditional) evidence of a systematic relationship between the 
variables by estimating a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model and calculating 
the responses of real estate prices, private consumption and trade balance in the U.S. to 
a an expansionary monetary shock and to a positive shock to house prices. I find that 
there is a positive (conditional) correlation between the three variables. I rationalize 
the evidence in terms of a two-country DSGE model, calibrated on the U.S. economy. 
As for the model used in the first chapter, I introduce the financial friction in terms of 
a borrowing constraint: some agents in the economy can borrow only a fraction m  of 
the collateral, which, consistently with the empirical evidence on the U.S. households, 
is the domestic real estate. In the model there axe also sticky prices and incomplete 
exchange rate pass-through into import prices (nominal exchange rate fluctuations are 
not fully transmitted to import prices). The first assumption allows for a not trivial 
role of the monetary policy. The second is consistent with the empirical evidence 
on the U.S. and limits the capability of the nominal exchange rate fluctuations to 
modify international relative prices and hence to allow the correction of the imbalance. 
Differently from existing literature on the global imbalances, I emphasize the particular 
role of the relative price of a domestic asset, the real estate, as a possible source of the 
trade deficit. The main result is that the DSGE model is able to qualitatively and to 
some extent quantitatively replicate the conditional evidence obtained from the VAR: 
conditional to an expansionary monetary shock or to a positive house price shock (the 
latter is introduced through a shock to the preferences for housing) the higher price 
of the collateral stimulates the increase in borrowing, consumption and hence imports; 
the trade balance moves towards deficit.
Finally, in the third chapter I empirically investigate the stylized facts of the real 
exchange rate dynamics. Several theoretical and quantitative contributions, based on
6the assumption of incomplete international financial markets (only a riskless bond is 
internationally traded) explain the high exchange rate volatility in terms of local cur­
rency pricing (import prices are sticky in the currency of the destination market) and a 
shock to the uncovered interest parity (UIP). The latter is a shortcut to capture noisy 
behavior, not formalized in the models, of participants in financial and currency mar­
kets. It is justified on the basis of the empirical failure of the UIP. Other contributions, 
instead, emphasize, almost always assuming incomplete international financial markets, 
the low level of the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between tradable goods as a 
source of the excess volatility of the real exchange rate. One way to reduce the elasticity 
of substitution at the producer level can be built up on the assumption of distribution 
services intensive in local nontradable goods.
I use the Bayesian methodology to estimate a two-country model having the features 
above illustrated: incomplete markets at international level, a shock to the UIP, local 
currency pricing, distribution services. I also estimate a version of the model without 
the distribution services (there is only local currency pricing) and one in which import 
prices are set in the currency of the producer (producer currency pricing assumption, 
which implies that the law of one price holds at international level). The contribution is 
empirical. It differs from the others in terms of richness and complexity, both justified 
by the existing theoretical and quantitative debate, of the estimated models. Main 
results are two. First, the model featuring the local currency pricing and distribution 
services is the most in agreement with the data, followed by that featuring producer 
currency pricing. The model based on the local currency pricing assumption is the most 
at odds with the data. Hence data express a preference for distribution services and 
the related low intratemporal elasticity of substitution. The second result is that the 
UIP shock, followed by the shock to the preferences, has a not negligible role for the 
real exchange rate volatility. Without these shocks, the models, when simulated, are 
not able to replicate it.
The three chapters of this thesis indirectly suggest that formalizing the role of 
assets in the decision process of the agents is a crucial step for models of international 
business cycle. Financial frictions such as borrowing constraints and/or UIP shocks 
help to reduce the distance between the standard models based on incomplete markets 
and the stylized facts. More work is needed to deeply analyze the open economy 
implications of these frictions. However, there is a whole range of theoretical options 
between the two opposite assumptions of complete and incomplete markets (with or 
without financial frictions). Hence, more work is also needed to understand the factors 
driving the accumulation of external asset and liabilities, the foreign asset portfolio and 
their relationship with the exchange rate adjustment. The analyses would be worthy 
not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from a policy perspective, given the 
recent developments in the global financial scenario.
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CHAPTER 1
Financial Openness and M acroeconomic Instability in  
Emerging Market Economies
1.1. Introduction
During the mid-eighties, after decades of financial repression, many emerging economies 
chose to pursue a financial liberalization strategy. The increase of competition among 
financial operators was favoured and the degree of openness of financial markets to the 
international capital flows was increased.
According to standard theoretical models of international economics, financial open­
ness should lead to a decline in the volatility of consumption and other main macro- 
economic variables. Thanks to the greater access to international financial markets, in 
fact, agents should better smooth consumption over time.
Evidence, however, suggests that in emerging markets financial openness - usually 
measured by gross capital flows as ratio to gross domestic product - has been systemat­
ically associated to an increase in macroeconomic volatility: during the nineties output 
volatility has essentially not changed relatively to the levels of previous periods, while 
the volatility of consumption has increased. As a result, consumption volatility has 
been always higher than output volatility, before and after the financial liberalization.
In this paper I explain the positive relationship between financial openness and 
macroeconomic instability in terms of imperfect international financial integration. My 
point is that emerging economies, differently from industrialized countries, have only 
a limited access to international liquidity: it is usually in the form of short-term debt, 
whose amount is conditioned to some form of guarantee, for example the value of 
a collateral. Given the imperfect access to international financial markets, greater 
financial flows from the rest of the world contribute to amplify the macroeconomic 
effects of a given shock, instead of allowing to smooth them over time.
To illustrate the point, I calibrate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
using data of Malaysia, a country that during the mid 1980s increased the degree of 
openness of its financial markets to foreign capital flows. The model is a standard real 
business cycle (RBC from now on) small open economy. Agents in the country produce 
an internationally traded good using capital and labor and import a good produced 
in the rest of the world. The two goods are used for consumption and investment 
purposes. The feature I add to this standard framework is a borrowing constraint: 
agents’ borrowing from the rest of the world is a proportion m  (the loan-to-value ratio)
7
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of the value of the domestic real estate. Many authors have emphasized, in fact, the 
role of real estate as collateral in both domestic and international financial transactions 
in emerging countries. That of real estate, hence, is a rather important channel to 
propagate shocks in the emerging economies.1
The main result is that in a more financially open economy (having a higher loan- 
to-value ratio m ) the volatility of consumption is higher than that of output and the 
ratio between the two increases as m  becomes bigger. The intuition is the following one. 
The borrowing constraint affects the intratemporal and intertemporal decisions of the 
agent. When m  is higher, a greater increase in borrowing is allowed for a given increase 
n the value of the collateral. Hence, there is less need to increase the demand of the 
collateral and more resources can be used to finance consumption of other goods. As a 
consequence, demand for consumption of goods different from the collateral increases 
more for a given shock.
Thanks to the presence of the borrowing constraint, I’m able to replicate the increase 
in the consumption volatility in Malaysia after the liberalization of capital inflows. Re­
sults are robust to changes in key parameters, such the elasticity of substitution between 
tradable goods, the share of the domestic good in the consumption and investment bun­
dles, the persistence of the exogenous shocks.
There exists a long and growing literature that seeks to explain the volatility of 
consumption in emerging markets. Standard RBC models of open economies have a 
difficult time capturing the behavior of the consumption. With forward looking agents 
and transitory shocks, consumption should be “smooth” relative to income and this 
dampens the volatility of consumption.
One way to address the issue is to emphasize that economies are mainly subject to 
substantial volatility in the trend growth rate (rather than to volatility in the transitory 
fluctuations around a stable trend) relative to developed markets. Aguiar and Gopinath 
(2005) show that this feature improve the capability of a standard RBC model to match 
the stylized facts of an emerging markets.
A second approach in the literature relies on market imperfections. Aghion et al. 
(2003) find that full financial liberalization (i.e., opening the domestic market to for­
eign capital flows) may actually destabilize, inducing chronic phases of growth with 
capital inflows followed by collapse with capital flight. Tornell et al. (2004) show the 
existence of a positive fink between financial liberalization, growth, and crises, using 
a disaggregate model based on the real and financial asymmetries between tradable 
and nontradable sectors. Also in this case, the existence of financial frictions is key for 
the final results. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Schneider and Tornell (2000),
^ee, among the others, Collyns and Senhadji (2002), Corsetti (1998), Corsetti et al. (1998), Jansen 
(2003), Krugman (1999), Mera and Renaud (2000), Radelet and Sachs (1998).
9Tornell and Westermann (2001, 2002, 2003) analyze the relevance of sectoral and na­
tional credit market imperfections - such as asymmetric sectoral financing constraint, 
currency mismatching and guarantees - in amplifying macroeconomic shocks in middle 
income countries.2
Differently from them, I develop and calibrate a fully articulated small open economy 
dynamic equilibrium model. Hence, I can quantitatively investigate the contribution of 
the financial friction for replicating the stylized facts about consumption.
The paper is structured in the following way. Next section presents some stylized 
facts about financial openness and consumption volatility in emerging markets. Section 
three describes the setup: the microfoundations of the model, the optimization problems 
and the equilibrium relations are illustrated. Section four reports the results of the 
analysis, based on impulse response functions and simulations. Finally, section five 
contains the conclusions.
1.2. Stylized Facts
Prasad et al. (2003) show that in 1990s industrial countries have had an enormous 
increase in financial openness. The picture is not uniform for developing countries. 
Using data of actual capital flows, the authors classify developing countries in two 
groups. The first group comprises 22 countries. They are the developing countries that 
have sharply increased their degree of financial openness during the 1990s. The second 
group is formed by the 33 least financially open countries.3
Table 1 reports changes in volatility for different macroeconomic aggregates over 
the last two decades for the three groups of countries. In the 1990s there is a significant 
decline in average output volatility for industrial countries and the least financially 
open developing countries, while for the more financially open developing countries the 
decline has been modest. The consumption rows show that the average volatility in the 
1990s has declined in line with output volatility for both industrial and less financially 
open developing countries. To the contrary, for more financially open developing coun­
tries the volatility of private consumption has risen in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.4 
Thus, the resulting increase in the 1990s of the ratio of volatility of consumption to
2See also Paasche (2001). Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) analyze the effects of the effects of the financial 
liberalization on the business cycle of open industrialized countries. Another strand of the literature 
on the macroeconomics of emerging markets has studied the implications of financial frictions - such 
as borrowing constraint or risk premia - for the optimality of currency regimes. See among the others 
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2002a, 2002b).
3The first group includes many countries of the South-Est Asia and South America. The second group 
many countries of Africa.
4To take into account for the possible smoothing role played by public expenditure - that could be 
important especially in developing economies - Prasad et al. (2003) also report total consumption. This 
variable is generally less volatile than private consumption. However, the general pattern is confirmed: 
consumption volatility declined for industrial and less financially open developing economies, while it 
increased for the more financially open developing countries.
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that of output for the more financially open developing countries suggests that finan­
cial integration has not provided better consumption-smoothing opportunities for these 
economies.5
1.3. T he M odel
I consider a discrete time, infinite horizon small open economy. The economy cannot 
affect the rest of the world’s interest rate and demand level. The representative agent 
consumes two tradable goods. One is domestically produced, the other is imported. She 
also consumes a durable good, the local real estate, which is in a fixed amount. The 
agent holds a riskless bond which is internationally traded, invests in physical capital, 
and supplies labor. Firms produce under a perfect competition regime a good which is 
sold domestically and in the rest of the world. In what follows, I denominate the small 
economy as Home, the rest of the world as Foreign. Starred variables axe related to the 
rest of the world.
1.3.1. Household
I initially illustrate the preferences, constraints and first order conditions of the Home 
representative agent. In the next section, I report the problem solved by the firms.
1.3.1.1. Preferences. The representative agent’s life time expected utility Uq is de­
fined as:
( i . i ) Uo - E oY , ! 1 [in Ct + j h In ht -  -L [3)t'
t=0 r
where E0 is the expectational operator at time 0, 7 is the discount factor (0 < 7 <  1), Ct 
is the consumption of nondurable goods, ht represents the real estate services ( jh > 0), 
is the labor supply (/c, r  > 0).
The consumption index Ct in the Home economy is given by the following const ant- 
elasticity-of.substitution (CES) aggregator:
A  « _ i  i
(1.2) Ct = 9 +  (1  — o>h)p P
where Cn,t (CV,t) is the consumption of Home (Foreign) produced good, a# (0 < a# < 
1) is the share of the domestically produced good in the consumption expenditure, 
(1 — an) is the corresponding share of imported good, p (p > 0) is the elasticity of 
intratemporal substitution between Home and Foreign goods. A similar definition ap­
plies to the investment in physical capital and public expenditure bundles, respectively
5See also Kose et al. (2003a,2003b).
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equal to:
(1.3) I , = a
i
p JH1
ez± 
H,t p +  (1 — an )p I fj
?-ip
(1.4) Gt =
£-1
aH^H,t p +  (1 — &h ) p Gp,t
3 - 1
P
p—T
Prom the above bundles the following utility-based consumer price index can be de­
rived:6
(1.5) Pt =  +  (i -  «*) Pf7 ]
Pn,t is the price of the Home good, Pptt is the price of the Foreign good. Consumption 
of Home and Foreign goods is a function of the relative price and total consumption, 
respectively:
(1*6) C n , t  =  o>h  C t , C f j  =  (1 — a # ) ( ^ ~ p ^  C t
Similar definitions apply to the investment goods Ih , If and to the public expenditures 
Gh , Cf :
(I-7) Ih,i = a>H ( “J p )  ^  =  (1 ~
(1.8) Gn,t =  O'H Eilp t
1 ' Gt, Gp,t =  (1 — O'h) ( Gt
Finally, let’s define the Home terms of trade:
Pp,t(1.9) T  =
Pn,t
It is the price of the imported good relative to that of the Home good.
1.3.1.2. T he constrain ts. The budget constraint is defined as follows:
PtBt
(1 +  r)
- P tCt -  PJt
(1.10) - S I  PtK<:[ -  PtTt
6The utility based price index P  is defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of
the composite good, given the prices of the Home and Foreign goods.
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where Bt is a riskless bond (Bt < 0 is a debt) traded with the rest of the world and 
denominated in units of domestic consumption, (1 +  r) is the interest rate which is 
always equal to its steady state level, Wt is the wage rate, Qt is the price of real estate
ht (which is a durable good), ^  ^  3X6 acUustment costs of installing physical
capital denominated in units of consumption (V> > 0, 0 < 5 < 1 is the depreciation 
rate of physical capital), Tt are lump-sum taxes denominated in consumption units and 
paid to the local government.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), I assume a limit on the obligations of the agent:
(1-11) —PtBt <  mEt (Qt+\ht)
where m  is the loan-to-value ratio (0 < m < 1). The term m Et (Qt+iht) is the maxi­
mum amount that the agent can borrow. Hence, the term (1 — m )Et (Qt+\ht) can be 
interpreted as a proportional transaction cost the lender must pay to repossess the bor­
rowers’ assets. The borrowing constraint captures the imperfect international financial 
integration of emerging markets: the agent cannot borrow as much as she wants; to the 
contrary, she faces a limit to the amount she borrows given by the expected value of 
the real estate. A higher value of the parameter m  corresponds to a higher degree of 
financial openness: for a given value of the collateral, the agent can borrow more from 
the rest of the world. In the Appendix it is shown that, under the assumption that the 
agent is relatively impatient (her discount factor 7 is lower than that of the rest of the 
world), the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and in a neighborhood 
of it.
Real estate is fixed in the aggregate. Capital is instead accumulated according to 
the following law:
(1.12) K \3) =  (1 -  6)K}L\ +  It
I assume that the prices are expressed in terms of consumption C  (P — 1). The first 
order conditions with respect to Bu hu / t, K [s\  L^  are respectively:
(U3>
(l-14) + Et j7^r^ + m Xtqt+i j
(1.15) ^
K \a)
1
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(1.16) =  7£ t j ^ j  +  ( l - 5 ) 7 £ (tft+1 +
~ l E t
a t+i
(U 7)
Equations (1.15) and (1.16) are standard in models of investment with adjustment costs. 
Equation (1.15) defines the shadow value of one unit of investment today, \kt, which 
equals the marginal cost of investment. Equation (1.16) states that this value must be 
equated across time periods. At the optimum, the shadow price of capital must equal 
the sum of the expected values of the following three components: the rental rate of 
capital, the shadow value of capital and the capital contribution to lower installation 
costs. Equation (1.17) is the first order condition for labor supply: in each period, the 
real wage wt is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure.
Equation (1.13) is the consumption Euler equation, modified to take into account for 
the marginal value of additional borrowing A. Equation (1.14) is the real estate demand 
equation (qt is the price of the real estate in terms of consumption units). It requires that 
the marginal utility of current non-durable consumption is equated to the marginal gain 
of the real estate. The latter depends on the following elements : (1) the direct utility 
gain of an additional unit of the real estate; (2) the expected utility from expanding 
future consumption by means of the realized resale value of the durable purchased 
in the previous period; (3) the marginal utility of relaxing the borrowing constraint. 
Both equations (1.13) and (1.14) contain A£, the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing 
constraint. A£ equals the increase in lifetime utility that would stem from borrowing 
1 +  r  today and consuming the proceeds, and reducing consumption by an appropriate 
amount next period. Since housing can be used as collateral, there is a distortion of 
the intratemporal and intertemporal allocations towards housing consumption.
Combining the equations (1.13) and (1.14) to substitute out the Lagrange multiplier 
and log-linearizing around the deterministic steady state (see the Appendix), we get 
the following equation:
Ct ~  +  r - 'm 'p  EtCt+1 1 — nip E‘qt+1
where /3 is the discount factor of the rest of the world (by assumption, (3 > 7 ).
The equation clearly shows how, keeping constant all the expected variables, the 
multiplier effect on consumption of given changes in the price of real estate qt can be 
rather large, and is increasing with m, the loan-to-value ratio. Consumption is a positive
14
function of house prices, with a coefficient 1/  (1 — m(5) (the inverse of the downpayment 
needed to purchase one unit of the real estate).
1.3.2. Firm s
Firms in the Home country operate under a perfect competition regime. They produce 
the Home good according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
(1.18) Y, =  A t K ^ f L ^ 1- 0
where 0 < a  < 1 and A  represents a shock to the total factor productivity. Firms solve 
a standard static profit maximization problem. They maximize profits, expressed in 
terms of domestic consumption units, pH,t^H,t ~ rt ^ t - i  “  wtL ^  with respect to 
and .7 The first order conditions are respectively:
(1.19) apH,tYH<t = rkt K{d\
(1.20) (1 - a ) p HttYHtt = wtLf>
1.3.3. Public Sector budget constraint
The budget constraint of the public sector is equal to:
Gt = Tt
I introduce the public expenditure only to correctly calibrate the model. Hence both 
G and T  are constant and equal to their steady state level.
1.3.4. M arket Clearings
The market clearing condition for capital is:
(1.21) K \d) = K \s)
The market clearing condition for labor is:
(1.22) L ^  = L[s)
The market clearing condition for real estate is:
(1.23) ht =  H
where I assume H  is fixed.
7Hence, Ph  =
15
The market clearing of the domestically produced good is:
(1-24) Yt = Cn,t + lH,t +  Gn,t +  {PHyt) p X t
where (p H, t ) ~ P X t is the demand of the rest of the world for the Home good, with X t 
exogenously given (see next section). For simplicity, I assume that the real price pn,t 
of the Home good in the small open economy and in the rest of the world is the same, 
as well as the elasticity of intratemporal substitution p.
The market clearing of the imported good is:
(1-25) Yp,t — Cp,t +  -Tpji +  Gp,t
1.3.5. Exogenous Driving Forces
I assume that the two external sources of uncertainty that drive business cycles in the 
model are the amount of export X t and technology At. The laws of motion are:
(1.26) ln(Xt) =  px  In (At_i) +  £x,t
(1.27) In (At) — Pa In (At~i) +  £A,t
where 0 < ps < 1, with S  =  X , A. Innovations £s,t (S  =  X, A) have zero mean and 
are normally distributed.
1.3.6. The Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is a set of decisions rules taken by the agent and firms 
such that all the optimality conditions, constraints and market clearing conditions hold, 
given initial conditions and the exogenous laws of motion of the shocks perturbing the 
economy. This equilibrium is log-linearized around a deterministic steady state. The 
steady state and log-linearized equilibria are reported in the Appendix. I calibrate the 
steady state to reproduce the main features of the economy of Malaysia, a country 
that during the mid ’80s experienced a process of financial liberalization. After the 
calibration, the results of the simulations are reported, to show the relationship between 
macroeconomic instability and degree of financial openness.
1.3.7. Calibration
Before calibrating the model, let’s consider how the degree of financial openness affects 
the steady state values of the main variables.
The investment-to-output ratio does not depend upon the parameter m:
(1.28) 1  =  5: 7"
Y  1 - 7 ( 1  -  5)
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The same is true for the public expenditure G, which is exogenous. Given the inequality 
7 < (3 (p is the discount factor of the rest of the world), a higher value of m  implies a 
higher real estate value-to-output ratio:8
nan Qh -  f  (i 1 G\
( ] Y  1 —7 —m(/3 —7) V Y  Y J
Correspondingly, the value of the borrowing-to-output ratio is in absolute value higher: 
(1.30) f  =
Higher borrowing-to-output ratio implies a lower consumption-to-output ratio, given 
the higher amount of interest rate payments on the existing debt:
(1-31) p  =  - ( 0 - l ) f + l - p - p
I calibrate the parameters of the model on a yearly basis. I match the yearly ‘great’ 
ratios of Malaysia over the period 1960-1996.9
Malaysia is a good case study, given the goal of the paper. First, in the middle 
1980s it liberalized capital account controls and got strong capital inflows, especially 
in form of short term debt.10 Second, consumption volatility during the period 1985- 
1996 was higher than during the period 1960-1984 (the period of financial closeness). 
Third, local real estate had a strong role as collateral in financial transactions during 
the period 1985-1996.11
I report the chosen values in Table 2.
Following the business cycle literature, I set the discount factor of the rest of the 
world (3 equal to 0.96 (on a quarterly basis, it corresponds to 0.99), The discount factor 
of the Home agent, 7 , is equal to 0.92 (0.98 on a quarterly basis).
I set j h equal to 0.01. The parameter of labor disutility r  is equal to 2. The 
elasticity of substitution between the Home produced and imported goods, p, is equal 
to 1.1, while an (the share of Home produced goods in the consumption and investment 
bundles) is equal to 0.44 to match the Malaysian share of imported goods over domestic 
output. I choose the value of the capital adjustment cost, if), to match the volatility of 
investment over the period 1960-1996. The share of capital in the production function
®See the Appendix for derivation.
9I do not consider the years after 1996 to avoid the macroeconomic effects of the East-Asia currency 
and financial crises.
10The liberalization of the capital account, that was accompanied by measures to deregulate the 
financial system, began in the late 1980s. See Ariyoshi et al. (2000).
n For more details, see Kim, S.H., A. Kose, and M. Plummer (2003).
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is equal to 0.48 and the capital depreciation rate S equal to 0.12. These values allow to 
match the investment-to-output ratio. The loan-to-value ratio is set to 0.3.
The obtained great ratios are reported in Table 3. They closely match the actual 
ones.
I set the loan-to-value ratio m, which is a key parameter to 0.3. In the exercises, 
I’ll capture the regimes of low and more open financial markets setting m  respectively 
equal to 0.15 and to 0.45. A higher m  implies a lower consumption-to-output ratio. 
This is consistent with the empirical evidence on Malaysia: the ratio is equal to 58 
percent during the period 1960-1984, while it is equal to 50 percent during the period 
1985-1996.
After the steady state, I calibrate the shocks to the export volume and to the 
technology shock. The persistence of the shock to export is 0.38, while the standard 
deviation is 0.0663. The coefficient of the technology persistence is 0.67, while the 
standard deviation of the shock is 0.0323.12
1.4. R esults
My main goal is to show that the model, thanks to the borrowing constraint (a fea­
ture that formalizes imperfect international financial integration), is able to reproduce 
the following stylized fact: the volatility of consumption increases when the degree of fi­
nancial openness of emerging markets increases. To this purpose, I initially show results 
obtained under alternative values of the loan-to-value ratio; than I’ll show what hap­
pens when the borrowing constraint is not in the model, and hence agents can smooth 
consumption over time. Finally, I’ll perform a robustness analysis of the results.
1.4.1. M acroeconom ic volatility and financial frictions
I compute averages of statistics from 100 simulations. Each simulation consists of 
100 periods. The reported moments axe averages across simulations. I discard initial 
observations so to work with a number of years equal to those used to construct the 
actual statistics. Consistently with the length of the period 1960-1984, in the case 
of the regime of less open financial market (m  =  0.15) I have discarded the first 76 
observations. In the case of a regime of more open financial markets (m =  0.45), I 
have discarded the first 89 observations (the period goes from 1985 to 1996). Other 
parameters are held constant across the two regimes.13
12I have estimated the two laws of motion using annual logged and filtered data of Malaysia. I have 
used the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with smoothing parameter equal to 100. The data go from 1963 to 
1996. Data for export are from the International Financial Statics of the International Monetary Fund. 
Those for technology are calculated using data of the Penn Table.
13If the variance of the shocks is very large, the agent might not borrow up to the limit after a long 
series of positive productivity or export shocks. Instead, she can decide to keep a buffer stock of 
resources to use in bad times to avoid the possibility of hitting the borrowing constraint. By assuming
Table 4 [^e^prfs the ratios of the volatility oj  consumption to that of output. In­
teresting results are two. First, both the simulated and actual ratios are greater than 
one in both the subperiods. Second, both theoretical and actual ratios in the second 
subperiod (1985-1996) are higher than their counterparts in the first subperiod.
To better understand the results in Tabled, Table 5 shows the values of consumption 
and output volatilities. The simulat^avolatility of consumption is lower than the actual 
one. However, it tracks the actuaTrrne'Imd in the period 1985-1996 it is higher than 
in the period 1960-84. The sipfulated but put volatility slightly increases across the two 
periods, while the actual pne decrease^. ^
Hence, the model is ableTo-reproduce the increase in consumption volatility that 
has characterized Malaysia and other emerging markets after opening their financial 
markets to foreign capital flows. The key parameters is m , measuring the degree of 
collateralization of borrowing. The higher m, the higher the amount of borrowing from 
the rest of the world, the higher the volatility of consumption. This suggests that 
financial frictions in emerging markets can contribute to explain the positive relation 
between macroeconomic volatility and financial openness in emerging markets.
I also report some statistics of the other main variables. The model is able to 
replicate the volatility of real imports and investment, while it overstates the volatility 
of the trade balance. At least to some extent, it is able to replicate (see Table 6) the 
persistence of consumption, investment, output and imports. Actual persistence is in 
fact higher. This indicates that the model lacks internal mechanism of persistence (such 
as sticky prices, for example) or that more persistent shocks should be added as sources 
of the dynamics. The trade balance has a countercyclical behavior, also if the simulated 
moment is in absolute value lower than the actual one (Table 7). The low magnitude 
of the moment is due to the technology shock, which induce a shift of consumption and 
investment towards the domestic good, which becomes relatively cheap.
To get some intuition on the results of the simulations, I show the impulse response 
of the main variables (see Figure 1) to a +1% shock to the amount of export.
When m  is higher (m  = 0.45), on impact the responses of real estate price, borrow­
ing, trade balance deficit, output and labor are lower; to the contrary, on impact the 
responses of imports, consumption, investment are higher. The terms of trade improve 
more when m  is higher.
Given that the agent is relatively impatient, she prefers current to future consump­
tion. The increase in the rental rate of capital and wage, due to the higher Foreign 
demand for Home good, generates a positive income effect. This stimulates current 
consumption. The borrowing constraint induces a wealth effect on the labor supply.
that the discount factor of the constrained agents, 7, is well below that of the agents in the rest of the 
world, /?, I can minimize the probability that credit constraints become non-binding in some states of 
the world.
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This effect is stronger in correspondence of lower m  (tighter borrowing constraint): to 
get a given amount of borrowing, a higher value of the collateral is needed; to finance 
the purchasejof the latter, the labor supply response must be stronger. To the con­
trary, wherfra isjngher the link between the labor supply and the borrowing constraint 
is weaker. TnTact, a higher m  implies a relaxed” borrowing constraint and a given 
amount of borrowing can be obtained with a relatively lower increase in the value of the 
collateral. The benefit from strongly increasing the supply of labor and the demand of 
the collateral is lower. The increase in borrowing is used to demand mainly the Home 
and Foreign nondurable goods. The increase in consumption of nondurable goods (and 
in investment) is hence stronger. This result is consistent with those of the simulation 
exercises, that positively relate the volatility of consumption to the value of m. The 
price of the Home good (relatively to that of the Foreign good) increases to a higher 
extent when m  is higher, given the stronger increase in Home demand and the lower 
increase in labor supply. The higher increase in the relative price of the Home good 
countersets the higher amount of imports and the trade balance deficit is on impact 
lower, consistently with the lower increase in borrowing from the rest of the world.
Results in the case of a positive technology shock are similar (Figure 2). In cor­
respondence of a higher m, on impact the response of consumption and investment is 
higher, while the increase in labor is lower. As in the case of the shock to export, a 
higher value of the parameter m  weaks the wealth effect of the borrowing constraint on 
the labor supply. Hence, the output increase is lower, contributing to a lower increase 
in the relative price of imports (a lower deterioration of the Home terms of trade). The 
decrease of imports is lower when m  is higher. The trade balance deficit is lower, as 
well as the increase in the price of the real estate and in borrowing.
To emphasize the role of the financial friction for the obtained results, I simulate the 
model without the borrowing constraint.14 Table 8 reports the results. Consumption 
volatility in the model without the borrowing constraint is lower than in the model with
14The model without the borrowing constraint is a standard small open economy real bysiness cycle 
model. The first order conditions with respect to B t and ht axe now:
Et V C«(l + r)$(Bt) + 7 O W  = °
— = j h— + Et (  7 -^ -^3 ht v c t+1)
I assume the steady state of the model without borrowing constraint is similar to that of the model 
with m  =  0.3. To make the model stationary, I assume the Home agent is as patient as the agents in 
the rest of the world (hence 7 =  ft =  and that there is a function $ { B t) capturing the cost of 
undertaking positions in the international asset market. The agent does not take into this extra-term 
when maximizes her utility. As borrower, the agent will be charged a premium on the interest rate; as 
lenders, she will receive a remuneration lower than the interest rate. I introduce this additional cost 
to pin down a well defined steady state. The payment of this cost is rebated to agents belonging to 
the rest of the world. I adopt the following functional form:
$(B t) =  ex p [M £ t - £ ) ]
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the borrowing constraint and lower than the actual value. It is also lower than that 
of the output. This result is clearly at odds with the empirical evidence on emerging 
markets. It is more in line with the evidence on industrialized countries, where the 
volatility of consumption is lower than that of the output.
To get some intuition, in Figure 3 I report the responses of the main variables to 
the shock to the export in the case the borrowing constraint holds (m = 0.3) and in 
the case it does not. In the model with the borrowing constraint the increase of the 
real estate price is stronger. Thanks to this increase, the agent can borrow more from 
the rest of the world and the trade balance goes towards deficit. Instead, in the model 
without the borrowing constraint the agent smooths consumption over time. She uses 
some of the revenues from higher export to reduce her debt. The foreign asset position 
and the trade balance improve. Consumption and investment increase in the model 
without the borrowing constraint, also if to a lower extent than in the model with the 
borrowing constraint. On impact the increase of output is higher in the model without 
the borrowing constraint, given the higher increase in labor supply. The response of the 
labor supply is higher in the model without the borrowing constraint. In the periods 
after the first, the output becomes higher in the model with the borrowing constraint, 
given the increase in physical capital associated with the higher investments.
The responses of the main variables do not change much when the technology shock 
is considered. Results are reported in Figure 4. The only differences are that imports 
decrease and the terms of trade deteriorate. The responses of these two variables are 
stronger in the model without the borrowing constraint, given that the stronger response 
of labor induces a stronger increase in the supply of the Home good.
The reported results suggest that more open financial markets, when there are 
financial frictions and international financial integration is not perfect, tend to increase 
macroeconomic instability. In particular the volatility of consumption is higher.
1.4.2. Some sensitivity analysis
In what follows I analyze how the responses and the volatility of the main variables 
change by varying some key parameters of the model. Specifically, I consider the re­
sponses in correspondence of different degrees of elasticity of intratemporal substitution 
between tradable goods, of different shares of Home good in the consumption and in­
vestment bundles, of different persistence of the shocks.
1.4.2.1. Different elasticities of substitu tio n . I analyze the case of a relatively 
high elasticity of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between Home and imported
where — 1 <  5 b < 0 and B  is the steady state asset position. The parameter 5 b controls the speed of 
convergence to the steady state. I set it as small as possible, compatibly with the stationarity of the 
model. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) for more details.
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goods. I compare the responses of the main variables when p is set to its baseline value 
(p =  1.1) and when it is set to 2.
Figure 5 reports the results in the case of a shgck-tcLgxmrts. The magnitude of 
the responses is lower in correspondence of a/hjgner value of p. i?he substitution effect 
becomes relatively stronger. The economy becoines more stable/in the sense that both 
prices and quantities react less to the shock. HoweverT^ualitatively the results do not 
change: output and labor supply increase; the price of the real estate, borrowing and 
demand for consumption and investment increase as well. The trade balance shifts on 
impact towards deficit.
Figure 6 reports the results in the case of a technology shock. The reaction of the 
main variables is stronger when the elasticity of substitution is higher. In that case, in 
fact, the deterioration of the Home terms of trade is lower and the increase in demand 
for the Home good is higher. This stimulates a stronger increase in output and labor. 
Demand for real estate is higher, stimulating a stronger increase in the relative price 
of real estate. The increase in borrowing is higher, allowing higher consumption and 
investment. The trade balance deficit is higher.
From a qualitative point of view, the response of the main variables is similar across 
different values of p. However, the magnitude of the effect of the elasticity of substitu­
tion on the main macroeconomic variables depends on the type of the shock affecting 
the economy. Some simulations I have performed show that when the economy is hit 
by both technology and export shocks the volatility of consumption and other main 
macroeconomic variables is decreasing in the value of p.15 The reason is that, according 
to the chosen calibration, the shock to export is stronger than the technology shock.
1.4.2.2 . Different degrees of trad e  openness. Figure 7 shows the responses to 
a shock to exports when an =  0.44 (the benchmark) and when a# it is equal to 
0.75.) A lower degree of openness reduces the magnitude of the effects of the shock. 
Export constitute-now alower share of Home production.16 As a consequence, the 
related increase in labor supply and output are lower. Real estate price, borrowing, 
consumption and investment increase to a lower extent.
Figure 8 shows the responses in the case of a technology shock. A lower degree of 
openness (higher an) amplifies the effects of a technology shock: quantities and relative 
prices react to a greater extent. When the degree of openness is lower, a wider part of
15The exercises consist in simulating the model in correspondence of different values of p. Remaining 
parameters are kept constant to their baseline values (see Table 2). When p is equal to 2 (1.1 in the 
benchmark), the volatilities of consumption, investment and output are respectively equal to 2.2 (3.54 
in the benchmark), 7.9 (14.27), 3.1 (3.15).
16In steady-state, the amount of export is equal to:
x  , ( C 1 G\ 
y - l - O H  ( y +  y +  y )
See the Appendix for more details.
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the increase in demand is direct towards the domestic good. The increase in production 
is higher. The increase in labor supply, real estate price, borrowing is stronger. As a 
consequence, also consumption and investment increase,jto_a greater extent.
From a qualitative^^ of the main variables is similar across
different values of an. The magnitude of the effect of the degree of openness on the 
main macroeconomic variables depends on the type of the shock affecting the economy. 
As in the case of the elasticity of substitution, I have performed some simulations in 
correspondence of different values of the degree of openness. They show that the volatil­
ity of consumption and other main variables is decreasing in the degree of openness.17. 
Also in this case, the reason is that the shock to export is relatively stronger than the 
technology shock.
1.4.2.3. D ifferent persistence of th e  shocks. Figure 9 shows the responses to a 
shock to the amount of export when its persistence is equal to its benchmark value and 
when it’s equal to 0.92 (this value corresponds to 0.98 on a quarterly basis). When 
the shock is more persistent, the agent does not strongly substitute future with current 
labor. Hence, on impact the increase in labor is lower. There is also a stronger income 
effect, which induces a higher increase in demand for real estate. The price of the latter 
strongly increase, favouring higher borrowing, consumption, and investment.
Figure 10 shows the responses of the variables to a technology shock when its per­
sistence is equal to 0.67 (the benchmark) and when it’s equal to 0.92. Responses of 
borrowing, consumption and investment do not differ from those obtained under alter­
native values of the persistence of exports shock.
As in the cases of alternative degrees of elasticity if substitution and of trade open­
ness, the responses of the main variables are qualitatively similar across different values 
of the persistence of the shocks. Simulations show that the volatility of consumption is 
increasing in the persistence of the shocks.18
1.5. Conclusions
In this paper I develop a model of a small open economy to address the relation 
between macroeconomic volatility and financial openness in emerging markets. I find 
that financial liberalization per se does not guarantee a reduction of macroeconomic 
volatility: greater but, because of financial frictions, imperfect access to international 
liquidity can amplify the effects of exogenous shocks and cause an increase in consump­
tion volatility. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that it is worthwhile to 
implement not only structural measures that increase the degree of financial openness,
17When an  is equal to 0.75 (0.44 in the benchmark), the volatilities of consumption, investment and 
output are respectively equal to 3.43 (3.54 in the benchmark), 13.9 (14.27), 3.18 (3.15).
18When the persistence of both shocks is equal to 0.92, the volatilities of consumption, investment and 
output are respectively equal to 4.93 (3.54 in the benchmark), 14.98 (14.27), 3.13 (3.15).
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but also those that contribute to eliminate the financial frictions and hence improve fi­
nancial integration. For example, incentives for prudent risk management, appropriate 
financial institutions for prudential supervision and regulation in the liberalizing coun­
try can contribute to reduce the asymmetric information, and hence the moral hazard 
problem, that are at the basis of the financial frictions; in other words, measures that 
contribute to develop the transparency of the financial system are important to exploit 
the potential benefits, in terms of macroeconomic stability, deriving from greater access 
to international financial markets.
According to the obtained results, more research is needed to understand how the 
design of financial institutions affects the macroeconomic results of financial liberaliza­
tion and to quantify the effects on assets and goods prices. In particular, it wold be 
interesting to quantitatively analyze the macroeconomic implications resulting from the 
interaction of the liberalization of capital account and that of the domestic financial 
sector. The setup illustrated in this paper could be extended to take into account for 
the possibility that agents in the small open economy are subject not only to an inter­
national borrowing constraint, but also to a domestic one. Finally, the model could be 
extended to quantitatively and empirically explore the macroeconomic effects of per­
manent technology shocks. This would help to measure the relative contribution of 
growth and financial frictions to the macroeconomic instability of emerging markets.
References
[1] Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, and Abhijit Banerjee (2003). “Financial 
Development and the Instability of Open Economies”, unpublished manuscript.
[2] Aguyar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath (2005). “Emerging Market Business Cycles: the 
Cycle is the Trend”, unpublished manuscript.
[3] Ariyoshi, Akira, Karl Habermeier, Bernard Laurens, Inci Otker-Robe, Jorge Ivan 
Canales-Kriljenko, and Andrei Kirilenko (2000) “Capital Controls: Country Ex­
periences with their Use and Liberalization”, International Monetary Fund Occa­
sional Paper, 190.
[4] Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2001). “International and Do­
mestic Collateral Constraints in a Model of Emerging Market Crises” , Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 48, 513-548.
[5] Cespedes, Luis F., Roberto Chiang, and Andres Velasco (2002a). “ Balance Sheets 
and Exchange Rate Policy”,unpublished manuscript, Harward University.
[6] Cespedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang, and Andres Velasco (2002b). “Must Origi­
nal Sin Bring Macroeconomic Damnation?”, unpublished manuscript.
[7] Collyns, Charles, and Abdelhak Senhadji (2002). “Lending Booms, Real Estate 
Bubbles and the Asian Crisis”, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/20.
[8] Corsetti, Giancarlo (1998). “Interpreting the Asian Financial Crisis: Open Issues 
in Theory and Policy” , Asian Development Review, 16(2), pp. 1-44.
[9] Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini (1998). “What Caused the 
Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?” Japan and the world economy, 11, 305-73,
[10] Iacoviello, Matteo, and Raoul Minetti (2003).“Financial Liberalization and the 
Sensitivity of House Prices to Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidence”, The 
Manchester School, 71(1), 20-34.
in ] Jansen, W. Jos (2003). “What do Capital Inflows Do? Dissecting the Transmission 
Mechanism for Thailand, 1980-1996”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 25, 457-480.
[12] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore (1997). “Credit Cycles”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 105(2), April, 211-48.
24
25
[13] Kim, S.H., A. Kose, and M. Plummer (2003). “Dynamics of Business Cycles in 
Asia”, Review of Development Economics, 7(3), 462-477.
[14] Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones (2003a). “Financial 
Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility”, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/50.
[15] Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones (2003b). “Volatility 
and Comovement in a Globalized World Economy: an Empirical Exploration”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/03/246.
[16] Krugman, Paul (1999). “The Return of Depression Economics”.
[17] Mera, Koichi, and Bertrand Renaud (eds.) (2000). “Asia’s Financial Crisis and the 
Role of Real Estate”.
[18] Paasche, Bernhard (2001). “Credit Constraints and International Financial 
Crises”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 48, 623-650.
[19] Prasad, Eswar, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose (2003). “Ef­
fects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evi­
dence”, IMF, unpublished manuscript.
[20] Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey Sachs (1998). “The Onset of the East Asian Financial 
Crisis” , NBER Working Paper no. 6680, August.
[21] Schmitt-Groh6, Stephanie, and Martin Uribe (2001). “Closing Small Open Econ­
omy Models” , Journal of International Economics, 61, October, 163-185.
[22] Schneider, Martin, and Aaron Tornell (2000). “Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout 
Guarantees and Financial Crises”, NBER Working Paper no. 8060, December.
[23] Tornell, Aaron, and Frank Westermann (2001). “Boom-Bust Cycles in Credit Con­
strained Economies: Facts and Explanation”, unpublished manuscript.
[24] Tornell, Aaron, and Frank Westermann (2002). “The Credit Channel in Midlie 
Income Countries”, NBER Working Paper no. 9355, November.
[25] Tornell, Aaron, and Frank Westermann (2003). “Credit Market Imperfections in 
Middle Income Countries”, NBER Working Paper no. 9737, May.
[26] Tornell, Aaron, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza Martinez (2004). “The Positive 
Link Between Financial Liberalization Growth and Crises” , NBER Working Paper 
no. 10293.
26
Appendix. The solution of the model
The equilibrium dynamics is characterized by solving a first-order log-linear approx­
imation to the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. In what 
follows, the deterministic steady state and the log linearized equations are shown.
The steady state equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is considered in which all the shocks are zero, there is 
no net capital accumulation (Kt =  K t- \  =  AT), no debt change (Bt =  Bt~ 1 =  B) and 
in which all price are constant. The following price normalization is used: Ph — P f  =  
P  =  1. Hence, the relative prices are equal to one.
The steady state value of r satisfies:
(55.1) p = —1—
1 +  r
where (3 is the discount factor of the rest of the world. Using the steady state version 
of the consumer Euler equation (1.13) and equation (1.14), the following value for A, 
the Lagrange multiplier, can be obtained:
(55.2) A =  ^  ~  7C
By assumption, 0 < 7 < / ? < l ; s o  the Lagrange multiplier is strictly greater than 
zero in the steady state (and in a small neighborhood of it). As a consequence, the 
borrowing constraint is binding.
I normalize the steady state value of the total productivity factor, A, to 1. From the 
firms’ first order conditions, equations (1.19) and (1.20), the following two equations 
are respectively obtained:
(55.3) ^  =  a
(55.4) ^  =  1 -  «
Prom equations (1.15), (1.16), (SS.3) the capital-to-output ratio is:
(s s -5> F  =
From the capital accumulation law (1.12), the investment-to-output ratio can be de­
rived:
(SS.6) ~  =  S, 7“
Y  1 —7(1 - S )
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The borrowing constraint equation (1.11) becomes:
/qq 7\ B  Qh(55.7) -  =  - m —
From the budget constraint (1.10), using equations (SS.3) and (SS.4), the consumption- 
to-output ratio can be written as:
(55.8) !  =
Combining equations (SS.7), (SS.8) and the steady state version of equation (1.14) the 
following equation for the real estate value-to-output ratio is obtained:
(SS9) 9 b  = _____________£ _____________
y 1 Y  1 — 7  — m (/? — 7 ) — j'* (/3 — 1) m \  Y  Y j
The ratio I / Y  is given by equation (SS.6) and G / Y  (as well as T / Y )  is exogenous. 
Hence, the ratio Q h /Y  is function of the structural parameters of the model. Substi­
tuting back into equations (SS.7) and (SS.8), also the ratios B / Y  and C /Y  become 
function of the structural parameters.
From the intratemporal first order conditions of Home agents - equations (1.6), 
(1.7), (1.8) - the following steady state allocations are obtained:
CH =  aHC , CF = ( l - a H) C  (SS.1 0 )
Ih =  ^hI » If =  (1 — &h) I (SS.11)
Gh — clhG , Gp =  (1 — o>h) G (SS.12)
The demand of the rest of the world demand for the Home good in steady state is (see 
equation (1.24)):
(55.13)
The Home demand for the Foreign good is (see equation (1.25) and the above steady 
state equations of Cp, / f ,  Gp):
(55.14) £  =  (1 -  aH) ( 2  +  L  +  p )
Finally, the budget constraint of the public sector is:
(SS.15) G — T
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The log-linearized equilibrium
Local dynamics is studied by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the 
steady state.
Let variables with a time subscript t, t  +  1 or t -  1 denote log-deviations from 
steady state and let those without a time subscript denote steady state values. The 
log-linearized equilibrium of the model is system of 14 equations in 14 variables: Y,
A A A A A A A, A A A
Yp, C, B, K , / , L, q, h, pH, Pf , T, A , X . They are log-deviations from steady state (for 
example, Yt =  In(Yt/Y) )  of, respectively, output, amount of imports, consumption, net 
foreign asset position, stock of capital, investment, labor supply, real estate price index, 
real estate holdings, price of the Home good, price of the Foreign good, terms of trade, 
technology, amount of export.
To save on notation, I drop the expectation operator between variables dated t -f
1. However the variables must be intended as in expected value conditional on the
information available at time t.
The equations are the following ones:
1. Aggregate demand
(ADI) Yt — —p (pn) +  -1- clhU +  X t
(AD2) y>,t =  - p  C0F) +  +  y l t
qt =  (1 -  m/3) Ct (AD3)
+  (7  +  m ( / ? - 7 ) ) ( ^ + i )
_(1 _ ry _  mp  + m^y)^
- 7  (1 -  m) Ct+1
( h - K t - i )  =  ^ (jt+i -  K t) +  ^  (Ct -  Ct+1)  (AIM)
+[1 -  7  (1 -  5)] [ i V +  £ + !-■ & ]
2. Borrowing constraint
(BCl)
3. Aggregate supply
Bt — ^+i +  ht
29
(AS1) Yt = a k t- i  + ( l - a ) L t
(AS2) PH,t  + Yt =  -\-Ct +  t  Lt
4. Flows of funds/ Other variables
(FF1) k t = ( l - 6 ) k t- 1+6I t
B  O B  ■' A C  "A /  A
(FF2) p y B t  =  y B t- i  +  pH't +  y t -  - c t -  - / *
(FF3) a H pH ,t  +  (1 — o-h ) P f j  =  0
(FF4) ht =  0
(FF5) Tt =  PF.t — Ptf.t
5. Shock process
(SP1) At_i +
(SP2) X t = px X t- \  + £x,t
The equations are divided in 5 blocks. The first block contains the demand side of the 
economy.
The first equation is the demand for the Home produced good (it is the log-linearized 
version of the equation (1.24).
The second equation is the demand for the imported good (it is obtained by log- 
linearizing the equation (1.25)).
The third equation is the derived from the agent Euler consumption equation (1.13) 
and real estate demand equation (1.14).
The fourth equation is obtained by combining the investment and capital first order 
conditions, respectively equation (1.15) and equation (1.16).
The second block is the borrowing constraint. It derives from equation (1.11).
The third block is the supply side of the economy.
The first equation derives from the technology constraint (1.18).
The second equation derives from the labor first order conditions (1.17), (1.20) and 
from the labor market clearing condition (1.22).
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The fourth block contains equations describing flows of funds and remaining vari­
ables.
The first equation is the log-linearized version of the capital accumulation law (1.12).
The second equation derives from the budget constraint (1.10).
The third equation defines the consumption as the numeraire (see equation (1.5), 
with P  =  1).
The fourth equation derives from the real estate market clearing condition (1.23). 
The real estate is in a fixed amount.
The fifth equation is the Home terms of trade. It is the log-linearized version of 
equation (1.9).
Finally, block number five contains the exogenous processes: the law of motion of 
technology and that of foreign demand.
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Table 1. Volatility of Annual Growth Rates of Consumption and Output
Full Sample Decade
1960-99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
O utpu t
Industrial countries 2.18
(0.23)
1.91
(0.26)
2.46
(0.28)
2.03
(0.30)
1.61
(0.14)
MFI economies 3.84
(0.20)
3.31
(0.42)
3.22
(0.37)
4.05
(0.44)
3.59
(0.62)
LFI economies 4.67
(0.35)
3.36
(0.61)
4.88
(1.01)
4.53
(0.69)
2.70
(0.38)
C onsum ption
Industrial countries 2.37
(0.30)
1.47
(0.27)
2.16
(0.25)
1.98
(0.28)
1.72
(0.20)
MFI economies 5.18
(0.51)
4.57
(0.49)
4.52
(1.04)
4.09
(0.94)
4.66
(0.46)
LFI economies 6.61
(0.78)
5.36
(0.58)
7.07
(0.11)
7.25
(0.81)
5.72
(0.78)
Source: Prasad et al. (2003).
Notes: Percentage standard deviations, medians for each group of countries. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. MFI denotes more financially integrated, and LFI less 
financially integrated, economies.
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Table 2. Model Calibration (Baseline)
Parameter Value
0 0.96
7 0.92
j h 0.01
T 2
P 1.1
an 0.44
1> 0.17
a 0.48
S 0.12
m 0.3 (baseline), 0.15,0.45
Px 0.38
Pa 0.67
<*x 0.0663
& A 0.0323
Table 3. Main “Great” Ratios of Malaysia (with respect to output)
Variable Actual Model
Consumption 55.7 57.8
Investment 25.7 27.8
Public Expenditure 15.3 15.3
Export 57.8 56.5
Imports 55.8 55.4
Net Exports 2.0 1.2
Source: Kim et al. (2003).
Notes: % values. Period 1960-1996. Actual values are taken from Kim et al. (2003).
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T a b le  4. The collateral effect: consum ption relative volatility (to  ou tpu t)
1960-1984 1985-1996
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.15)
Actual Simulated
(m=4L45)
Consumption 1.33 1.11 2.19 ( 1.17
V A -
Notes: volatility is measured by the standard deviation of logged and filtered (HP filter, 
with A =  100) variables.
Table 5. The Volatility of the Main Variables
1960-96 1960-1984 1985-1996
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.3)
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.15)
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.45)
Consumption 4.68 3.54 4.02 3.41 4.75 3.66
(0.30) (0.33) (0.33)
Output 3.39 3.15 3.01 3.07 ( 2 .17\ / Y  3 1 V;
(0.33) _ (0 ,2 6 )
Investment 14.09 14.27 11.94 13.6
y
’’ 11.44 14.90
(1.17) (1.13) (1.34)
Trade Balance 8.29 36.59 8.75 43.27 4.59 30.30
(2.90) (3.37) (2.40)
Imports 10.29 7.76 8.68 7.47 8.30 7.94
(0.63) (0.55) (0.59)
Source: Kim et al. (2003).
Note: volatility is measured by the standard deviation of logged and filtered (HP filter, 
with A =  100) variables (standard error between brackets).
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Table 6. The Persistence of the Main Variables
1960-96 1960-1984 1985-1996
Actual Simulated 
(m = 0.3)
Actual Simulated 
(ra =  0.15)
Actual Simulated 
(771 =  0.45)
Consumption 0.52 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.44 0.20
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Output 0.62 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.30 0.36
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Investment 0.73 0.18 0.61 0.17 0.38 0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade Balance 0.33 -0.11 0.19 -0.09 0.05 -0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Imports 0.42 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.09
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Source: Kim et al. (2003).
Note: persistence is measured by the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the logged 
and filtered (HP filter, with A =  100) variables (standard error between brackets).
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Table 7. Contemporaneous Comovement with Output
1960-96 1960-1984 1985-1996
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.3)
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.15)
Actual Simulated 
(m =  0.45)
Consumption 0.69 0.22 0.54 0.23 0.75 0.19
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Investment 0.83 0.15 0.70 0.17 0.90 0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade Balance -0.37 -0.05 -0.15 -0.06 -0.23 -0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Imports 0.58 -0.16 0.47 -0.17 0.16 -0.18
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Source: Kim et al. (2003).
Note: contemporaneous comovement with output is measured by the correlation between 
the filtered (HP filter, with A =  100) series and the filtered output (standard error between 
brackets).
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Table 8. The collateral effect
1960-96
Actual Simulated 
(m = 0.3)
Simulated 
(no borrowing constraint)
Consumption 4.68 3.54 0.56
(0.30) (0.06)
Output 3.39 3.15 3.09
(0.33) (0.28)
Investment 14.09 14.27 1.67
(1.17) (0.11)
Notes: volatility is measured by the the standard deviation of logged and filtered (HP filter, 
with A =  100) variables (standard error between brackets).
Figure 1. A lternative values of m: shock to  the  export
Trade balance
Terns of Trade
Notes: dashed lines m  =  0.45; solid lines m  =  0.15. Ordinate: time horizon in years.
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
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Figure 2. A lternative values of m: technology shock
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Notes: dashed lines m = 0.45; solid lines m = 0.15. Ordinate: time horizon in years. 
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%. Plots of terms of 
trade and output are magnified to emphasize differences.
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Figure 3. The role of borrowing constrain t: shock to  the  export
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Notes: dashed lines: no borrowing; solid lines m  =  0.3. Ordinate: time horizon in years.
Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the real estate price shock: 1%.
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Figure 4. T he role of borrowing constraint: technology shock
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Notes: dashed lines: no borrowing; solid lines m = 0.3. Ordinate: time horizon in years. 
Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the real estate price shock: 1%. The plot 
of the output is magnified to emphasize differences.
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Figure 5. Alternative values of the elasticity o f intratem poral substitution:
shock to the export
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Notes: dashed lines p  =  2; solid lines p  — 1.1. Ordinate: time horizon in years. Coordinate:
percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
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Figure 6. Alternative values o f the elasticity of intratem poral substitution:
technology shock
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Notes: dashed lines p  — 2; solid lines p  — 1.1. Ordinate: time horizon in years. Coordinate:
percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
Figure 7. A lternative values of the  degree of openness: shock to  th e  export
Notes: dashed lines fl//=  0.75; solid lines olh=  0.44. Ordinate: time horizon in years. Coor­
dinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
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Figure 8 . A lternative values of th e  degree of openness: technology shock
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Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
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Figure 9. Alternative values of the persistence of the shock to the export
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Notes: dashed lines p x  — 0.92; solid lines p x =  0.38. Ordinate: time horizon in years.
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
Figure 10. A lternative values of the  persistence of the  technology shock
Notes: dashed lines p&— 0.92; solid lines Pa =  0.67. Ordinate: time horizon in years. Coor­
dinate: percent deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: 1%.
CHAPTER 2
House Prices, Consum ption and Trade Balance in th e U .S.
2.1. Introduction
The high level of trade and financial global imbalances is stimulating a large debate 
about the determinants of the U.S. trade balance and current account dynamics. The 
main views are two. The ‘global saving glut’ explains the widening of the U.S. external 
imbalances in terms of three factors: (1) a sharp rise in national savings in China and 
oil-exporting countries; (2) relatively weak investments in some key industrial countries 
such as Germany and Japan and in some emerging Asian countries; (3) relatively high 
investments in the U.S. economy.1 The other view emphasizes the reduction in domestic 
saving and it can be split in two strands: one highlights the influence of the widening 
U.S. public budget deficit on the reduction of national savings (‘twin deficit’ hypothesis); 
the other points out the negative effect of the booming house prices on household 
saving.2
Recent contributions tend to downplay the ‘global saving glut’ and the ‘twin deficit’ 
hypotheses. Regarding the first hypothesis, some authors observe that in the period 
2001-2004 U.S. investments have decreased.3 Regarding the second, the Ricardian ef­
fect of public deficit on private saving seems to be not negligible: an increase in the 
federal budget, resulting in higher interest rates, lower private domestic consumption 
and investment, would have a rather low net effect on the external deficit.4
To the contrary, several observers emphasize the existence of a relationship between 
the recent boom in U.S. house prices and higher trade balance deficit.5 This pattern 
is experienced not only by the U.S. economy. The OECD, for example, reports that 
between 1996 and 2004 the countries whose current account have moved toward deficit
1See Bernanke (2005).
2See Roubini and Setser (2005).
3See Roubini (2005).
4See Kim and Roubini (2004) and Ergeg et al. (2005).
5Bernanke (2005) points out “...the expansion of housing wealth, much of it easily accessible to house­
holds through cash-out refinancing and home equity lines of credit” and “...the evident link between 
rising household wealth and a tendency for the current account to shift toward deficit”. Greenspan 
(2005) notes a strong correlation between the U.S. mortgage debt and the U.S. current account deficit. 
Rogoff (2005) says that “...low interest rates that have fuelled an increasingly speculative housing price 
boom, which has in turn contributed to low personal savings and a bigger current account deficit” .
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have also experienced substantial housing appreciation and increasing in house wealth, 
contrary to countries where the housing appreciation has been slow.6
Following the latter strand of the debate, I investigate the relationship between the 
U.S. housing prices and trade balance.
I estimate two vectors autoregressive^£VAR from now on) models to look at the 
empirical evidence initially, then I rationalize it in terms of a two-country dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE^om nojvon) model.
Main feature of the model is the presence of a domestic borrowing constraint: some 
agents, I define them ‘constrained’, in the country have only access to domestic financial 
markets and can borrow using the domestic real estate holdings as collateral.7 Uncon­
strained agents, instead, can also borrow from the rest of the world. The trade balance 
is determined by the difference between the value of the output and that of the total 
demand. Other features are rather standard to get a model as simple as possible: in 
each country two tradable_non riurahl° g ^ ds are consumed, one domestically produced, 
the other imported from the other country; monetary policy is introduced in form of 
a^IhylbFTuIej~tKere areTiominalTigidities in form of staggered prices; to capture the 
observed low degree of import price pass-through at consumer level, I assume import 
prices are set in local currency terms. As a first step, I develop a simplified version of 
the model. It is a one-country open economy model, with the rest of the world taken as 
exogenous. Thanks to this basic setup, I can focus on the relationship between house 
prices, consumption and trade balance in the U.S. economy.8 I subsequently extend the 
basic setup and develop a two-country model to take into account general equilibrium 
considerationsmsulting from the United States’ large size in the global economy.
The rfiam result of the model, roughly in line with the empirical evidence suggested 
by the estimatea VARs, is that changes in house prices contribute to determine the 
trade balance dynamics through a^collateral effectfon agents subject to the borrowing 
constraintr Higjier hoUsmg~pnces allow higKerl^olfowmg^ higher^tmsump-
tion; as a consequenceTimports increase'contributing to shift the trade balance towards 
deficit.9 .
Other results are the following ones, ^ irs t, the effect of a house price shock on the 
trade balance is higher in correspondence^! higher values of the loan-to-value ratio
6OECD Economic Outloook (2004).
7Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Jappelli and Pagano (1989), Zeldes (1989) document evidence of 
financing constraint at household level.
8Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) also develop a partial equilibrium model of U.S. that neglegts its large 
size.
9Several empirical papers find a positive relationship between consumption and house prices. Case et 
al. (2001) find long-run elasticities of consumption to housing prices of around 0.06 for a panel of U.S. 
states. Davis and Palumbo (2001) estimate a long-run elasticity of consumption to housing wealth of 
0.08. These positive elasticities are hard to reconcile with the traditional life-cycle model. For more 
detailed discussion, see Iacoviello (2005).
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(the amount of borrowing for unit of collateral) faced by the U.S. constrained agents. 
Secraid, lower values of the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced and 
imported goods limit the size of the trade balance deficit in the aftermath of a shock. 
Tmrdjche deterioration of the trade balance after a U.S. expansionary monetary shock 
is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime than under a regime in which the other 
country pegs the dollar. Finally, 1 analyze how the nominal exchange rate depreciation 
affects the trade balance dynamics when the assumption of low pass-through of nominal 
exchange rate into import prices is relaxed and it is assumed that pass-through is 
complete (so that the depreciation of, let’s say, the U.S. nominal exchange rate has 
a strong impact on international relative prices and shifts world demand towards U.S. 
produced goods). I show that the depreciation of the exchange rate contributes to some 
extent to limit the increase of the trade deficit under this counterfactual assumption.
This paper is related to recent studies that have formalized the ‘credit view’ in open 
economy general equilibrium models.
Iacoviello and Minetti (2005) develop an international real business cycle model 
based on a borrowing constraint a la Kiyotaki-Moore, having real estate as collateral.10
Also Gilchrist et al. (2002) and Faia (2005) study the open economy implications of 
financial frictions, which are introduced via a risk premium on borrowing proportional to 
the level of leverage.11 The performed analysis focuses on how cross-country financial 
heterogeneity affects and amplifies the propagation of international spillovers under 
alternative monetary policies and exchange rate regimes.
My paper differ in three main aspects. First, I perform a systematic evaluation of 1 
the implications of the household borrowing constraint for the trade balance dynamics. 
Second, I focus on the real estate market and consumer’s expenditure. Third, I focus ^  
on the U.S. economy by estimating the VARs and appropriately calibrating the DSGE ^  
model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Next section illustrates the VAR evidence on the 
relationship between trade deficit and real estate price. Section three rationalizes the 
evidence in terms of a single open economy model with a real estate credit channel (the 
rest of the world is taken as exogenous). Section four develops a two-country version 
of the model used in section three. Conclusions are in section five.
2.2. Em pirical evidence
I use the VAR methodology to find evidence of a relationship between house prices, 
private consumption and external deficit in the U.S. economy.
10See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998).
11The theoretical framework is based on Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999), Carl- 
strom and Fuerst (1997, 2001).
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I estimate two VARs. The two models share the variables needed to identify a 
monetary policy and a house price shock; they differ in terms of the variable representing 
the U.S. trade. The shared variables are the detrended log of real gross domestic product 
(T), the change in the log of consumer p ncaicdex (n), the detrendecTlogT)TreaHiouse 
prices (<?), the Fed Funds rate (R), the detrended log o f v a t e ~ c o n s u m p tioiT~(C)r 
TSemo^^ip^fic^variables are: I) the ratio of detrended balance of goods and services 
(divideabyldie consumer price level) to the^average (over the estimation period) real 
gross domestic producf~tT^yf2) detrended log of real ^go r^ jy^^m lJinpo rts  (M ).12 
Data are from 1974Q1 to 2005Q2. The Fed Funds rate is the average value in the 
first month of each quarter. The house price series (deflated with the consumer price 
deflator) is the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index from Freddie Mac.13 The 
logs of gross domestic product, housing prices, consumption, exports and imports are 
detrended with a band-pass filter that removes frequencies above 32 quarters. All the 
considered variables are expressed in percentages and in quarterly rates.
The VARs have lag length equal to three (chosen according to the Hannah-Quinn 
criterion) and include a constant, a time trend, a shift dummy from 1979Q4 (to take 
into account the change in the U.S. monetary policy) and one lag of the log of the 
CRB (Commodity Research Bureau) commodity spot price index. To make the VAR 
and the DSGE models more comparable, the shocks are orthogonalized in the order 
R, 7r,<7, Y,C ,TB ; in the other VAR X  and M, taken in that order, substitute TB, 
while the order of the remaining variables does not change.14
Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a negative interest rate shock.15 There is 
a positive response of real housing prices, consumption, while inflation increases with 
some lag. The trade balance moves towards deficit.
Figure 2 presents impulse responses to a positive house price shock. Also in this 
case, there is a positive comovement between house prices and consumption and the 
trade balance moves towards deficit.
To better understand the dynamics of the trade balance, I run the VAR substituting 
the trade balance variable with U.S. export and imports.
Figure 3 presents impulse responses to a negative interest rate shock. Consumption 
and real estate prices increase, as well as imports.
A similar pattern - an increase in consumption and imports - is observed when a 
positive house price shock is considered, as shown by Figure 4.
12The variable T B  has the property of being consistent with the trade balance variable used in the 
DSGE model.
13Data on gross domestic product, private consumption, consumer prices, export, imports, trade bal­
ance are taken from the database FREDII of the St. Louis Federal Reserve and from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.
14However changing the order does not greatly affect the results.
15A11 the VAR impulses have 90-percent bootstrapped confidence bands. Shocks have a one standard 
deviation size.
I
51
The reported evidence suggests two points. First, following an exogenous increase 
in housing prices or decrease in interest rate, there is a positive comovement between 
housing real prices and consumption; this evidence, which is in line with the results 
found by Iacoviello (2005), suggests the existence of a real estate credit channel; through 
it, the asset “real estate” affects domestic demand for consumption.16 Second, trade 
balance deteriorates when real estate prices and consumption increase, while the amount 
of imports increases.
In what follows, I rationalize this evidence through a microfounded open economy 
DSGE model having a real estate credit channel. This channel, in fact, is able to 
create, following an increase in house prices, a collateral effect on consumption and 
hence a positive comovement between the two variables, in line with the found empirical 
evidence.
2.3. T he Basic Setup
In this section I illustrate the basic model. It is a one-country open economy model, 
with exogenous rest of the world. In the next section, I illustrate the complete two- 
country model.
The country, denominated Home, can be interpreted as a stylized representation of 
the U.S. economy. The rest of the world is denominated Foreign. In the Home country 
there is a continuum of economic agents. Some agents axe financially unconstrained 
(they lie on the interval (0, 1]) and the others are constrained (they lie on (1,2]).
Constrained agents axe subject to a borrowing constraint: they can borrow a certain 
fraction of the expected value of the collateral, which is the real estate. Thanks to this 
assumption, I formalize in a simple way the real estate credit channel. Both types 
of households belonging to the Home country consume, work, demand money and 
real estate services. I assume real estate is fixed in aggregate and not tradable at 
international level. Agents supply labor to a wholesale sector which, according to a 
Cobb-Douglas technology, produces a homogenous good. The good is differentiated by 
the retailer sector, and sold domestically and in the rest of the world. Firms in the 
retail sector, owned by the unconstrained agents, are the source of nominal rigidities 
in the model. In the country there is a central bank that adjusts money supply and 
transfers to support an interest rate rule.
In what follows, starred variables axe referred to variables belonging to rest of the 
world.
16See also Aoki et al. (2004) and Iacoviello (2002) for other VAR models on the real estate credit 
channel.
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2.3.1. Bundle and price indexes
The consumption index C  of agents belonging to the Home country is given by the 
following constant-elasticity-of substitution (CES) aggregator:
(2.1) Ct = A C h^  +  (1 -  a „ ) i  CF,t ' p  >  0
where C h  ( C f ) is the consumption of Home (Foreign) produced good, a# (0.5 < an < 
1) measures the home bias in consumption, p is the intratemporal elasticity of substitu­
tion between Home and imported goods. In the rest of the world, the CES aggregator 
is (I assume mirror symmetric home bias):
(2.2) c; = 1(1 - a*) J crH/?  +  4 c ;/
The consumption bundles C h  and C f  are defined as:
0 0
(2.3) CHf = ( J  Ct ( h ) ^  d h \ 1=1, CF,t =  U  Ct ( f ) ^  d f ) ^ 1 , e > l
where C (h) and C (/) are respectively the consumption of the generic Home and im­
ported brand. C* (h) and C* ( /)  are similarly defined. For each type of good, I assume 
that one brand is an imperfect substitute for all the other brands produced within a 
country, with a constant elasticity of substitution equal to 6.
The utility-based consumer price index in the Home country is:17
(2.4) P, =  [aHP lH- f  +  (1 -  aH) P ^ }  ^
where P h  is the price of the domestically produced composite good and P p  is that of 
the imported one. Prices are in units of the Home currency.
A similar price index of tradable goods holds in the rest of the world:
(2.5) P: =  [(1 -  aH) P ^-o  + a „ P £ r}  ^
where prices are in units of the Foreign currency. Given that I assume that firms set 
their prices in the buyer’s currency (local currency pricing policy), prices of the same 
goods should not be necessarily the same when measured in the same currency (see 
below for the description of the pricing policy of the firms). Hence: P J  ^  P h /S  and 
P f  7^  SPp, where S  is the nominal exchange rate of the Home economy, defined as 
number of Home currency units per unit of Foreign currency.
17The consumer price index P  is defined as the minimum expenditure necessary to buy one unit of C , 
given the prices of the Home and Foreign good.
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The utility-based price index of the good produced in the Home country is:
(2.6) = d h ) ^
The indexes Pp, P# and Pp are analogously defined.
Given the structure of preferences of the Home agents, the demands of the Home 
and Foreign bundles are respectively:
(2.7) CH<t = a„ ( ^ i )  PCt
(2.8) CFjt =  (1 -  aH) PCt
They are functions of the relative prices and the total consumption.
In the rest of the world, the demands of the Home and Foreign bundles Eire respec­
tively equal to:
(2-9) CTHJt = { l - a H) ” Cl
(2-10) Ch  = a u { j ±  \ ' c I
In the Home country, the demands of the brands h and /  are respectively:
(2 .11) Ct (h) =  ( M )  * CH*  Ct ( / )  =  6
They are function of the relative price and the total consumption of the Home and im­
ported goods. Demands for brands h and /  in the rest of the world are similarly defined. 
I assume that investment goods and public expenditure have the same composition as 
that of consumption. Here I define the following relative prices:
(2.12) Tt = t ;  =
Ptf,* H,t
They represent the relative prices of the Foreign good in terms of the Home good, 
expressed in local currency, respectively in the Home country and in the rest of the 
world. Finally, I define the real exchange rate of the Home country:
(2.13) RSt =
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2.3.2. H ouseholds
The Home country is populated by unconstrained and constrained households, each 
infinitely lived. Unconstrained agents have access to international financial markets. In 
what follows, unconstrained agents are indexed by j ,  constrained agents by f .
U nconstrained A gents
Each unconstrained household maximizes a lifetime utility function Uq given by:
(2.14)
f=0
In Ct (?) +  jt In ht (j ) +  x  In M' -  - L rt (j )
It. T
X,«,T > 0
where Eq is the expectation operator at time 0, j3 € (0,1) is the discount factor, C  is 
consumption of tradable goods, h denotes the holdings of housing, L are hours of work 
and M / P  are money balances Mt divided by the price level. The subscript t under 
j h allows for random disturbances to the weight of housing in the utility function; 
it constitutes a parsimonious way to formalize an exogenous disturbance on housing 
prices. The budget constraint of the agent j  is defined as follows:
(2.15)  Bt{]) r ■ -  Bi-i 0 )  +  (j) + M t (j) -  M t-t (j)
(1 +  k )  * ( f f )  1 +  *ft«
= [  n t(h,j)dh + RKK(j)  + WtLt (j) -  PtC, (J) -  Qt {h (j) ~ h -1 (j ))
Jo
-  TAXt (j) -  PJ(j)
B  and B h are respectively household’s holding of an internationally traded and of a 
domestically traded risk-free one-period nominal bond, both denominated in units of the 
Home currency.18 This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence, which suggests 
that a large fraction of U.S. foreign debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. The nominal 
interest rate on B  is i, while the nominal interest on Bh is z#- I introduce a financial 
friction, & (J|), that multiplies the nominal interest rate (1+i) on internationally traded 
bonds. The function $  (.) captures the costs of undertaking the financial position. It 
depends on the real holdings of internationally traded bonds by the entire class of 
unconstrained agents. Hence unconstrained agents take the function $  (.) as given 
when deciding the optimal holding of the bond. As borrowers, they will charged a 
premium on the interest rate; as lenders, they will receive a remuneration lower than 
the interest rate. Unconstrained agents are the only agents in the model subject to 
this cost; neither Home constrained agents nor Foreign agents are subject to it.19 The 
nominal dividends from the ownership of the domestic retailers (which axe illustrated
18The international financial structure of the model is similar to that of Benigno (2001).
19I introduce the friction to make the model stationary and well define the steady state.
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in the next section) axe f* II(htj)dh. W  is the nominal wage. K  is the capital stock. 
I assume capital is equal to its steady state level (see the Appendix A). I introduce it 
only to correctly calibrate the model. I also assume that in each period firms demand 
of capital is constant. Hence also Rk, the rental rate of capital, is constant and equal 
to its steady state level.20 In the complete model, illustrated later, I allow the physical 
capital to change over time. Here, I prefer to have the model as simple as possible, 
so to focus on the relationship between real estate, consumption and trade balance. 
The real estate h is a durable good and Q is its nominal price. I  is the investment 
in physical capital, which I assume to be constant at its steady state level. T A X  are 
non-distortionary (lump-sum) net taxes to unconstrained households. I assume that:
(a) preferences and initial wealth conditions are the same for all agents; (b) retailer 
profits are equally shared across agents. As a consequence, all unconstrained agents 
take the same optimal consumption and labor paths; I can drop the index j  and consider 
a representative unconstrained agent. The first order conditions for the choice of the 
internationally traded bond, domestically traded bond, real estate demand, labor supply 
are respectively:
(2-16)    r - y  =  Ek (V 1
PtCt (l + i t ) $ ( % )  \  Pt+lC'+i
(2-17) (1 +  it) $  ( j )  =  (1 +  i„,t)
Qt+i
Pt+iCt+i
wt
(2 ' 19) S  =
First order conditions are rather standard. Equation (2.17) is the no-arbitrage con­
dition, which derives from the fact that at the margin the agent equates the bonds 
revenues. Since I assume that in each country the local monetary authority follows an 
interest rate rule (as illustrated later in the text), money supply will always respond 
to meet money demand at the desired equilibrium nominal interest rate; as utility is 
separable in money balances and the assumption of equality between money injections
I require that $(0) =  1 and that <£(.) =  1 only if Bt =  0. 4>(.) is a, differentiable, (at least) 
decreasing function in the neighborhood of zero. Revenues from the financial friction (which are 
always positive given the shape of the function (.)) are assumed to be distributed to Foreign agents:
F F  = BPU+ij -  i Benigno (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) use a similar feature
to make the model stationary.
20Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) also make the same assumption.
and net taxes for each group of agents holds (see later), the actual quantity of money 
has no implications for the rest of the model; therefore the money first order condition 
can be ignored.
C onstrained Agents
Constrained households (denoted with a j ')  have the same preferences as the uncon­
strained ones. The only difference is that their discount factor, 7 , is lower than that of
the unconstrained agents, (3. This assumption guarantees that the constrained agents
face a binding borrowing constraint in equilibrium (see the Appendix A). The budget 
constraint of the constrained agents is defined as:
(2.20) ^ 4 ^  -  Bu,t-\ ( / )  +  Mt (/) -  Mt-i O')1 + lH,t  
=  W't Lt O') -  PtCt O') -  Qt (hi O') -  ht- 1 0 ' ) )  -  TA X, O')
Constrained agents do not have access to international financial markets. This assump­
tion allows to uniquely determine in a simple way the asset position of the constrained 
agents.
Main aspect of the allocation problem is the presence of the borrowing constraint. 
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), it is assumed the existence of a limit on the 
debt of the agent j'. In each period £, the amount she can borrow from other domestic 
agents, comprehensive of interest payment, cannot exceed a fraction m  < 1 of next 
period’s expected value of real estate holdings. Hence, the constrained household debt 
is limited by:
(2.21) - B „ it ( / )  < m Et (Qt+iht ( / ) )
One way to rationalize this constraint is by thinking to the existence of liquidation costs: 
in case of default, costs amount to a fraction 1 — m  of the real estate value. As in the 
case of unconstrained agents, I assume that preferences and initial wealth conditions 
are the same across constrained agents. Given that they face the same prices, they 
choose the same optimal path for borrowing, consumption and labor supply. I hence 
drop the index f  and consider a constrained representative agent.
The first order conditions with respect to B'H U h!t and L't are:
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(2*24) p ^ t =  K L 'r
Both the Euler and the housing demand equations differ from the usual formulations 
because of the presence of X[, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint, 
which distortes both intratemporal and intertemporal allocation between houses and 
non durable consumption.
As in the case of the unconstrained agents, the assumptions of (1) monetary au­
thority following an interest rate rule, (2) equality between money injections and taxes 
for each group of agents, (3) separable utility in money balances imply that the actual 
quantity of money is residual with respect to the rest of the model; the money first 
order condition of constrained agents can therefore be ignored.
I assume that the following uncovered interest parity (expressed in log-linear terms) 
holds for Foreign agents:
(2.25) (1T i t )  -  ( l + 7 t ) = Et ( A S ^ )
where Et ( / \S t+i \  is the expected variation of the nominal exchange rate (see the 
Appendix A for more details)
I take the rest of the world as exogenous. The above condition can be rationalized by 
assuming that Foreign agents can allocate their wealth among domestic money and two 
bonds. Both bonds are risk-free with one-period maturity. One, Bp, is denominated 
in Foreign currency, pays a nominal interest rate equal to i*t and is not internationally 
traded; the other is the bond exchanged with Home unconstrained agents. Optimal 
behavior requires that at the margin revenues from the two bonds must be equal.
2.3.3. The Production Sector
The supply side of the Home economy is constituted by a wholesale and a retailer 
sector. The former produces a homogeneous good and sells it to the latter. The retailer 
sector differentiates the good and sells it both domestically and abroad. In this section, 
I illustrate the problem solved in each sector.
2.3.4. The wholesale sector
The wholesale sector produces a homogenous good under a perfect competition regime. 
It assembles labor supplied by the two agents to operate a constant return to scale 
production function:
(2.26) Yt = K aLt( 0 < a  < 1 0 < /i < 1
Capital is assumed to be constant at the steady state level (I relax this assumption in 
the complete model). Labor demand results from a static problem of cost minimization.
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First order conditions for Lt and L't are:
(2.27) Wt = ( l - a ) f i P w,tYt/ L t
(2.28) W't = { l - a ) { l - ^ ) P w,tYtIL't
where Pw is the price of the wholesale good.
2.3.5. Retailers
There is a continuum of retailers having mass one which buy the domestic homogeneous 
good at the given price Pw from the domestic wholesale sector, differentiate at no cost 
and then sell it both domestically and internationally. Each retailer is the only producer 
of a single differentiated good. The retail sector is subject to a monopolistic competition 
regime. In this way I introduce price stickiness as in Calvo (1983): when a Home retailer 
h has the opportunity to set a new price in the Home or in the Foreign market in period 
t, it does so to maximize the expected valued of its profits taking into account that there 
is a nonzero probability of not adjusting prices in each future period.
I assume there is international good market segmentation: retailers engage in third 
degree price discrimination across countries and set prices in each country in terms 
of local currency, taking the demand curve as given (hence the international law of 
one price does not hold). Home retailers choose Home and Foreign currency prices, 
respectively p° (h) and p°* (/i), to maximize the expected discounted value of profits. 
Hence, they solve the following problem:21
oo /  p°t (h)Yt+k (h)+StPr  (h)Yt*+k (h)
(2 -29) p?™Z{h)Yl^kAt’t+kEt ( Piy,.+>(r5t(V yr+*w )
f c = 0  \  P t+ k
where Yt+k {h) and Y*+k (h) are respectively the Home and Foreign demand for Home 
produced good:
(2.30) Yt+k(h) = ( ^ - )  *
\  H,t+k J aH t+k )  p (CW* +  C’t+k +  /)
and
(2.3i) r(; t (h) =  ( f {h)
Htt+k
At^ +fc =  P(Ct/Ct+k) is the unconstrained household discount factor (retailers are agents 
for the unconstrained household, to whom transfer profits in a lump-sum fashion). The 
parameter $ is the probability of not adjusting the price of the brand h in the Home
21Benigno (2004) solves a similar problem.
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and in the Foreign market. Since retailers simply repackage wholesale goods, P ™is the 
marginal cost of producing a unit of output. The optimal choices of p° (h) and p°* (h) 
satisfy the following first order conditions, respectively:
(2.32) AM+*(e ~ 1)P° p  '1 ~  dPw't+hYt+k (ft)) = 0
V Pt+k /
(2.33) £  & E, U tMk {6 ~  1} StVT {H) ~  8Pm+kY;+k (ft)) =  0
k=0 '  t+k '
Since there are no firm-specific state variables, all retailers setting price at t will choose 
the same optimal prices p° (h) and p°* (h). It can be shown that the price indexes of 
the Home good evolve in the Home and in rest of the world respectively according to:
(2.34) PHt =  +  (1 -  tf) (p°t (ft))1*9)  m ~$)
(2.35) +  (1 -  «) (pT  (ft))1' 9) 1/(1_S)
Equations (2.32) and (2.34), once log-linearized around the steady state, yield a Phillips 
curve of the Home good holding in the Home country; it positively relates Home good 
inflation rate in the Home country, Phj /P hj- i, to its expected value Et (Phj+i /PH,t) 
and to the marginal cost Pw,t- Equations (2.33) and (2.35) yield a similar curve holding 
in the rest of the world. I assume similar equations hold for the Foreign retailers that 
export to the Home country:
(2.38) J 2  <>kEt (A l tJ 6 ~  1)P?p ^  ~  9P^ t+kYt+k ( / ) )  =  0
(2.37) pF,t = (*  P>;!1 +  (i -  0) (rf (Z))1- 9)
Profits are rebated lump-sum to the agents in the rest of the world. Thanks to 
the assumption of local currency pricing, I introduce a low degree of nominal exchange 
rate pass-through into import prices and reduce the size of substitution effect (between 
domestic and imported goods) induced by changes in the nominal exchange rate. This 
assumption has two advantages: first, it is consistent with empirical evidence on the 
U.S. nominal exchange rate pass-through into import prices, which is extremely low in 
the short run; second, it allows to better emphasize the real estate credit channel and
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the wealth effect of changes in the housing prices on the trade balance and imports. 
However, in the two-country model I also consider the case of complete pass-through.22
In agreement with the preferences of Home and Foreign agents, the aggregate final 
goods are defined as the CES composite of individual retail goods:
1 o - x  \
(2.38) Yfftt=  ( fo Yt (h)— dh
(2.39) Y l t =  U  Y; ( h ) -  dhj
Similar aggregators hold for goods produced in the rest of the world.23
2.3.6. M onetary Policy Rule
In the Home country, the central bank makes lump sum transfers of money to the 
unconstrained and constrained agents to implement a Taylor-type interest rate rule. 
The rule has the form:
+ + (P t -1 , ( Y t- l \ {1~PR)Py
P 40’ ( .T + fc j  ‘  ( -T m T J  U ^ ' )  ( — )
with 0 < pR < 1, pn, pY > 0. Monetary policy responds systematically to the deviations 
of past inflation Pt-\/P t - 2  and total output from their correspondent steady state levels, 
1 + ih, ft and Y. The lagged value of the nominal interest rate is introduced to allow 
for interest rate inertia. e ^ t is a shock to monetary policy.
2.3.7. Market Clearing C onditions, Public Sector B udget Constraints and 
the trade balance
The model is closed by the market clearing conditions and the public sector budget 
constraints. Equation (2.41) is the housing market clearing condition:
(2.41) ht + h't = H
where i f  is in a fixed amount. Equations (2.42) and (2.43) are the Home good market 
clearing conditions respectively in the Home country and in the rest of the world:
22The assumptions of international price discrimination, local currency pricing, incomplete pass­
through, their implications for the monetary policy and the empirical evidence are widely discussed in 
Campa and Goldberg (2002), Devereux and Engel (2001, 2002), Engel (2002).
23CES makes aggregation difficult. However, it is possible to show that within a small neighborhood of 
the steady-state a linear aggregator Y ^ t =  f*  Yt (h) dh (Y^'t =  Yt (h) dhj  is equal to Yh,t ( Y ^ t), 
with the sum of Yn,t and y h , t equal to the aggregate wholesale output Yt . In what follows I’ll consider 
Yt as home aggregate output.
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(2.42) Yff.t =  Cn,t +  C'Ht +  I h
(2.43)
Equation (2.44) is the Home demand for the good produced in the rest of the world:
(2.44)
Equation (2.45) is the Home country resource constraint:
(2.45)
Equation (2.46) is the market clearing of the bond traded in the Home country:
In the Home country, government rebates seigniorage revenues in a lump-sum fashion 
to domestic agents. Hence the public sector budget constraint implies:
The trade balance of the Home country is obtained by consolidating the budget con­
straints of the Home agents, equations (2.15) and (2.20), and of the public sector; it is 
equal to:
Hence the trade balance is expressed as the change in the international asset position of 
the Home unconstrained agent, comprehensive of interest payments. It corresponds to 
the difference between total production and the total expenditure in the Home country.
2.3.8. T he Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined as a sequence of allocations and prices such that, given the 
initial conditions of the state variables and the stochastic processes of the exogenous 
shocks, (a) households, firms in the wholesale sectors and retailers solve their respective 
maximization problems, (b) the market clearing conditions, the government budget 
constraint and the monetary policy rules hold. For simplicity, and consistently with 
the focus of the paper (which is on the trade balance effects of the U.S. real estate credit 
channel) I assume that in the rest of the world the aggregate consumption, interest rate, 
marginal costs of production, inflation rate of the Foreign good do not change after a
(2.46) B h ,i +  B'Ht — 0
(2.47) Mt -  M(_x =  -TAX)
(2.48) M[ -  M U  =  -TAX,'
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shock in the U.S. economy. The equilibrium dynamics is characterized by solving a first- 
order log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic 
steady state. They are shown in the Appendix A. I relax the assumption of exogenous 
rest of the world in the two-country model.
2.3.9. Solution of th e  m odel
I calibrate the model as similarly as possible to Iacoviello (2005), who studies the real 
estate credit channel of monetary policy in the U.S. economy using a closed economy 
DSGE model. The time period is one quarter. Values are reported in Table 1. For 
the standard parameters, values which are within the range considered in the monetary 
business cycle literature are chosen. The discount factor of the unconstrained agents, 
/3, is set equal to 0.99; the value of the parameter p - determining the unconstrained 
agent’ wage share - is set equal to 0.67; the share of capital is 0.33. The depreciation 
rate of capital, 6, is 0.025. Following Lawrance (1991), which estimates discount factors 
for poor households (which are more likely to be debtors) in the range of 0.97 - 0.98, the 
discount factor of constrained agents, 7 , is set equal to 0.98. The parameter measuring 
the weight of housing in the utility function, j h, is set to 0.1. The parameter governing 
disutility of labor effort is set to 1,01. This value rationalizes the weak observed response 
of real wages to macroeconomic disturbances. For the Taylor rules the parameters are 
set as follows: pR is set equal to 0.79, p^ is set equal to 1.29, py is set equal to 0.16. The 
parameter m, which measures the loan-to-value ratio of the constrained agents, is equal 
to 0.4. The parameter #, which measures the retailers’ probability of not adjusting 
prices, is set equal to 0.75. The parameter a#, which measures the degree of home bias, 
is set equal to 0.95. The parameter p, which measures the elasticity of substitution 
between Home and Foreign goods, is equal to 1.5. The parameter 0, which measures 
the elasticity of substitution between the various types of brands, is set equal to 21, so 
that the steady state markup is equal to 1.05. The autocorrelation parameter, Pj, of 
the stochastic process of the preference shock, is set equal to 0.85, while its standard 
deviation 07 is set equal to 28.5. The Home monetary shock has a standard deviation aR 
equal to 0.29, in line with the standard error of the interest rate equation in the VARs. 
The steady state net foreign asset position of the unconstrained agents is assumed to be 
zero. Unconstrained agents hold a positive asset position against constrained agents. 
Finally, the parameter 6b in the financial friction, that guarantees the stationarity of 
the net foreign asset position, is set equal to 0.00001.
63
2.3.10. R esults
To explain how the real estate credit channel affects the trade balance dynamics, I 
report the main predictions of the DSGE model and compare them with those of the 
VAR.
M onetary  Policy Shock. In Figure 5 I consider a one standard deviation neg­
ative shock to the nominal interest rate (expansionary monetary shock). The trade 
balance moves towards a deficit position. The mechanism is the following one. The 
lower nominal and real interest rates induce constrained agents to substitute future con­
sumption with current one. Their demand for real estate increases, inducing an increase 
in the correspondent price. Given that the real estate is used as collateral for finan­
cial transactions, its higher price stimulates borrowing by the constrained agent. The 
extra-borrowing, the ‘symptom’ of the collateral effect, further stimulates consumption.
Unconstrained households, instead, reduce to a limited extent present consumption: 
the higher inflation rate and the lower interest rate reduce the real value of domestic 
outstanding credit and the revenue from the credit service; these effects more than com­
pensate the positive substitution effect of lower interest rate on current consumption.
The total consumption, however, increases; the higher consumption is partly sat­
isfied by the domestic output, which increases, and partly by the higher amount of 
imported goods.
H ousing P rice  shock. In Figure 6 I consider a one standard deviation shock to 
the weight of housing j h in the utility function of the unconstrained households. This 
shock can be interpreted as a temporary tax advantage to housing, which shifts the 
demand. Also in this case, there is a deterioration of the trade balance.
The increase in house pricing induces a positive collateral effect on constrained 
agents, who increase their borrowing, consumption of the nondurable goods and con­
sumption of the real estate.
Given the rise in the inflation rate and output, the monetary authority increases 
the nominal interest rate.
Unconstrained agents reduce consumption of both housing and nondurable good: 
the increase in the interest rate discourage current consumption by increasing its price 
in terms of future consumption.
However, the aggregate consumption increases and induces a higher domestic output 
and higher imports.
Com parison w ith  the  VAR. I compare the DSGE impulse responses with those 
of the estimated VARs (the one including the trade balance, the other including the 
export and imports separately). To make this comparison is not strictly correct, given
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that the identification schemes of the DSGE and the VAR axe different. I perform this 
exercise to assess the empirical properties of the model.
Figures 7 and 8 report the responses estimated to a one standard deviation decrease 
in the nominal interest rate.
As it can be seen, the sign of the trade balance and imports responses in the model 
is the same as that in the data. The same is true for the remaining variables. However, 
the initial increase in trade deficit and in the imports is higher in the model than in 
the VAR.
The Figures suggest that the model is able to reproduce qualitatively and to some 
extent quantitatively the empirical evidence. The model reproduces the observed pos­
itive conditional correlation between private consumption, real estate price and trade 
balance deficit. It also reproduces the positive conditional correlation between real es­
tate, consumption and amount of imports. The model overstates the impact response 
of imports. Adding an adjustment cost on the amount of imports, or habit in con­
sumption, would improve the capability of fitting the empirical responses. However, 
the main message of the Figure, which is to illustrate the effects of the U.S. real estate 
credit channel on the trade balance and imports, is not affected by the lack of these 
features.
Figures 9 and 10 report the responses to an increase in the housing preference 
shock. Also in this case, qualitatively and to some extent quantitatively the model is 
able to reproduce the main features of the data. In particular, the model reproduces the 
observed correlation between housing prices, consumption, imports and trade balance 
deficit.
2.4. T he tw o-country m odel
I extend the basic framework illustrated in the previous section by elaborating a two- 
country model. In this way I can take into account general equilibrium considerations 
resulting from the United States’ large size in the global economy. I focus on the effects 
of the shocks on the trade balance under alternative monetary regimes and alternative 
degrees of exchange rate pass-through into import prices. I also perform a robustness 
analysis of the main results.
2.4.1. T he se tup
In the model there are two countries symmetric and of equal size. U.S. is the Home 
country. Equations characterizing the Home country are similar to those of the basic 
model, with one exception: I allow the physical capital to vary, instead of setting it 
at the steady state level. In what follows, I’ll report only equations that change with 
respect to the basic setup.
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2.4.1.1. Hom e unconstrained  agents. The budget constraint of the Home uncon­
strained agent j  becomes:
(2.50) -  Bt. x U) + -  B H,t.r  (j) + Mt (j ) -  Mt_! (j)(1+^j 1 +  lH tt
= [  nt(h, j)dh + RfKt-tU) + WtLt (j ) -  PtC( (j) -  Qt (St {j) -  St-1 (j))
Jo
-  T A X t (j) -  PtI( j)  -  Ys { i t l  ~  s)  P*K “ W
where the term ^  { j^z7 ~  PtKt- 1 represents quadratic adjustment costs of capi- 
tal ('ip > 0, 0 < 5 < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital). Physical capital is accumulated 
according to the following law:
(2.51) K t(j) = (I -  6) K ^ i j )  + It(j)
Hence the agent maximizes the utility function also with respect to It and to K t. In 
a symmetric equilibrium where all unconstrained agents are equal, the following two 
first-order conditions hold, respectively:
(2.52)
'lb
4 Ct K t-i
- 5 +
Ct
(2.53) =
- p E t 1
Ctt+i
t
2
J±1 
Kt
h+\ [t+1
K t \ K t
- S
Equations (2.52) and (2.53) are standard in models of investment with adjustment 
costs. Equation (2.52) defines the shadow value of one unit of investment today, which 
equals the marginal cost of investment. Equation (2.53) states that this value must be 
equated across time periods. At the optimum, the shadow price of capital must equal 
the sum of the expected values of the following three components: the rental rate of 
capital, the shadow value of capital and the capital contribution to lower installation 
costs.
2.4.1.2. Firm s. The supply side is similar to that illustrated in the basic setup. The 
only difference is that firms belonging to the wholesale sector now maximize profits 
out of the steady state choosing not only the optimal quantity of labor but also that of 
physical capital K t- 1. Hence, the following (standard) first order condition with respect 
to physical capital K t~i should be added to those reported in section illustrating the 
basic setup:
(2.54) R ?  =  aPw,tYt/Kt- i
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As in the basic model, the wholesale sector produces a homogenous good which is 
differentiated and distributed by the retailers both domestically and in the Foreign 
country. The assumption of local currency pricing continues to hold: Home retailers 
choose a price P t ( h )  for the Home market and a price for the Foreign market. The 
prices are denominated in the currency of the destination market. The supply-side of 
the Foreign economy is similar to that of the Home country. Foreign retailers buy a 
homogenous good produced by the local wholesale sector, differentiate and sell it both 
domestically and in the Home country. They set a price p*t ( /)  for the Foreign market 
and a price Pt(f) for the Home market.
2.4.1.3. Foreign unconstrained  agents. The Foreign country is symmetric to the 
Home country. The consumption and investment bundles C* and I* are mirror-symmetric 
(because of the home bias) to those in the Home country. Other bundles C#, Cp, /#  
and Ip are symmetric to their Home counterparts. There are unconstrained and con­
strained agents. Foreign unconstrained agents trade the riskless bond denominated in 
the Home currency with the Home unconstrained agents. They also trade, but only do­
mestically, a riskless bond Bpyt denominated in Foreign currency and paying an interest 
rate equal to i*t . The budget constraint of the Foreign unconstrained agent j *  is:
(2.55)
B t  ( f )  ( f )  +  B ^ ( £ )  _  +  ^
S t  (1 + i t )  S t  1 + i \
=  f 1 n t ( f j * ) d f  +  R f K t - t t i ' )  +  w ;L t ( f )  +  f f * -  p ; c t ( f )  -  Q't (ht ( f )  -  ( / ) )
Jo
-  T A X t ( f )  -  -  S \ P t K - m
The internationally traded bond is divided by the nominal exchange rate (St is the 
number of Home currency units per unit of Foreign currency) to convert it in Foreign 
currency terms. The terms f*  II(f ,j*)df  represents profits from holding local firms. 
The term h represents local real estate, which is not internationally traded. F F * 
are revenues from the financial friction <f> (.) paid by the Home unconstrained agents. 
First order conditions are similar to those of the Home unconstrained agents. There 
is only one difference: given that the Foreign unconstrained agent trades two bonds 
denominated in different currencies, she will maximize her utility with respect to Bp 
and B. The following first order conditions hold, respectively:
C t+ iU T 1 P’ 
C t U - y 1 pi+1
1 — (1 +  it) PEt 
— (Id- i t )  0 E t C t+ iU T 1 P,
C tU T 1 pi+i St+1
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Combining the log-lineaxized version of these equations we get the uncovered interest 
rate parity equation (2.25). Other first order conditions are similar to those of the 
Home unconstrained agents.
2.4.1.4. Foreign constrained agents. The Foreign constrained agent j *' is subject 
to a borrowing constraint in which local real estate is the collateral:
(2.56) - B Ff ( f )  < m -Et (Qt+1h*t ( f '))
with 0 < m  < 1. Foreign constrained agents are symmetric to their Home counterparts. 
They do not have access to international financial markets and trade only the bond Bp. 
First order conditions are similar to those of Home agents.
As in the basic model, I assume that within each class of agents (Home uncon­
strained, Home constrained, Foreign unconstrained, Foreign constrained), initial wealth 
conditions are the same. This assumption and that of symmetric preferences imply that 
there is a representative agent for each class. I can hence drop the indexes j ,  j *, j \  j*'.
2.4.1.5. T he Foreign m onetary  au thority . The Foreign monetary authority sets 
the interest rate according to the following rule:
(2.57)
! +  *?\ _  / ' l  +  i/f .t - iY 5' (Yt' _ A ( ^  /  st ,AaV(}~',*)Pls
1 +  i* J \  1+T* J \ P t*_ 2 7 J \ Y * J  \ S t - i
where 0 < Pr < 1, p*, py, p \s  > 0 -1  allow monetary policy to react not only to 
deviations of past inflation Pt-i/P t - 2  and past output from their correspondent steady 
state levels, but also to the deviations of the nominal exchange rate variation from its 
steady state value AS: when the U.S. dollar appreciates (St/S t- i  decreases) the interest 
rate ij increases. I’ll consider alternative exchange rate regimes by opportunely varying 
the parameter pAS. When p*AS is set equal to zero, the monetary authority reacts only
to domestic inflation and output. To introduce a fixed exchange rate regime, pAS is set
to an extremely high value: the monetary authority changes the nominal interest rate 
to exclusively stabilize the nominal exchange rate.
2.4.1.6. T he m arket clearing conditions. The model is closed by the market clear­
ing conditions and the public sector budget constraints. The Home country house 
market clearing condition is:
(2.58) ht + h't = H
where H  is in a fixed amount. A similar equation holds in the Foreign country.
The market clearing condition of the good produced in the Home country is:
Yt =  Cn,t +  C'Ht +  In,t 
(2-59) +Cf{,t +  ^H,t +  Ifi,t
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The market clearing condition of the Foreign good is:
(2.60)
The market clearing of the bond traded in the Home country is:
(2.61) +  B'H t  — 0
The market clearing of the bond traded in the Foreign country is:
(2.62) B h  +  B'h  =  0
The market clearing of the internationally traded bond is :
(2.63) Bt +  b ; =  0
In the Home country, government rebate seigniorage revenues in a lump-sum fashion 
to domestic agents. Hence the public sector budget constraint implies:
Similar equations hold in the Foreign country.
Home country trade balance is obtained by consolidating the budget constraints of 
the Home agents, equations (2.50) and (2.20), and of the public sector budget constraint. 
The following equation is obtained:
2.4.1.7. Equilibrium . The equilibrium is defined as a sequence of allocations and 
prices such that, given the initial conditions of the state variables and the stochastic 
processes of the exogenous shocks, in each country (a) households, firms in the whole­
sale sectors and retailers solve their respective maximization problems, (b) the market 
clearing conditions, the government budget constraint and the monetary policy rules 
hold. The equilibrium dynamics is characterized by solving a first-order log-linear ap­
proximation to the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. The 
steady state and the log-linearized system are in the Appendix B. Given the assumption 
of symmetric countries, every parameter is set to the same value in each country. The 
values of those parameters that are present also in the basic model do not change (see 
Table 1). The physical capital adjustment cost, not present in the basic model, is set 
equal to 1. The depreciation rate of capital, £, is set equal to 0.025.
(2.64) Mt -  M t-i =  - T A X t
(2.65) Ml -  M ’t_x =  - TAXI
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2.4.2. R esults
I analyze the implications for the U.S. trade balance of the two U.S.-based shocks 
introduced in the basic model: an expansionary monetary shock and a positive shock 
to the preferences for real estate of the unconstrained agents, initially. Then, I analyze 
the change in results when some assumptions are modified. In particular, I consider 
different exchange rate regimes, different values of the loan-to-value ratio and of the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign good. I also consider 
different assumptions about the degree of pass-through of nominal exchange rate into 
import prices.
2.4.2.1. Response Ansdysis. M onetary  Policy Shock. In Figure 11 I consider a 
negative shock to the U.S. nominal interest rate (expansionary monetary shock). The 
responses of the main U.S. variables are not much different from those in the basic 
model (see also Figure 5). The amount of imports increases and the trade balance 
moves towards deficit. In fact, the lower nominal (and real) interest rate makes cur­
rent consumption more convenient than future consumption. The demand for housing 
increases. The related price increase induces a positive collateral effect of constrained 
household through the borrowing constraint. Private consumption is hence further 
stimulated. The Home inflation increases. The nominal and real exchange rates (not 
reported in the Figure) depreciate, given the lower Home interest rate. However, the 
assumption of local currency pricing implies that the pass-through is low: the depreci­
ation of the nominal exchange rate is not fully transmitted to the import prices faced 
by the agents; hence, the increase in the relative price of the Foreign good is relatively 
low and the agents do not strongly substitute the Foreign good with the Home good.24
H ousing P rice  shock. In Figure 12 I consider a shock to the weight of housing 
j h in the utility function of the U.S. unconstrained households. Also in this case the 
trade balance and the net foreign asset position of the Home country deteriorate. The 
increase in house pricing induces a positive collateral effect on the constrained agent. 
As a consequence, borrowing and aggregate consumption increase, inducing a higher 
domestic output and higher imports from the Foreign country.25
2.4.2.2. R obustness Analysis. I analyze the effects of the monetary and house price 
shocks under alternative assumptions. The goal is to investigate the robustness of the 
positive effects of the real estate credit channel on the trade balance deficit and on
24U.S. investment in physical capital (not reported to save on space) increases, given the stimulating 
effect of the lower real interest rate.
25U.S. investment in physical capital (not reported to save space) decreases. The higher interest rate 
has a depressing effect on the physical capital accumulation. The decrease in investment, however, 
only partially compensate the increase in private consumption due to the collateral effect of higher 
real estate prices. Hence, the trade balance moves towards deficit.
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imports. I consider alternative exchange rate regimes, different values of the loan-to- 
value ratio ra, of the elasticity of substitution between tradable, alternative pricing 
policy of the firms.
A lternative  exchange ra te  regimes. I compare the effects of the shocks on 
the trade balance in the benchmark case, in which the exchange rate is flexible, to 
the case of a pegging regime. In the benchmark case the Taylor rule of the Foreign 
monetary authority is similar to that of the Home authority; under the pegging regime, 
the Foreign authority moves its nominal interest rate to peg the U.S. dollar. In the 
latter case, the nominal exchange rate does not change (St/ S t- i  is equal to 1).
Figure 13 reports the responses to a U.S. expansionary monetary shock. Under 
the pegging regime, there is no deterioration of the U.S. trade balance nor change 
in international relative prices, given that both monetary authorities de facto adopt 
the same expansionary policy. Home consumption increases in both cases. Foreign 
consumption (not reported to save space) increases in the fixed exchange rate regime, 
given the reduction of the Foreign interest rate.
In Figure 14 I consider the effects of a U.S. positive house price shock. In this 
rcase there is always a deterioration of the U.S. trade balance. The size of the deficit 
/ is not much different across the regimes. What matters is the relative price of the 
\J  housing, that increases and stimulates consumption in the U.S. economy. The Home 
monetary authority augments the nominal interest rate to contrast the higher inflation, 
caused by the increase in consumption and investment. Under the pegging regime, the 
Foreign monetary authority increases the interest rate to peg the U.S. dollar. Foreign 
consumption and house prices decrease; hence, the U.S. export decrease to a greater 
amount.26
Different values of m. I consider a positive U.S. housing price shock under two 
alternative values of m, the loan-to-value ratio: when m  is equal to its benchmark value,
0.4, and when it assumes a lower value, 0.2. Results are in Figure 15.
In correspondence of the lower value of m, the collateral effect is lower and the 
model predicts a lower deterioration of the trade balance, because the increase of the 
constrained agent’s consumption, and hence imports, is lower.
These responses show that the conditional correlation between housing prices and 
consumption is rather low when the collateral effect, associated to the real estate credit 
channel, is close to zero (m extremely low). Housing prices and the consumption of 
non durable goods would have a one to one relationship (the multiplier effect of higher
26The relative price of U.S. imports is not greatly different across the two regimes, given the assumption 
of imperfect exchange rate pass-through: in the case of the flexible exchange rate regime, nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations are not fully trasmitted to the import prices. From this point of view, there 
is not a great difference between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime.
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housing prices on consumption would be lower) and the depressing effect of the higher 
interest rate would dominate. However, a negative correlation between housing prices 
and consumption of non durable goods is counterfactual, as shown by the VARs.
Different values of th e  elasticity  of substitu tion  p. I consider the effects on 
trade balance of a one standard deviation expansionary monetary policy shock in the 
U.S. under two alternative values of the elasticity of substitution between Home and 
Foreign goods, p: when it is equal to its benchmark value, 1.5, and when it assumes a 
lower value, 1.1.
In correspondence of the lower value of p (see Figure 16), the model predicts a lower 
deterioration of the trade balance. Given the decrease (favoured by the home bias) in 
the price of imports relative to that of the U.S. domestic good (see the definition of T  
in equation (2.12)), U.S. households are less willing to substitute domestic for imported 
goods; hence, while the increase in aggregate consumption is the roughly the same in 
the two cases, the increase of the imports is lower in the case of lower elasticity. The 
amount of U.S. export decreases less in correspondence of lower p for a given increase 
in their Foreign relative price (equal to 1/T*, see equation (2.12)). Results are similar 
in the case of a house price shock (Figure 17).
T he effects of the  nom inal exchange ra te  fluctuations. One strand of the 
debate on the U.S. current account deficit has focused on the possibility that the U.S. 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations could help in reducing the U.S. external imbalance. 
A depreciating U.S. dollar, in fact, would increase the relative price of Foreign goods and 
shift world demand towards U.S. goods (substitution effect). The implicit assumption 
behind this statement is that nominal exchange rate fluctuations are, at least to some 
extent, passed-through to the import and export prices. Until now I have assumed that 
the prices are set in local currency terms, so that the degree of pass-through is relatively 
low.
To understand if the substitution effect of the nominal exchange rate can counteracts 
the (expansionary) collateral effect of the housing prices increase on the trade balance, 
I make the assumption of producer currency pricing: producers set the price of the 
good they produce in their own currency (hence Home producers set pt(h) and Foreign 
producers set pi ( /)  given the respective world demands) so that the international law 
of one price holds (pt(h) =  Spl(h) and Pt(f) =  *S'p*(/)). I consider an expansionary 
monetary shock in the U.S. economy in Figure 18. The depreciation of the U.S. dollar 
(not reported in the Figure) modifies international relative prices. Home goods are 
cheaper than Foreign ones. The substitution effect counteracts the collateral effect and 
contributes to reduce the trade balance deficit on impact, by increasing the relative
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price of Foreign goods (the U.S. terms of trade deteriorate), reducing the imports and 
increasing U.S. exports.27
The determination of the degree of pass-through, and hence of the relative size of the 
substitution effect with respect to the collateral effect, is an empirical matter. Evidence 
for the U.S. suggests that the degree of pass-through is rather low at the border and at 
consumer level. Hence a flexible exchange rate hardly would be able to limit the effects 
of the higher housing prices on the trade balance dynamics.
2.5. Conclusions
Recent contributions emphasize the role of technology and fiscal shocks to explain 
the U.S. trade balance deficit. I add to the existing literature a new dimension, by 
investigating whether changes in real estate prices influence the U.S. trade balance 
dynamics.
The model, calibrated on the U.S. economy, shows that the domestic monetary 
and housing price shocks can also contribute to explain the movement of the U.S. 
trade balance through the real estate credit channel. Because of households’ imperfect 
access to financial markets, real estate price changes generate a collateral effect which 
induces consumption to positively commove with house price; as a consequence, the 
trade balance moves towards deficit. Impulse responses obtained from the model are 
roughly in line with those obtained from an estimated VAR using U.S. data. I also 
show that a depreciation of the U.S. dollar limits the shift of the trade balance towards 
deficit when the pass-through is, counterfactually, complete.
The model can be extended to allow the constrained agents to borrow interna­
tionally, so to better understand the role of international financial flows over the U.S. 
business cycle. Fiscal policy could also be added, to consider the implications of the 
financial frictions for the ‘twin-deficit’ story. These are the next steps in the research 
agenda. More theoretical and empirical work is needed.
27The U.S. terms of trade is defined as Pp j /SPf j  t . In the case of complete pass-through, the law of 
one price holds and the previous definition can be rewritten as S tP p t / P h j -
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Appendix A. The basic model
The steady state equilibrium
I assume a symmetric steady state flexible price equilibrium in which all the shocks 
are zero, there is no change in asset positions (Bt =  Bt~ 1 =  B, Bn,t = Bn,t- 1 =  B h), in 
house holdings (ht = ht-\ =  h),no net accumulation of physical capital (Kt- i  =  Kt — 
K)  all price inflation rates as well as exchange rate depreciation are zero (Pt/P t~i =  1, 
Qt/Qt-i  =  1) St/ S t-1 =  1), the net foreign asset position is zero (hence also the trade 
balance is equal to zero). I assume all tradable goods have the same price (Ph =  P f  = 
P = SP* =  SPp =  Ph /S)  and I normalize them to one. Let’s consider the Home 
country equations.
The pricing equation (2.32) implies:
(2.67) Pw = —q-
Normalizing all the variable by Y  (the total national production), the steady state 
values become function of the deep parameters (technology and preferences) and hence 
are uniquely determined. I derive all the quantities that enter as coefficients in the 
log-linearized equilibrium system (see next part of this Appendix).
Labor demand first order conditions, equations (2.27) and (2.28), become respec­
tively:
W L(2.68) —  = ( l - a ) f i P w
W'U(2.69) _ _  =  ( ! _ « ) ( !  - t j , )Pw
The value of real estate held by the unconstrained agent, obtained from equation (2.18), 
is equal to:
(2 70) ^  =  J Y C
( ' ’ Y  1 - / 3 Y
The consumer Euler equations of the Home unconstrained agent, equation (2.16) and 
(2.17), imply:
(2.71)
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I assume that agents invest to replace the depreciated capital (5 is the depreciation 
rate):
Y  Y
and the steady state capital stock satisfies the traditional first order condition (hence 
I assume that in steady state standard first order conditions for capital hold for agents 
and firms):
K  a(3
Y  ~  1 - 0 ( 1  - S )
Combining the steady state versions of the constrained and unconstrained agent Euler 
equations, (2.16) and (2.23), the following value for A, the Lagrange multiplier of the 
borrowing constraint, can be obtained:
7 ? ~ 7 \(2.72) A' =
C
By assumption, O < 7 < 0 < l ; s o  the Lagrange multiplier is strictly greater than 
zero in the steady state (and in a small neighborhood of it). As a consequence, the 
borrowing constraint is binding.
From the first order equations, (2.22) and (2.23), the real estate held by the con­
strained agent is:
(2 7 3 ) -  J* C
( ’ Y  1 —7  —m(/? —7) K
The borrowing constraint equation (2.21) becomes:
p>r Ah pi
(2-74) =  - m - ---------
Y  1 — 7 — m (p  — 7 ) r
Using the budget constraint of the constrained agent and the above two equations it is 
possible to derive the equation of the constrained agent’s consumption, C' :
(2.75) y  =  (1 -  a) (1 -  n) 1 — 7 — m (/3 — 7) w1 — 7 — m  (0 — 7) +  m j h (1 — 0 )_
I assume that the net foreign asset position is zero. From the trade balance equation 
(2.49), the consumption of the unconstrained agent, C, can be derived:
(2-76) ^  =
78
Using the market clearing condition for the bonds traded in the Home country, equation
(2.46), the asset position of the unconstrained agent can be determined:
(2.77) B h B'hY  Y
The Home demand function for the Home produced good, using equations (2.7) and
(2.42), is:
ro-NH Yh(2.78) ~Y ~ a H \ Y  Y  Y )
Total demand for the Home produced good, equation (2.45), is:
(2.79) 1 =  9  +  T
From it, the share of Home export over the total output is obtained.
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The log-linearized equilibrium
Let hatted variables denote percent changes from the steady state, and those without 
subscript denote steady state values. The trade balance and the net foreign asset 
position of the Home country are not log-linearized, given that they are equal to zero 
in steady state; I hence exploit the following definition: Y(tbt) =  (TBt — TB)  and 
Ybt =  Bt — B, with T B  = B  — 0. I apply a similar definition to the asset position of 
the constrained agents, also if its steady state value is not zero (but negative). Note 
that 7r.jt =  ln(l + 7r.it) =  ]n(Pyt/P.,t-i) and that ASt =  \n(St/S t-i).To  save on notation, 
I drop the expectation operator before variables dated t — 1, which must be intended 
in expected value conditional on the information available at time t. The model can be 
reduced to the following linearized system.
I. R elative Price and Inflation R ates.
(RPl) Tt — Tt-1 + 7TF,t ~ 7TH,t
(RP2)  ^* II ~i
>
i 
*
H-i 1 c**.
(RP3) R S t — R S t 4" A S t + — TTt
(RP4) + (1 — a n )  7TF,t
(RP5) K  = (1 -  aH) TTH,t
II. A ggregate supply
(AS1) Yt =  ( I -  a )  \xLt + (1 -  a ) (1 -  /i) L't
(AS2) Pw,t -\-Y t =  C t +  r L t
(AS3) Pw,t + Lt = <5t + r L't
(AS4) ltH,t =  fiftH t+ l H................. ^ \P w ,t + (1 O-h) T tJ
(AS5) ± ^  , (x - 0M1 -  W  ( - r  \ftF,t — P^ F.t+l + ^  0,f{Tt + R o tJ
(AS6) :S.. , (! -  (! -  00) ( f r ~  . „ ffs So > nH,t =  P*H ,t+1 + '  ^ \P w ,t +  aHTt R b tj
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m .  A ggregate D em and
(ADI) —Ct — —Ct+1 + (1 +  h) ~ fibybt — ftt+i
(AD2) (1 +  ijj.t) =  (1 +  it) ~  $bybt
(AD3) qt =  C t +  (3qt+1 —  P C t + i  +  ( 1  —  P) r K  +  ( 1  —  P)j tq h /Y
(AD4) qt = (1 -  mP)C't +  qt+i (7 +  m (P -  7 )) -  C’t+l7 (1 -  m)
-  -  7 -  m (P -  7)) -  ra/3(l +  it) +  mP^t
(AD5) (1 +  it) =  A S t
(AD6) yw,t =  (1 -  a„)PTt +  p C , +  y C [
(AD7) Y£t =  anpTt'
(ADS) YF,t = -a „ Pf t + y C t + y C 't
(AD9) Yt = - ~ Y Ht + y -Y n .t
IV. Borrowing constrain t and  flows of funds 
(BCl) fibt -  6t_!
=  Y  ( -  (1 -  aH) T, + Y„,t)  + ^  +  R St + % )  -  y C t -  yC \
B'
(BC2) [b'Hit -  (1 +  it)j -  - f  -  A-t_x)
= (1 -  a) (1 -  p)p,y +  y()  -  -  b!t_x -  yC 't
(BC3) -b'Ht =  m y  (qt+i + 7rt +
(BC4) tbt =  fibt -  fc4_!
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V. M onetary Policy rules and shock processes
(MP1) (1 +  i n , t )  = Pr{ 1 + i H , t - i) +  (1 — pR)pir7tt- i  +  (1 — PidpyYt-i +
(PREl) j =  pjj + £,,t
The first block contains the definitions of international relative prices and of infla­
tion rates: equations (RP1) and (RP2) represent the log-linearized versions of relative 
prices (2.12) (note that the price of Foreign good in the Foreign country is assumed 
to be constant); equation (RP3) is the log-linearized Home country real exchange rate 
(2.13); equations (RP4) and (RP5) are the Home and Foreign country inflation rates, 
respectively obtained from equations (2.4) and (2.5).
The second block is formed by the equations describing the supply side of the 
economy: (ASl) is the log-linearized version of the production function (2.26); (AS2) 
is obtained from log-linearizing labor demand (2.27) and supply (2.19); (AS3) is the 
analogous of equation (AS2) for the constrained agent (obtained from equations (2.24) 
and (2.28)); the short run Phillips curves, equations (AS4), (AS5), (AS6) are obtained 
from the solution of the retailers’ problem.
The third block is the demand block, composed by the Home unconstrained agent 
and interest parity, (ADI) and (AD2), respectively obtained by log-linearizing equations 
(2.16) and (2.17); the unconstrained and constrained agent real estate Euler equations, 
(AD3) and (AD4), respectively obtained by log-linearizing (2.18) and (2.23) (using 
the house market clearing condition (2.41)); the modified uncovered interest parity 
(AD5), in which the Foreign interest rate is assumed to be constant; the market clearing 
conditions (AD6), (AD7), (AD8), (AD9), respectively obtained from equations (2.42),
(2.43), (2.44), (2.45) (note that C* is assumed to be constant).
The fourth block is formed by the equations describing the borrowing constraint, 
the flows of funds and the trade balance: equation (BCl) describes the Home country’s 
net foreign asset position and it is obtained by consolidating equations (2.15), (2.20),
(2.41), (2.47), (2.48); equations (BC2) and (BC3) are the constrained agent’s budget 
and borrowing constraints (obtained respectively from equations (2.20) and (2.21)); 
equation (BC4) is the Home country’s trade balance, obtained from the equation (2.49).
The last block is formed by equations describing the monetary policy and the exoge­
nous shocks: equations (MP1) is the log-linearized version of equation (2.40). Equation 
(PREl) is the exogenous law of motion of the housing preference shock.
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Appendix B. The two-country model
The two country are symmetric (the only exception is that there is symmetric home 
bias). The steady state equilibrium is the same as that of the basic model. In what 
follows, I describe the log-linearized equations of the dynamic equilibrium. Starred 
variables are referred to the Foreign country. / , K , f k are respectively the investment 
in physical capital, the stock of physical capital, the rental rate of capital (log-deviation 
from the steady state)
I. R elative prices and inflation rates.
(RP1) Tt — Tt_i +  7Tp,t — ftH,t
(RP2) ?; = tu + rFf - rHJt
(RP3) R St =  R St + ASt +  K  ~
(RP4) 7r, =  aHTTH,t +  (1 -  aH) ttf ,t
(RP5) r t = ( i - a H) r H't + aHr Fit
II. A ggregate supply
(AS1) Yt = a lf i- i  +  (1 -  a) fj.Lt +  ( l - a ) ( l -  fi) L't
(AS2) Yt'  =  a k l ,  + (1 -  a) ptkt + (1 -  a) (1 -  fi) L?
(ASZ)
(AS4)
(AS5)
(AS6)
(AS7)
(AS8)
Pw.t +  Yt — Ct +  rLt 
Pw,t + Yt = C't + r  L't
^  +  y;  =  c ;  +  t l -
P ^ t + Y; = C? + tL?
Pw.t + Yt =  +  k t - i
p ^ t + y t' = + k - 1
(AS9) nH)t =  — —  (pw,t + (1 -  aH) T^j
(oxdv)
(6av)
’/ 4  + i ? 4  + o  +  _  T) =  (xxdv)I  tU u  v
<*#[(?-xK  -  x]+
( l+Io  -  Id )  y  +  ( .V  - I+.’/ )  L =  ( l~ ! x - ! i )
* # [(? -x )x -- i]+
( 1+’q - ,d ) j  + ( ,x - ' +’i )* ' =
*j£gta + (j?+j.)gto — ( ( L  — t f ) w  — L  — \ ) > y  -  
(m -  x) L'+>q - ( ( l - Q l ) u i  +  L)  '+$ +  'iQitfxu -  I) =  ’6 (8QV)
Iv^Xd -  x) +  l+Iod  -  l+IPd+ Id  =  IP (zciv)
>jigut + ’(*H-^)£ta -  ((I -  d) m -  t  -  t)’v -
(w -  t) - ( ( L - d ) i u + l y + m  +  ioW m -  x) =  ’P (9dV)
’?(£/ X) +  ; v f ( L (  d  l) +  l+}D£l l+,Pd +  }D  = }P (SdV)
’g v -  =  (j? + x) -  fe  +  x) (rav)
’9^’? -  (’J  +  X) =  (;‘"?_+X) (SdV)
I+Jjf -  (j? +  x) +  l+l Q -  =  l o - (zciv)
1+»JI -  ’<}—ip -  (»t + T) + l+ ,Q -  =  IQ­
' S  ----------
(XdV)
ptreuiap a^SaaSSy *TTT
t e ^ - x ) - ^ ) ^ - TH , - T)+l+!' ^  = ^ texsv)
(> sv & *  +  ’* $ )  w _ x^ _ T)+ I+,^  = ’^ (XTSV)
(>OT + > x * ° V> _ t) _ x) + 1+1 ^ (oxsv)
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(AD12) y ,h  =  o.„pTT +  ~ c ;  +  y C t*' +
(AD13) Yfj =  —o-HpTt +  y C t +  — C( +  —It
(AD14) C - C' - , /=  -(1  -  an)pTt +  - c ;  +  Y c r  +  -
(AD15) Yh - Y i  Yt =  f Y H,t +  y - Y ^ t
(AD16) Y: =  ^V >,t +
IV. Borrowing constraint and flows of funds 
(BCl)
011t -  fc,_!
=  ^  ( -  (1 -  a„) % + y„,()  +  ^  (-a „ T (* + RSt +  > £ ,) -
(BC2) P^y- ~  ^  +  *‘)] ~  1 ^  t6**-1 ~
= (1 -  p)pw {pwi + Y^j - y -  ( p t~  h’t- 1)  -
(BC3) -b'Ht =  (&+i +  n  +
(BC4) p % -  [fc^ -  (1 +  <«•)] -  ^  (6Sit_j -  * U )
=  (1 -  a ) (1 -  p ) p w  ( p f o  +  Y ? )  -  ^  (&? -  C )  -  f<5r
(BC5) - 6" , =  rn ^ r  (qt+1 + r t + f y )
(BC6) k t = ( \ ~  5) k t^  + Sit
(BC7) k ;  = ( 1 - 5 )  k i ,  +  s i;
(BC8) tbt = 0bt -  f>,_ i
B'n
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V. M onetary policy rules and shock processes
(MP1) (1 +  in,t) — P r ( 1 +  iH,t-i) +  (1 ~ pR)Pir™t-i +  (1 — pR)pYY t-i +  £R,t
(MP2) ( fH * )  =  ^ ( 1 ^ )  +  (1 -  p 'd A K - i  +  (1 -  P s K f c i  -  (! -  PR)p*As£St 
(MP3) j  = P j H h t
The first two equations in the first block contains define the relative price of the Foreign 
good in terms of the Home good respectively in the Home and in the Foreign country. 
The third equation defines the real exchange rate of the Home country. The last two 
equations define the consumer price inflation rate respectively in the Home and in the 
Foreign country.
In the second block (the ‘supply side’) the first two equations are the Home and 
Foreign production functions. The third and the fourth equations are the labor market 
equilibrium conditions of the Home unconstrained and constrained agents. The fifth 
and sixth equations are the correspondent Foreign equations. Equations (AS7) and 
(AS8) are the Home and Foreign demand of capital. The last four equations of the 
block are the Phillips curves of the Home and Foreign good in the Home country and 
their counterparts in the Foreign country.
In the third block (the ‘aggregate demand’) there are the Euler equation of the 
Home unconstrained agent, the Euler equation of the Foreign unconstrained agent, the 
no-arbitrage condition holding for the Home unconstrained agent, the uncovered in­
terest parity holding for the Foreign unconstrained agent, the real estate first order 
conditions of the Home unconstrained agent, Home constrained agent, Foreign uncon­
strained agent and Foreign constrained agent. Note that in the first order conditions 
of the unconstrained agents I have used the relevant log-linearized real estate market 
clearing conditions (%yht +  ^fh!t = 0 for the Home agent, +  ^y-h*t' =  0 for the 
Foreign agent). Equations (AD8) and (AD9) are the Home and Foreign investment 
schedules, respectively. The last six equations are the related to the goods markets: 
the Home good market clearing conditions in the Home and in the Foreign country, 
the correspondent equations for the Foreign good, the resource constraints of the Home 
and Foreign good.
In the fourth block (‘borrowing constraint and flows of fund’) there axe the following 
equations (taken in that order): the Home country net foreign asset position, the budget 
constraint and the borrowing constraint equations of the Home constrained agent, the 
budget constraint and the borrowing constraint equations of the Foreign constrained 
agent, the Home and Foreign accumulation laws of physical capital, the Home country 
trade balance.
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The last block (‘monetary policy rules and shock processes’) contains the Home and 
Foreign monetary policy rules and the shock to the weight of housing in the utility 
function of the Home unconstrained agent.
Table 1. Model Calibration
Parameter Value
P 0.99
7 0.98
P 1.5
T 1.01
m 0.4
sb 0.00001
an 0.95
3h 0.1
e 21
p 0.67
a 0.33
S 0.025
1
0.75
PR 0.79
Pit 1.29
Py 0.16
Pj 0.85
a. 28.5
<?R 0.29
Figure 1. VAR responses to  a U.S. expansionary m onetary  shock.
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Notes: The dashed lines indicate 90-percent confidence bands. Ordinate: time horizon in
quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: one standard
deviation.
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Figure 2. VAR responses to  a  U.S. positive housing price shock.
The U.S. trad e  balance
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Notes: The dashed lines indicate 90-percent confidence bands. Ordinate: time horizon in
quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: one standard
deviation.
90
Figure 3. VAR responses to  a  U.S. expansionary m onetary shock.
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Notes: The dashed lines indicate 90-percent confidence bands. Ordinate: time horizon in
quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: one standard
deviation.
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Figure 4. VAR responses to  a U.S. positive housing prices shock.
T he U.S. im ports
Nominal test Rate
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Notes: The dashed lines indicate 90-percent confidence bands. Ordinate: time horizon in
quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Size of the shock: one standard
deviation.
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Figure 5. DSGE responses to  a U.S. expansionary m onetary shock
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position and trade balance are ‘deviation from steady state-to-steady state output’ ratio.
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Figure 6. DSG E responses to  a  U.S. positive housing prices shock
Nominal Interest Rate Unconstrained Agent Consumption Constrained Agent Real Estate
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Asset
position and trade balance are ‘deviation from steady state-to-steady state output’ ratio.
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Figure 7. DSGE and VAR responses to  a  U.S. expansionary m onetary shock.
T he U.S. trade balance
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from the steady state.
Solid line: DSGE responses. Dashed line: VAR responses and 90-percent confidence bands.
95
Figure 8. DSGE and VAR responses to  a U.S. expansionary m onetary shock.
T he U.S. im ports
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from the steady state.
Solid line: DSGE responses. Dashed line: VAR responses +  90-percent confidence bands.
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Figure 9. DSGE and VAR responses to a U.S. positive housing prices shock.
T he U.S. trade balance
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Asset
position and trade balance are ‘deviation from steady state-to-steady state output’ ratio.
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Figure 10. DSGE and VAR responses to  a U.S. positive housing prices shock.
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Asset
position and trade balance are ‘deviation from steady state-to-steady state output’ ratio.
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Figure 11. DSGE responses of U.S. variables to  a  U.S. expansionary m onetary shock.
The tw o-country model
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Figure 12. DSGE responses of U.S. variables to  aU.S. positive housing price shock.
The tw o-country model
Nominal t e s t  Rate
1.5
as
5 .  J O  J 5  20
C o n ta in e d  Agent Bond^osition ^
nW LpJui 21 5 ,1 0 ,  15 20
15 20 5  10 15 20
02
0
Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. 
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ratio.
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Figure 13. DSGE responses under alternative exchange rate regimes. 
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Figure 14. DSGE responses under alternative exchange rate regimes. 
U.S. positive housing price shock
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Figure 15. DSGE responses of U.S. variables to  a  positive U.S. housing price shock.
Different values of the loan-to-value ratio  m
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Figure 16. Responses of U.S. variables to  an expansionary U.S. m onetary shock.
A lternative elasticities of substitu tion
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line: p  =  1.5. Dashed line: p  =  1.1.
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Figure 17. Responses of U.S. variables to  a positive U.S. house price shock.
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Figure 18. D SGE responses of U.S. variables to  an expansionary U.S. m onetary shock.
Different degrees of exchange ra te  pass-through
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Notes: Ordinate: time horizon in quarters. Coordinate: % deviation from steady state. Solid
line: incomplete pass-through. Dashed line: complete pass-through.
C H A PT E R  3
T he D ynam ics o f th e  R eal E xchange R ate: a B ayesian  D S G E
A p p ro a c h
3.1. In troduction
Three main stylized facts in international economics are related to the real exchange 
rate dynamics. Its fluctuations are extremely volatile, persistent and do not matter for 
the other variables (‘disconnect’ from the real economy).
Several contributions in the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM from now 
on) literature have extended the Obstfeld and Rogoff sticky-price general equilibrium 
model, in which the real exchange rate is constant and the purchasing power parity 
(PPP from now on) holds, to explain the quoted stylized facts.1
The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate these extensions. To that purpose, 
^ estimate three two-country NOEM models using Bayesian techniques and data of euro 
area and U.S. economy.
In one model (let’s call it the ‘complete’ model) I relax the three assumptions at 
the basis of the PPP condition: international law of one price, symmetric preferences, 
tradeability of all goods.
I make two assumptions to remove the international law of one price and introduce 
international price discrimination. One is the local currency pricing (LCP from now 
on) assumption. Contrary to the producer currency pricing (PCP from now on) case, 
exporters face costs of adjusting prices not only in their own currency, but also in the 
currency of the importing country. Hence, import prices are sticky in the currency 
of the destination market. Chari et al. (2002) show that a high degree of sticky 
prices is necessary to reproduce the volatility of the real exchange rate when there 
are monetary shocks.2 The other source is that of distribution services intensive in 
local nontradable goods. Distribution services induce differences in demand elasticity 
across countries. Thus, with monopolistic producers the law of one price does not hold 
in general, even in a flexible price equilibrium. Firms in the tradable sector would 
optimally charge different wholesale prices in the two countries. The advantage of
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
2Kollman (2001) studies a small open economy model in which nominal prices and wages are set two 
or four periods in advance, and in which monetary shocks are the dominant source of exchange rate 
fluctuations. His model generates variability in the real and nominal exchange rate not much different 
from that in the data.
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introducing distribution services is that, when combined with standard preferences, 
they contribute to generate a low price elasticity of tradables. Thanks to the price 
discrimination, fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate are not fully transmitted to 
the price of imports (assumption of incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import 
prices). Hence, large exchange-rate swings do not translate into large consumer prices 
movements.3 I also relax the assumption of symmetric preferences, imposing home bias 
in consumption. Finally I assume that some goods are nontradable.4 Also these features 
can contribute to increase the volatility of the real exchange rate.
I assume that financial markets are incomplete and there is a shock to the uncov­
ered interest parity (UIP from now on). In fact, incomplete exchange rate pass-through 
and nominal rigidities per se are not sufficient to replicate the high volatility of^the 
real exchange rate. When international financial markets are complete, the^sjs^a risk 
sharing cohd&ion linking the real exchange rate to the cross-country ratio of consump­
tion marginal utilities. According to this condition, the volatility of the real exchange 
rate is proportional to that of the fundamentals. The risk sharing condition can be 
removed by assuming that only a riskless bond is internationally traded. Incomplete 
financial market are not able to reproduce the high volatility of the exchange rate. In 
fact, the uncovered interest rate parity links real exchange rate fluctuations to the real 
interest rate differential; the related tilting of the consumption path and current ac­
count adjustment limit the volatility of the real exchange rate. One possible solution 
is to assume that the coefficient of risk aversion is high.5 Another is to introduce a low 
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between domestic tradable and imported goods 
using, as I do, distribution services. Alternatively, it is possible to add an uncovered 
interest parity shock that drives a wedge between the real interest rates. The result is 
the weakening of the link between exchange rate and fundamentals. The introduction of 
the UIP shock is justified by the empirical evidence on the failure of the UIP condition 
as well as by its long-standing use in the theoretical literature.6
3See Corsetti et al. (2004). Campa and Goldberg (2004) provide evidence that the presence of 
distribution services helps to explain a lower exchange rate pass-through at the consumer level than 
at the producer level.
4The role of non tradable goods in the explanation of the observed behaviour of prices and exchange 
rates is still debated. Chari et al. (2002) observe that empirically the real exchange rate dynamics is 
mainly determined by rigidities in tradable goods prices so that the inclusion of a non tradable sector 
in a model is unnecessary. Burnstein et al. (2005) reach opposite conclusions. Given this lack of 
consensus, and the presence of distribution services intensive in local nontradable goods in our model, 
I include them.
5Chari et al. (2002) find that a high coefficient of risk aversion is necessary to reproduce real exchange 
rate volatility. The result is robust to the structure, complete or incomplete, of the financial markets.
6Devereux and Engel (2002), Jeanne and Rose (2002), Duarte and Stockman (2005) show how devia­
tion from the UIP condition, as well as from the complete pass-through assumption, are required to 
reproduce the high real exchange rate volatility in a monetary model.
Finally, I exploit a combination of nominal price and wage rigidities and ‘inertial’ 
monetary policy to reproduce the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate. 
Nominal rigidities increase the correlation between the nominal and the real exchange 
rates and allow the overshooting of the correspondent long-run responses. Inertial 
monetary policy m epj^that the adjustment towards the monetary target is smoothed 
overt time. Benigjno (2004) shows that with staggered prices and inertial monetary 
policy the real exchange rate is persistent because, through the interest rate differential, 
also its adjustment is smoothed over time.7
The other two models are down-sized versions of the complete one. In the first, 
incomplete pass-through is due only to LCP (there are no distribution services, I call 
it the ‘LCP’ model). In the second the pass-through is complete because I assume that 
prices are set in the currency of the producer (I call it the ‘PC P’ model).
Thernmn results of the estimation are the following.
Krst, incomplete pass-through and the UIP shock are the features most supported 
byTh%4s£^ The model with distribution services produces the best fitting.
/ /Second, Ihe real exchange rate variance breakdown into its main economic determi- 
nalrts-akmg with parameters estimates prove that international price discrimination - 
and hence incomplete pass-through - and home bias are the main determinants of real 
exchange rate deviations from PPP, at least for the complete and LCP models, where 
the incomplete pass-through limits the transmission of exchange rate fluctuatjons-to 
other variables. In the case of the PCP model this is obtained through the hdpcie biaff, 
whose estimated value becomes extremely high so as to limit the effects of import prices, 
which fully react to exchange rate movements, on consumer prices.
Third, in the three models the relative prices of nontradable goods (the internal 
real exchange rate) play a limited role in generating real exchange rate fluctuations. 
However nontradable goods cannot be dismissed: in the complete model (the one that 
better fits the data, as said before) the estimate of the distribution margin is around 
50%, suggesting that distribution services are an important component in the final sale 
price of tradables and hence an important source of international price discrimination.
Fourth, median estimates of nominal rigidities say that at the border import prices 
change once a quarter for the euro area and once every two quarters in the U.S. econ­
omy. In the complete model, the pass-through of nominal exchange rate into euro 
area import prices at the border is equal to 40 percent (10 percent for U.S. import 
prices), at the consumer level 20 percent (5 percent for U.S. imports). The estimates 
are lower than those usually found in the literature on empirical NOEM models. They
7The benchmark model of Chari et al. (2002) with prices fixed for 1 year is able to reproduce the 
observed volatility in the real exchange rate but generates persistence below the observed one. Bergin 
and Feenstra (2001) use a model with translog preferences to amplify the effect of staggered price 
contracts and pricing-to-market in generating persistence. To generate the high persistence observed 
in the data, they have to impose contracts of 2-3 years length.
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axe also lower than the estimated nominal rigidities of nontradable goods and wages. 
These results suggest that models that disregard nontradability, distribution services 
and price discrimination may severely distort the importance of nominal frictions for 
import prices.
Fifth, all the models are able to reproduce the persistence of the real exchange rate, 
thanks to presence of nominal rigidities and inertial monetary policy.
Finally, a forecast error variance decomposition shows that in the complete model 
about 75% of the real exchange rate variability is explained by the shock to the UIP, and 
the rest by shocks to preferences. Consumptions, inflation rates and short-term interest 
rates are, on the contrary, mostly explained by technology and preference shocks.
I’m not the first to estimate NOEM models using Bayesian techniques. Adolfson et 
al. (2004), Batini et al. (2005), Lubik and Schorfeide (2005) and Rabanal and Tuesta 
(2006) also estimate open economy model with nominal rigidities and incomplete pass­
through. Differently from them, I consider a wider array of sources of real exchange 
rate volatility and persistence. In fact, I have nontradable goods, distribution services 
and shocks to the UIP, so to minimize the risk that model mis-specification would affect 
estimates.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the setup. Section 3 describes 
the main determinants of the real exchange rate dynamics. Section 4 reports the results 
of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
3.2. The Setup
The world economy is composed by two large countries of equal size (Home and 
Foreign country). The two countries are symmetric in terms of technology and tastes, 
with the notable exception of home bias in preferences. In each of them consumers 
maximize their utility with respect to leisure and a composite good resulting from 
the aggregation of non tradable and tradable commodities. The latter can be either 
imported or domestically produced. Monopolistic firms in the two sectors produce a 
differentiated variety of either tradable or nontradable goods using labor.
Nominal rigidities should improve the capability of the model to match the volatility 
and persistence of the real exchange rate. Standard theory predicts that monetary 
shocks have no effect on the real exchange rate under price flexibility, but induce real 
exchange rate movements that closely trank the nominal exchange rate when prices are 
(sufficiently) sticky.
I consider not only nominal price rigidities, but also nominal wagqggidities. Sticky 
wages, in fact, make the nominal marginal cost less responsive to a given shock; as a 
consequence, also nominal prices should be less responsive.
8See also Bergin (2003, 2004), Justiniano and Preston (2004), Smets and Weuters (2003, 2005).
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In what follows, I illustrate the complete model. I report only the equations of the 
Home country. Those of the Foreign country are similar.
3.2.1. Household optim ization
In this section I illustrate households’ preferences and budget constraint.
3.2.1.1. Preferences. In each country there is a continuum [0,1] of symmetric house­
holds. Home households are indexed by j ,  Foreign households by j*. The expected value 
of agent f s  lifetime utility U q is given by:
(3.1) Uq =  Eo |  ftZpRj
I i=0
< ^ - K- L t U Y1 -  crc r <jc , « ,r  > 0
where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on information set at date 0 and /3 is 
the intertemporal discount factor (0 < /? < 1). The household obtains utility from 
consumption C (j ) (1/oc is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and receives 
disutility from labor supply L (j) .  I assume that households are monopolistic compet­
itive and supply a differentiated labor service to firms. Zpr is a preference shifter, 
common to all Home households, that scales the overall period utility. It is a country 
specific exogenous process that evolves as:
In ZpRjt =  PzPR ln Zprj- i +  €zP R , t
where 0 < PzPR < 1 and czPRtt 1S an independently and identically distributed shock 
with mean and variance respectively equal to 0 and <j 2p r . A similar preference shifter 
scales the Foreign agent’s utility (hence there is no cross-country correlation between 
the shifters nor between the shocks).9 The index Ct (j) is defined as follows:
r . . i=i l 1^(3.2) Ct (j ) =  (It Ctj {j) * +  (1 — or) CV,t (j) * <f> > 0
Cr,t (j) is the bundle of tradable goods, while (j ) is the that of nontradable goods. 
The parameter (j> is the elasticity of substitution between the two bundles. The parame­
ters ar and (1 — ap) are the weights on the consumption of traded and nontraded goods, 
respectively. I assume a similar index holds in the Foreign country. The index of traded 
goods Cr{j) is given by the following constant elasticity of substitution aggregator:
T~P
(3.3) Ctj (j) = [offCW.t (j) p +  (1 — q>h ) Cp,t (j )
kiR
p p > 0
where p is the elasticity of substitution between the consumption of the Home good 
Cn(j) and the Foreign good Cp(j).
9I do not model money explicitly, but I interpret this model as a cash-less limiting economy, in the 
spirit of Woodford (1998), in which the role of money balances in facilitating transactions is negligible.
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The parameter ah (a# > 1/2) and (1 — aH) are the weights on the consumption 
of Home and Foreign traded goods. I assume that a parallel bundle of tradable goods 
holds in the Foreign country, but with a weight an (clh > 1/2) on consumption of 
the domestically produced good F .10 This assumption of “mirror symmetric” baskets 
generates a home bias in tradable goods. Cn,t {j), Cf j U), C*N,t (j) are indexes of 
consumption across the continuum of differentiated goods produced respectively in the 
Home tradable, Foreign tradable and Home nontradable sector:
(3.6) l/'Jo
Q rp  X Qrp — 1
(3.7) CF,t (j) = [ / ’Jo
B'r — 1
Ct(fJ)  ‘t df
O'T — 1
(3.8) 7Jo 0 N— 1
IfcL
6 n ~ 1
On  >  1
C t(h,j)  and Ct ( f , j )  are respectively agent j 1 s consumption of Home brand h and 
Foreign brand / .  Ct (n,j)  is the same agent’s consumption of nontradable brand n. 
Or is the elasticity of substitution between brands belonging to the Home tradable 
or to the Foreign tradable sector. On is the elasticity of substitution between brands 
belonging to the nontradable sector. The Home brand demand function resulting from 
cost minimization is:
’P t ( h )
H,t
—8j'
(j)
Similar demands can be derived for the other brands produced in the Home and in the 
Foreign country.11 pt (h) is the price of the generic Home brand h in the Home country.
10Hence:
(3.4)
and:
Ct ( f )  = \arCT_t U')1^  + (1 -  O.T) CN,t (f
(3.5) CT,t ( f )  s  [(1 -  a„) CH,t ( D 1^  + “hCf,, ( j ' ) ^
1:lUsing the above indexes, the demand for the bundles Ch, Cp, Ct and Cn can be derived: 
(3.9) CH,t (j) = <*h C?) ’ Cfj  (3) =  (1 -  o-h ) Ct t i)
(3.10) ( h , t U )  =  a r ( ^ )  CN,tU) =  (1 “  <*t) ( ^ )  * G (j)
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Pntt is a utility-based price index:
(3.11) P H , t = ( j \ t { h f ~ eTdh
It is the minimum expenditure necessary to buy one unit of the good (3.6). A similar 
definition applies to Pp,t and P/v,* and their Foreign counterparts. Similarly, the con­
sumer price index and the price index of tradable goods can be derived respectively 
from the bundles (3.2) and (3.3):
(3.12) Pt = [aTP t f  + (1 -  or) p t f \
1
(3.13) PT =  [aHP jr P +  ( ! - « * )  Pf~p]
Similar indexes hold in the Foreign country.12
3.2 .1.2 . B udget C onstrain t. I assume that households belonging to the Home coun­
try can allocate their wealth among two bonds. Both bonds are risk-free with one-period 
maturity. One is denominated in the Home currency and the other in the Foreign cur­
rency. In contrast, households that belong to the Foreign country can allocate their 
wealth only in one risk-free nominal bond denominated in the Foreign currency.
The budget constraint of household j  in the Home country is:13
B hj ( j ) ______ StBFtt (.j )_____
(1 +  i t) (1 +  i t )$ (St )Zuip,t 
- B h j - i  (j ) — S t B p j - i  (j )
n t (h, j ) d h +  Ut (n, j)  dn
Jo
(3.16) +Wt (j) L t (j) -  PtCt (j) -  A C ?W t (j) Lt (j)
B h (j) is household f  s holding of the risk-free one-period nominal bond denominated in 
units of Home currency.14 This bond pays a nominal interest rate it. St is the nominal 
exchange (number of Home currency units per unit of Foreign currency). Bp (j) is
12Hence:
(3.14) 
and:
(3.15)
o r i# -* + ( 1 -or) J#r*]
*? = [ ( ! -  “») PS"" + “hP'f "']
1-p
13See Benigno (2001) for a similar financial structure.
14Our time convention has BH,t-i (j )  and B r , t - i { j )  as agent f  s nominal bonds accumulated during 
period t  — 1 and carried over t.
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the holding of the risk-free one-period nominal bond denominated in units of Foreign 
currency. It pays a nominal interest i*t . The nominal rates it and i* are paid at the 
beginning of period t + 1 and are known at time t. They are directly controlled by
c D
the national monetary authorities. The function $( *p ’*) captures the costs, for the 
households belonging to Home country, of undertaking positions in the international 
asset market. As borrowers, they will be charged a premium on the Foreign interest 
rate; as lenders, they will receive a remuneration lower than the Foreign interest rate.15 
I introduce this additional cost to pin down a well defined steady state.16 The payment 
of this cost is rebated to agents belonging to the Foreign country.17 I adopt the following 
functional form:
r S t B F t \  f S t B p t  N
$ ( — p T - )  =  e x p (^6 ~p~~ )
where 0 < Sb < 1. The parameter 5b controls the speed of convergence to the steady 
state.
I add a risk premium shock Zuip^t to allow for exogenous variations in international 
financial markets conditions. It evolves as:
\nZuip,t — Puip^-Zuip^t-x +  tuip,t
where 0 < Puip < 1 and €zulPt is an independently and identically distributed shock 
with mean and variance respectively equal to 0 and Households derives income
from two sources: nominal wages Wt (j ); profits of domestic tradable and nontradable 
firms, respectively f*  n t (h,j) dh and fg n t (n, j)  dn. Each household is the monopolis­
tic supplier of a labor input j . When setting her wage W (j), each Home agent takes 
into account firms’ demand for her type of labor (see later):
* > *
where Lt is the total amount of labor supplied in the economy and Wt is a wage index 
defined later. The elasticity of substitution among labor inputs j s , 0L}t, is subject to 
independently and identically distributed shocks with mean and variance respectively 
equal to 0 and o\^. I assume there is a wage-adjustment cost, which is given by the
IS SBThe function <E>(—PtF~ ) depends on real holdings of the foreign assets in the entire Home economy. 
Hence, domestic households take it as given when deciding on the optimal holding of the foreign bond. 
We require that $ (0) =  1 and that <f>(.) =  1 only if Bp,t — 0. $ (.) is a, differentiable, (at least) 
decreasing function in the neighborhood of zero. See also Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003).
16See Turnovsky (1987).
17Hence, in the budget constraint of household j* in the Foreign country the following term appears:
K  =
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following quadratic function:18
(3.17) « - 2 0
I assume that all the households belonging to the same country have the same initial 
level of wealth and share the profits of domestic firms in equal proportion. Hence, 
within a country all the households face the same budget constraint. In their optimal 
decisions, they will choose the same path of bonds, consumption and wages. First order 
conditions with respect to Bn,t (j ), Bp,t (j) are rather standard:
(3.18) Ct (J)” a ZpRf =  (1 +  it) PEt ( c t+1 O P "  Z PRit+1 P‘ ^
t + 1 ,
Pt St+i(3.i9) q orc zPR,t=(i+in n^Z )zulPitEt (ct+1 op- zPR,t+r
r t  \  r't+ l &t
In a symmetric equihbrium (Lt(j) =  Lt, Wt(j) = W, Ct(j) =  Ct), the first order 
condition with respect to Wt(j) can be written as:
i ■ kw wt (  wt ^  \  N _1
+  1 )  Wt-1 V ^ t - 1  n w )
Pt ( Wt+1 \  2 ( Wt+ 1 _  Lt+1 ZpR't+ip i : { m )  { w r - n w) £  Cx c 2p; t
w
P  I  S ^ - E ,
(3.20) x . 9 l■* . L l - ^
( 0 L , t  ~  1 )  % P R ,t
The real wage is equal to a the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure times the term 6i>t/  {6l^ — 1) and the reciprocal of a term including the wage 
adjustment costs. In the case of no wage rigidities, the real wage would be equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution times the markup, # l)£/  (0L,t — 1).
3.2.2. Firm s
In what follows I illustrate the problems solved by the Home firms. Foreign firms solve 
similar problems.
3.2.2.1. P roduction . There is a continuum of firms. Firms belonging to the tradable 
sector are indexed by h e [0, 1]; those belonging to the nontradable sector are indexed 
by n e [0,1]. Foreign firms belonging to the tradable sector are indexed by /  e [0,1]; 
those belonging to the nontradable sector are indexed by n* e [0, 1].
The technology used by firms is the following one:
(3.21) yt (h) +  y* (h) = ZT,tLt (h) , yt (n) =  ZNitLt (n )
18See Kim (2000).
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Zx,t (X  = T, N) is a technology shock common to all the firms belonging to the same 
sector (T is for Home tradable sector, N  for Home nontradable sector). It follows a 
stationary AR(1) process:
(3.22) In %x,t =  Px In Zx,t-1 +  ezx,t X  = T ,N
where 0 < pZx < 1 and ezx is an independently and identically distributed shock 
with mean and variance respectively equal to 0 and a2Zx. The only input used in the 
production is a basket Lt of labor. It is a combination of differentiated labor inputs 
defined over a continuum of mass one (j e [0, 1]):
Lt (x ) = [/'Jo Lt (x,j) dj
° L , t - 1
x  =  h,n
Firms takes the prices of labor inputs as given. Cost minimization implies that the 
demand for labor input j  by firm x  is a function of the relative wage:
Lt j ) — I ^  1 Lt (a:)
where Wt(j) is the nominal wage paid to labor input j  and the wage index W  is defined 
as:
Wt = [/Jo
1 - 6 L, t
Cost minimization also yields an expression for the marginal cost MCt(x):
Wt(3.23) MCt(x) =
'x,t
Hence the marginal cost is the same for all firms belonging to the same sector.
3.2.2 .2 . P rice setting. A feature common to all firms is that there is sluggish price 
adjustment due to resource costs measured in terms of total profit. The adjustment 
cost is quadratic.19 In the case of a firm belonging to the Home nontradable sector, it 
is:
Pt ( n )(3.24) AC? (n ) - k”n  (  Pt(ACn.‘ W -  2 U - i (n) -  1
where kpn > 0. In the case of a firm belonging to the Home tradable sector, we have:
(3.25) ACgj (h) =
p Pt (h) -  1 ACS; (h)
K Pt (h) -  1
2 \P*t-1 W
where kph , kF^  > 0. Firms producing tradables pay a cost according to the destination 
market. Let’s consider the profit maximization problem, starting with firms belonging 
to the nontradable sector.
19See Dedola and Leduc (2001), Rotemberg (1982).
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N ontradable  sector. Each firm n  takes into account the demand for its product 
and sets the nominal price pt{n) by maximizing the present discounted value of real 
profits. Demand comes not only from consumers but also from the firms belonging to 
the local distribution sector. These firms purchase Home and Foreign tradable goods 
and distribute them domestically using a Leontief technology: they combine one unit 
of the tradable good with 77 > 0 units of the nontradable goods basket N:20
r c  °n~i
(3.26) 77 =  \ J  77(71) 0n dn On > 1
Firms in the distribution sector are perfectly competitive. The distribution costs in­
troduce a wedge between wholesale and consumer prices. Let’s denote with p the 
consumer price and with p the wholesale price. It follows that in the case of the Home 
good (similar relations hold for the Foreign traded good), I can write:
(3.27) pt{h) = pt(h) + rjPNyt , p\(h) = p\(h) + rjP^t
Given that there is market segmentation, the law of one price for tradable goods does 
not hold; hence at the wholesale level I have pj ^  pt(h)/St. Similar inequalities hold at 
the consumer level.
Corsetti et al. (2004) show that, under incomplete markets, high home bias and 
low price elasticity of tradable goods are key to make the real exchange rate volatile 
and to obtain a negative correlation between relative consumption and real exchange 
rate. Given the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods at the consumer level, 
p, distribution services reduce the price elasticity of tradable goods of the producers, 
which is equal to:
(3.28) p ( i - v f N ^
P(h)J
where Pn and p (h) are set at their steady state values. All these features, which are 
present in the complete model I estimate, contribute to increase the real exchange rate 
volatility. There are no distribution costs for nontradable goods (pt{n) = pt(n)). Hence, 
the demand for Home nontradable goods is:21
Vt (n) =
\  r N,t
CN,t + r}( [  Ct (h,j) dj + [  Ct (/, j) dj
Vo Jo
20Hence consumers cannot purchase the tradable goods directly from producers but from firms belong­
ing to the distribution sector.
21The term CN,t is obtained by maximizing, for every agent j ,  equation (3.8) subject to
the constraint Jq p(n)c(n)dn =  Z (Z  is any fixed total nominal expenditure on goods). Demands for 
all other brands are similarly derived.
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The price-setting problem is characterized as:
max
{ P r ( n » ~ t
P n-oc
^ j ^ ( p ( n ) - M C (  n)) 'Pt(n)
. ?N,t ,
c N,t + ,n ( f o Ct (h, j )  dj + £  Ct (/, j)  d j \  (1 -  a c pK t (n))}
The term (/3PtC~ac / PTC^ ac) is the household discount factor. Firms are agents for 
the local households, to whom transfer profits in a lump-sum fashion. In a symmetric 
equilibrium (p(n) — PN, Ct (h) = CH,u Ct (f) = CFtU Ct (n) =  CNit) the first order 
condition is:
W t(3.29)
where:
pN,t =  A.- lN N' JN,tm
A n  = (0 N -  1) + p - - i^N ( -5 - ^ -----1-nv,t-i V-nv.t-i
Ct+i pt p% ,t+1 [CV ,t+i +  V (C/f.t+i +  CV.t+i)] N,t+1
pt+1 Crffc [cw,t + V (c H,t +  c F,t)\ ,<w V PN,t
In absence of nominal rigidities, the above condition says that the price is a constant 
markup over the marginal cost.
T radable sector. Firm producing the generic brand h sets a price pt(h) (in Home 
currency) in the Home market subject to the demand constraint
/u\ ( Pt { h) + r)pN,t\~eT ^
yt(h) = { — p ^ r - )  ^
and a price p*t {h) (in Foreign currency) in the Foreign market, subject to the demand 
constraint:
- 1
yt (h) =
pt (h) + nP^ t c tp* I ^H,tH,t
Hence, the maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
{PAh),p*r (h)}?Lt
00 p  n-<*c
E‘ E  Pr (h) -  MCr (h)) yT (h) ( l  -  A C ?^ (h))
T — t Prc;
+ (STp; (h) -  MCr (h)) y*T (h) ( l  -  A ^ r (h))}
In a symmetric equilibrium (p(h) = PHit, P*t (h) = Ct (h) =  CH,u Ct ( /)  =  CFyt),
the first order condition with respect to p(h) and to pt (h) can be written respectively 
as:
7 Wt N(3.30) P h ,i =  A' 1 0 %T,t + r}PN,t
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(3.31)
where
P'u, =  A* -1
Wt
°Tz t +  ^
A„ =
A* =  /iH —
_  P a c t+\ Pt ( PH,t+ 1 \ 2 / f i y . t + i  _  - i^  CH,t- 
khP Pt+1 c -« c   ^ p Hit J { T ^ r  L) CHr
ft+i a
( P'H.t A
_ 'n.t-1 vpH,t-i ;
Pt /  PH,t+l\ 2 (  _  l ' )  CH,t+
r c v pH,t ; V pkt J cH.t
Ot - 1  + kPh
n~ ac  ■t±1_
The two above equations are the result of the international price discrimination. Its 
determinants are two: the local currency pricing policy, e.g. the prices are sticky in the 
currency of the buyer; the distribution services intensive in local nontradable goods, 
which imply that the elasticity of demand for any brand is not necessarily the same 
across markets.
In presence of international price discrimination the law of one price does not hold 
(that is, pt (h) 7^  Stp* (h)) and exchange rate pass-through into import prices is not 
complete (d logp l(h )/d \ogS t < 1). It is possible to derive a structural coefficient 
measuring the degree of the pass-through of nominal exchange rate into import prices. 
Prom equation (3.31), after some algebra, a structural coefficient measuring the pass­
through at the border can be obtained:
(r}pN + w) ~l ' ~ 1(3.32) p*H t =  . . .  -  6 t w — 1 ( 1  +  P)]  +  @tPh
.(Ph +  VPn) . }Ph +  r)pN
where prices and wages are expressed in terms of consumption. Structural exchange 
rate pass-through is the percentage change in import prices - denominated in local 
currency - resulting from a one percent change in the bilateral exchange rate, other 
things equal. A higher pass-through implies that fluctuations of the nominal exchange 
rate are transmitted to a greater extent to import prices; in the limiting case, when 
the pass-through is complete (i.e. equal to 1) the fluctuations are transmitted one for 
one into import prices. In my case, the pass-through is complete when there are no 
distribution services (77 =  0) and no nominal rigidities (/c# = 0 ) .  If at least one of 
the two features is in the model, then the pass-through is incomplete. Hence, the 
fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate can be not fully transmitted to the import 
prices even if prices are flexible, given the presence of distribution services.
International price discrimination and the related pass-through incompleteness help 
to increase the exchange rate volatility and disconnect: given that the exchange rate 
change has little effect on the behavior of final purchasers of goods, than it may take 
large changes in exchange rates to achieve equilibrium after some shock to fundamentals.
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3.2.3. M onetary Rules
In the Home country, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest according to 
the following rule:
*rr f
(3.33) < y
/  \ it \  ( \-\-it i \ Pr (  Pt \  ^ ~pR^PnffYt \  PRPy(l~PRPn /  St  ^(l~pR)ps
i + i j i  +  i  j  \ P t ~ i  J
with 0 < pR < 1, pn, pY, Ps > 0- The interest rate 1 4- it is set by the central 
bank, Pt/Pt-i  is the consumer price inflation, Yt is the total output and the coefficient, 
St/St-i  is depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate, 1 -f 1 and Y  are the steady 
state levels of interest rate and output, respectively. The parameter pR, which assumes 
values between zero and one, captures inertia in conducting monetary policy: the higher 
the coefficient, the more inertial is the monetary policy. The parameters p„, py and 
ps measure the reaction of monetary authority respectively to consumer price inflation, 
output and nominal exchange rate depreciation. ZRit is a shock having the following 
law of motion:
In ZR,t = €zr>t
where ezr t is an identically and independently distributed shock to the monetary policy 
function having mean zero and variance aR. A similar monetary policy function holds 
for the Foreign country:
(3.34)
2*\ \ P*R (  P* \  /y *  \  /  s* \t i   i i I \ j t> § /  ^ I ( \ r/  ^
1 +  i /  \  1 +  & /  \P*-i J \  Y J \St-]
The law of motion of ZRt is similar to that of ZRtt.
Monetary policy contributes to match the high persistence of the real exchange rate. 
When monetary policy is conducted in an “inertial” way, so that the adjustment of the 
instrument toward its target is smoothed over time, the real exchange rate exhibits 
persistence. Hence, higher values of the real exchange rate persistence should be as­
sociated to higher values of the parameters pR and pR in equations (3.33) and (3.34), 
respectively.22
3.2.4. M arket Clearing Conditions
I assume that the bond denominated in the Home currency is traded only among Home 
agents. Hence the market clearing is:
(3.35) f 1 BHt (j)dj = 0
Jo
22See G.Benigno (2004) and Chari et al. (2002).
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The market clearing condition of the internationally traded bond is:
(3.36) r BP,t (j) dj + f BF,t (j*) dj* =  0
Jo Jo
The market clearing conditions of the generic brand h are:
(3.37) yt (h) = [  Ct {h, j)  dj
Jo
(3.38) y*t (h)=  [ ' C t i h j ^ d j *
Jo
The market clearing condition of the generic brand n in the Home country is:
yt (n) = [  Ct (n J )d j
Jo
(3.39) + ( ^ 7 )  n \ J !  Ct {k’ j ) d j  + I o Ct i f ' j )  dj
The labor market clearing of the generic labor type j  is:
(3.40) Lt (j) =  [  Lt (h, j)  dh +  [  Lt (n, j )  dn
Jo Jo
Similar equations hold in the Foreign country. In agreement with the preferences 
of Home and Foreign agents, the aggregate final goods are defined as the constant- 
elasticity-of-substitution composite of individual retail goods:
f l y
a
l  0T —X \  0 7 . - 1
Yt (h) ‘T dh
al »J,_1 \  eT-iy;  (ft) t  rfftj
1 °N
Yt (n)°N~ dn \
Home total tradable output can be defined as:
Ytjl =  Yn,t + Y h
Home total output as:
Yt = YT + YNtt
Similar aggregators hold for goods produced in the Foreign country.
In a symmetric equilibrium (households within the same country are similar, as well 
as firms within the same sector), the trade balance T B  of the Home country can be
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obtained by combining the equation (3.35) with the integral (over the Home population) 
of the equation (3.16)
rprj  _______StBp,t_______
(1 + i i )^(^^)ZUIP}t
—S t B P,t-i 
= PHjt^H,t + S t P H,tY H>t + P n j Y n j
(3.44) - P tCt -  AC™WtLt
3.2.5. T he equilibrium
Let’s consider an initial allocation of Bn,t0, B P>to, B *p t and initial prices Wto, Wto,pt0{x) 
(x =  h, h*,n), p*tQ{x) (x = / ,  ito, i*to and the processes ZPRtU Z*PRt, 0LjU 6*Lt,
Zx (X  = T, TV, T*, N*)) ZRft, ZRjt, Zuip,t• Given these initial conditions and processes, 
for t > to I define an equilibrium as a sequence of allocations and prices such that 
the households and firms satisfy their respective first order conditions, the monetary 
authorities follow their respective monetary rules and the market clearing conditions 
hold. The rest of the paper considers an equilibrium in which agents and firms are 
symmetric respectively in each country and in each sector, dropping the indexes j ,  j*, 
K  *^5 /> /*» n i n*-2Z Note that in an equilibrium where Lt( j) = Lt and Lt (j*) =  L*t 
output is a linear function of labor: Yn = Z ^ L N and YR-\-YR = ZTLT. The LCP model 
is obtained from the complete model by setting 7] = 0 (hence, distribution services 
are eliminated as well as the distinction between wholesale and consumer prices of 
the tradable goods). The PCP model is obtained by setting 77 =  0 and substituting 
the assumption of local currency pricing with that of producer currency pricing. A 
firm producing the Home tradable good sets only one price pt {h), in Home currency, 
given the world demand for the good and subject to a single price adjustment cost. 
The Foreign currency price of the Home good follows the law of one price (pj (h) = 
pt(h)/St , hence the pass-through of nominal exchange rate is complete). Similarly, a 
firm producing the Foreign tradable good set only one price in its own currency, p j(/). 
The price of exports to the Home country follows the law of one price (pt (/) =  Stpt(f))-
3.3. The determ inants o f th e  real exchange rate dynam ics
The real exchange rate of the Home country is:
(3.45) R S  =
Pt
23Hence W (j )  =  W , p(h) =  PR , p (f )  =  Pf , p(ji) =  P/y. Similar relations hold for consumer prices 
and in the Foreign country.
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The price indexes can be used to decompose the real exchange rate into its main deter­
minants (international price discrimination, relative price of nontradable goods, home 
bias).24 Jointly with the assumption of incomplete international financial markets, the 
decomposition is at basis of the performed empirical analysis of the real exchange rate 
dynamics.
After log-linearizing the price indexes around the steady state of the model (see 
details of the steady state in the Appendix) and some algebraic manipulation I obtain:
(3.46) A R S t = ( l - a T)(n*N t - 7 t ^ t) - ( l - a T)(7rNit- n Tyt) +
+ (2aH ~V)(lTp,t  — TTH.t)
+aH((AStX  n*Ft ~ ™F,t) + (1 -  aH) ^A Sj + fr*Ht -  nH,t)
where A R S t and A S t are the percentage change in the real and nominal exchange rate 
between period t and t — 1, 7f^*, tchj, %f,u represent, respectively, the consumer 
price inflation rates in the Home country of tradable, Home tradable, Foreign tradable 
and nontradable goods.25 The variables with a star represent the corresponding inflation 
rates in the Foreign country. The first two terms in equation (3.46) are the Home and 
Foreign internal real exchange rate, respectively; the second row is the home bias; 
finally, the last two terms show the deviations from the international law of one price 
for the Foreign and Home tradable good, respectively. I now consider each of them in 
turn.
The two terms in the first row of equation (3.46) represent the part of deviation 
from the PPP due to nontradable goods. As for international price discrimination, the 
presence of nontradable goods into the bundle of the agents limits the transmission 
of nominal exchange rate fluctuations to the relative prices faced by the consumers.26 
Hence larger real exchange rate fluctuations are needed for an economy with a high 
share of nontradable goods ((1 — clt) in our model) in order to achieve the same degree 
of relative price adjustment which accommodates asymmetric shocks. Note that in our 
model, the prices of nontradable goods affect the internal real exchange rate not only 
directly, but also indirectly through changes in the prices of traded goods, induced by 
distribution costs intensive in local nontraded goods.
The second term in equation (3.46), (2a h — — ^//.t), measures the home bias
component of the real exchange rate. When the parameter an equals 0.5 (no home 
bias) this term vanishes; when an is greater than 0.5 then the higher the home bias,
24See Benigno and Thoenissen (2006).
25I use the following definition: 7r_it =  ln ( l +7r.)t) =  ln (P .,t/P .,t-i).
26See Hau (2000, 2002) and Benigno and Thoenissen (2006).
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the wider axe the changes in the real exchange rate induced by changes in the relative 
price of the imported good.27
The term a# ( a S t +  #J*|t — ^F,tj +  (1 — a/f) (a5*  +  fc*H t — in equation (3.46) 
is a measure of international price discrimination: if the law of one price holds (so that 
the price of a tradable good, when expressed in a common currency, is the same in each 
country), each of the two terms would be equal to zero.
These terms are crucial for the dynamics of the real exchange rate. Their estimates 
constitute one of the results of the empirical analysis.
A crucial assumption is also that of incomplete international financial markets.28 
When a complete set of state contingent nominal assets is traded, hence international 
financial markets are complete, the following risk-sharing condition holds in every state 
of nature:
™-r°(§r
where r 0 is a constant, depending on initial conditions. Log-linearizing around a given 
steady state, I get:
R S t  =  crc (Ct -  C l )
where the hat is for log-deviation from the steady state value. This condition says 
that the real exchange rate is proportional to the relative marginal utility of consump­
tion, and hence, given the specification of preferences, to the relative consumption. The 
drawback is that it is hard to replicate the exchange rate volatility without assuming a 
sufficiently high level of the coefficient of risk aversion oc  (i.e., a relatively low intertem­
poral elasticity of substitution). Hence, I weak the risk-sharing condition by assuming 
that international financial market are incomplete, so that the relation between the 
real exchange rate and marginal utilities of consumption holds only in expected values. 
In fact, the combination of the Home and Foreign agent’s (log-linearized) first order 
conditions with respect to the internationally traded bond Bp,t  gives:29
(3.47) Et [J & t+1 -  & S t] =  Et [uc (Cw  -  Ct) -  ( £ P*,t+1 -  Z PH,t) ]  -
E, °c(c*t+, -  <5n -  ( ^ , t+1 -  z*PR^ ]
+SbbF,t — Zuip,t
27See Warnock(2003).
28See Chari et al. (2002) and Devereux and Engel (2002).
29The first-oder conditions with respect to Bp,t in the Foreign country is equal to:
ct (n-’c=0 (1+in Et (c«+1 (f)-°° ^ - )
Combining the log-linearized versions of the above equation, the correspondent equation holding for 
the Home agents and the real exchange rate definition I get the equation in the text.
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where Ybp,t =  StBp,t/Pt (see the Appendix). The assumption of incomplete markets 
has other two advantages. First, shocks lead to wealth redistribution across countries 
and hence favour the increase in the persistence of the real exchange rate. Second, under 
risk sharing, the correlation between real exchange rate and relative consumption is, 
counterfactually, positive (Backus-Smith puzzle).30 This is not necessarily the case 
under incomplete markets: since the bond is traded only after a given shock is realized, 
in the impact period the above equation does not necessarily hold. As a consequence, 
the correlation between real exchange rate and relative consumption can be, consistently 
with empirical evidence, negative. I also add preference shocks Zpr and ZpR> that 
contribute to weak the link between real exchange rate and relative marginal utility.31 
Finally, the assumed financial structure affects the behavior of the nominal and real 
exchange rates also through the shock to the modified UIP condition. The shock can 
be justified on the basis of the well known weak empirical evidence in favour of the UIP 
condition. From a theoretical point of view, the shock can be seen as a shortcut, among 
the others, for “noise traders” having biased expectations on the exchange rate, or of 
“information shocks” affect the risk premia required by foreign-exchange markets.32 
This shock contributes to create the disconnection between the real exchange rate and 
the fundamentals.
3.4. T he em pirical analysis
The analysis is based on the estimation of three models. I compare the complete 
model - whose setup has been described in previous sections - with two downsized 
versions: one without distribution services (international price discrimination is due 
only to LCP); the other in which the PCP holds and pass-through is complete. The 
Home country is the euro area; the Foreign country is the U.S. economy. I report 
the posterior estimates of the parameters and the overall fit of the alternative model 
specifications, initially. Then, on the basis of the results of the estimation, I analyze 
the capability of the models to reproduce the main stylized facts of the real exchange 
rate and investigate its main sources of fluctuations.
3.4.1. M odel solution
Since a closed form solution is not possible, the behavior of the economy is studied by 
looking at a log-linear approximation to the model equations in the neighborhood of a 
deterministic steady state. In this steady state the shocks are set to their mean values, 
price inflation, wage inflation and exchange rate depreciation are set to zero, interest 
rates are equal to the agents’ discount factor, consumption is equalized across countries,
30See Backus and Smith (1993).
31For a similar use of preference shocks, see Stockman and Tesar (1995).
32See Devereux and Engel (2002) and Duarte and Stockman (2005).
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the trade balance and the net foreign asset position are zero. Given the presence of 
distribution costs, price of nontradable goods is different from that of traded goods; 
however, prices are symmetric between countries and the real exchange rate is one. 
The elasticities of substitution between tradable brands ( 6 t )  and between nontradables 
(6n ) are calibrated so that the steady state mark-ups are equal across sectors. More 
details can be found in the Appendix.
3.4.2. T he Bayesian estim ation
The estimation procedure consists of various steps: the transformation of the data into 
a form suitable for the computation of the likelihood function using the stationary 
state-space representation of the model; the choice of appropriate prior distributions; 
the estimation of the posterior distribution with Monte Carlo methods. These steps 
are discussed in turn in this section.
The Bayesian approach starts form the assertion that both the data Y  and of the 
parameters 0  are random variables. From their joint probability distribution P  (Y , 0 ) 
one can derive the fundamental relationship between their marginal and conditional 
distributions known as Bayes theorem:
P ( 0 | F ) o c P ( r | 0 ) * P ( 0 )
Reinterpreting these distributions, the Bayesian approach reduces to a procedure for 
combining the a priori information I have on the model, as summarized in the prior 
distributions for the parameters P  (0), with the information that comes from the data, 
as summarized in the likelihood function for the observed time series P  (T |0 ). The 
resulting posterior density of the parameters P  (0 |F ) can then be used to draw statis­
tical inference either on the parameters themselves or on any function of them or of the 
original data.
The computation of the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters cannot 
be done analytically and thus I resort to Monte Carlo simulations in order to obtain a 
sample of draws from this distribution that can be used to compute all moments and 
quantities of interest.33 I use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to explore the parameter 
space starting from a neighborhood of the posterior mode (found by maximizing the 
kernel of the posterior using a numerical routine) and then moving around using a ran­
dom walk “jump distribution” whose covariance matrix is chosen so as to achieve an 
efficient exploration of the posterior. The algorithm defines a Markov Chain which even­
tually generates draws coming from the posterior distribution, although the sequence of
33See An and Schorfheide (2005) for a review of Bayesian methods for estimation of DSGE models.
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draws will be correlated; keeping one every n-th draws results in a sub-sample of almost 
uncorrelated draws which can be used to approximate the posterior distribution.34
3.4.2.1. T he da ta . Estimations is based on nine quarterly key macroeconomic vari­
ables sampled over the period 1983:1-2005:2: real consumption, CPI inflation, non­
tradable inflation and nominal short-term interest rates for both countries (the euro 
area and the U.S.) and the euro — dollar real exchange rate. Figure 1 shows all the 
used data. The model has implications for the log deviations from steady state of all 
these variables, and thus I transformed them before estimating the model. All series 
are demeaned and real consumption is detrended by fitting a linear trend to the origi­
nal series. Seasonality has been removed from those series that were available only in 
unadjusted form regressing them on a set of seasonal dummies. The euro area is the 
Home country.
3.4.2.2. P rio r d istribu tions and  calib rated  param eters. A very small number 
of parameters are calibrated. The discount factor is calibrated at 0.99, implying an 
annual steady state real interest of 4%; the elasticity of substitution between nontrad­
able varieties, 6^, is set equal to 6, while the elasticity of substitution between tradable 
varieties, 9t , is endogenously determined so that 6t =  On (1 +  77), which assures that 
markups are equal across sectors; the parameter of labour disutility, r , is set equal to 
2; the steady state elasticity of substitution between labour varieties, 0l , to 4.3.
For all the other I have set the means and variances of the prior distributions (see 
Table 1). The choice of the priors functional forms is rather standard. I assume all 
distributions to be a priori independent. The share of tradables in the consumption 
basket, <2t, is set equal to 0.45 (standard deviation 0.1).35 The share of the Home 
produced goods in the Home tradable composite good, an, is set is set equal to 0.8 
(standard deviation 0.1). The mean of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between 
Home and Foreign tradable goods, p, is set equal to 1.14, while the mean of intratem­
poral elasticity of substitution between tradable and non tradable goods (f> is equal to 
0.74. The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption cfc has a mean 
value equal to 2 (standard deviation 0.2).
The priors on the coefficients in the monetary policy reaction functions are stan­
dard: the persistence coefficient mean is set to 0.8 (standard deviation equal to 0.1); 
a relatively high prior mean on the inflation coefficient (1.5, with standard deviation 
equal to 0.1) helps to guarantee a unique solution path when solving the model.
34Geweke (1999) reviews regularity conditions that guarantee the convergence to the posterior distrib­
ution of the Markov chains generated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. More details on bayesian 
techniques and DSGE models are in DeJong et al. (2000), Del Negro et al. (2004), Schorfheide (2000). 
For an applicaton of maximum likelihood methods see Ireland (2004) and Kim (2000).
35Stockman and Tesar (1995) suggest that the share of nontradables in the consumption basket of the 
seven largest OECD countries is roughly 50 percent.
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Parameters measuring the degree of price stickiness have the same mean value, equal 
to 5.6, with standard deviation equal to 10. Parameters measuring the degree of wage 
stickiness have a mean value equal to 63, with standard deviation equal to 40.
The autoregressive parameters of the shocks follow a beta distribution with mean 
values set to 0.9. The standard errors have a common value, equal to 0.05. The 
variances of all shocks have non informative distributions.
3.4.2.3. E stim ates. Tables 2-5 report the results. Tables 2-4 reports the posterior 
median, the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile, the mean and the standard deviation of the 
estimated parameters. Table 5 reports a comparison of the median estimates.
N om inal rigidities.
Sticky prices and wages are crucial for matching the volatility and persistence of 
the real exchange rate and the disconnect. Table 6 reports the frequency of adjustment 
obtained from the estimated parameters of prices and wage adjustment costs.
In each country nontradable goods are stickier than tradable goods. The ranking 
is common to the three estimated models. It is consistent with the evidence for the 
euro area: according to Fabiani et al. (2005), in the euro area prices are stickier in the 
services sector (the frequency of price changes per year for the majority of the firms 
is not greater than one) than in the trade sector (the frequency for the majority of 
the firms is between one and three). The ranking is also consistent with the evidence 
for the U.S. economy. According to Bils and Klenow (2002), in fact, in the U.S. price 
changes are more frequent for goods than for services.
The degree of nominal rigidity for the import prices is crucial in our models. In fact, 
it is one of the determinants of the incompleteness of the nominal exchange rate pass­
through and, hence, of the behavior of the real exchange replicated by the estimated 
models. There are some differences across the estimates (for example, in the LCP 
model the U.S. import prices axe more flexible than in the complete model). However,
the overall results suggest that import prices adjust once a quarter and a half or two- 
quarters. These values are lower than those usually found in the literature. Rabanal 
and Tuesta (2006) estimate a LCP model using U.S. and euro area data. They find 
an average price duration equal to one year for the euro area and five quarters for the 
U.S. economy. Lubik and Schorfeide (2005) estimate an average price duration of U.S. 
import prices equal to two quarters and of the euro area import prices between three 
and four quarters. Batini et al. (2005) find a degree of price stickiness for the euro area 
and the U.S. import prices greater than 20 quarters.
The estimates of nominal rigidities for import prices I obtain are hence lower than 
those commonly found in the hteraturp^The reason can be that the other authors 
do not have in their models nontradanle goods, nor distribution services nor, with the 
exception of Batini, staggere^^^geSv^Alt^tne stickiness that is in the data on prices 
used for estimation is hence reproduced by increasing the import price stickiness to
values that are puzzling, at least according to conventional wisdom on the degree of 
competition in the import price sector. The lack of nontradable goods probably cause 
a serious problem of model mis-specification, with the implication that the estimation 
may severely distort the importance of nominal frictions for import prices.
Wages are stickier than prices. The ranking is in line with the estimates of Altig 
et al. (2005). Their results suggest that in the U.S. households re-optimize wages on 
average once every 3.6 quarters, while firms change price on average once every 1.5 
quarters. Our estimates indicate that in the U.S. wages are stickier than in the euro 
area. This result is in line with the estimates of Batini et al. (2005) and Smets and 
Weuters (2004). Batini finds that the average duration of euro area wage contracts is 
5.8 quarters, while that of the U.S. contracts is 9 quarters. Smets and Weuters find 
that the degree of wage rigidity is three quarters for the euro area, five quarters for the 
U.S. economy.
On the basis of the obtained estimates, I compute the exchange rate pass-through 
into import prices. In Table 7 I report the values of the coefficients (see equation 3.32). 
In the complete model the pass-through at the border is 42 per cent for euro area and 10 
per cent for the U.S. economy; the presence of distribution costs halves the pass-through 
at the consumer level in both countries. According to the LCP model, pass-through at 
the consumer level is equal to 32 per cent in the euro area and to 44 per cent in the 
U.S. economy.
Elasticities of substitu tion  and  shares
Corsetti et al. (2006) show that the combination of incomplete markets, high home 
bias and low elasticity of substitution between tradable goods, the latter obtained also 
thanks to the presence of distribution services intensive in local nontradable goods, 
increases the capability of a model to reproduce the main stylized facts of the real 
exchange rate. This approach, also shared by Backus et al. (1995), is opposite to that 
of Chari et al. (2002), which relies on a low value of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.
The results I obtain do not seem to support the low intertemporal elasticity approach 
(see Table 5). The estimate of the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
17c, is around 2.2, while Chari et al. (2002) set it equal to 5. Our result is not different 
from that of Smets and Weuters (2004), whose estimate of the inverse of the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution is around 1.5 and 2. Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) have 
an estimate that is between mine and the value of Chari et al. (2002), equal to 3.8.
To some extent, instead, the estimates are in line with the approach based on the 
low intratemporal elasticity. The estimate of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
between Home and Foreign tradable goods, p, is equal to 1.2. Rabanal and Tuesta 
(2005) and Lubik and Schorfeide (2005) find a value, around 0.5, which is lower than 
the one I find. However, note that the model with distribution services is the most
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preferred by the data (see later). In this model, the distribution services introduce a 
wedge between the elasticity of substitution of tradable goods at producer level and at 
the consumer level, with the first lower than the second. 95% of the probability mass 
for the parameter r^j lies between 0.92 and 1.27 (see Table 2), with a median value of 
1.08.36 GiyefTthese estimates, the producer price elasticity of tradables, p ( l  — >
is more/th: less equal to 0.58.
Datk argalso infbrmatiyg^tbbut the degree of substitutability between tradable and 
nontradable-'gdods: is pushed below the prior mean (1.2) to 0.91 in the complete
model and 0.75 in the LCP and PCP models. This result is in line with the 0.74 
estimated by Mendoza (1991) for a sample of industrializfifLcountries.
The estimates of home bias are high, and rang^rrom 0.8 Complete model) to 0.97 
(PCP model). The high estimate is expected, giventBht, as said before, the volatility of 
the real exchange rate is higher for higher values of the home bias. The extremely high 
value in the case of the PCP model could be interpreted as a signal of mis-specification: 
the high home bias substitutes exchange rate pass-through incompleteness as feature 
for increasing the volatility of the real exchange rate without augmenting that of the 
fundamentals. Many previous attempts to estimate or calibrate this parameter ended 
up in the same ballpark of our numbers: both Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) and Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2005) find a value of 0.87, while Chari et al. (2002) choose 0.984 in 
their calibration /
The share of nontradable goods has a nof negligible median weight, (1 — a^), that 
ranges from 0.37 (PCP model) to 0.46 (LCP model).
M onetary  policy rules.
The ability of the model to reproduce the persistence of the real exchange rate and 
of other variables hinges, among other things, on the interplay between the degree of 
monetary policy inertia, the degree of nominal rigidities and the persistence provided 
exogenously by the shocks. In both countries the parameter regulating nominal interest 
rate inertia is pushed up by the data. The high persistence of the monetary policy is 
transmitted to the real exchange rate through the uncovered interest parity. Instead, 
data are not informative on the response of U.S. monetary policy to inflation and 
output.
Exogenous shocks.
The estimated^atoctu ra l shocks are rather persistent. The standard deviations are 
in line with the findings of Rabanal and Tuesta (2005) and Lubik and Schorfeide (2005). 
Since the importance of shocks cannot directly be assessed from the magnitude of the
36Corsetti et al. (2006), following Burstein et al. (2003), set r) equal to 1.22, to match the share of 
the retail price of traded goods accounted for by local distribution services in the U.S. (approximately 
equal to 50%).
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associated standard deviation, I decompose the variance of exchange rate fluctuations 
(see below).
3.4.2.4. Goodness-of-fit. I compare the three estimated model in terms of their fit­
ting of the data.37 Table 8 reports the results. The complete model has the highest 
Bayes factor, followed by the PCP model and LCP model. Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) 
also find evidence in favour of the PCP model over the LCP model, while Lubik and 
Schorfeide (2005) find the opposite result.
3.4.3. W h at determ ines th e  real exchange ra te  dynam ics?
In this section I investigate the implications of the estimated models for the dynamics 
of the real exchange rate. The issue is to understand if and under which conditions 
the empirical models I have are able to replicate the dynamics of the real exchange 
rate, in particular its high volatility, persistence and the disconnection from the other 
variables. I initially investigate which - among the home bias, the international price 
discrimination and the internal exchange rate - is the main economic determinant of 
the variance of the real exchange rate. Subsequently, I perform a forecast error variance 
decomposition, an analysis of the impulse responses and of the moments.
3.4.3.1. T he role of in ternational price discrim ination. To quantify the rele­
vance of the price discrimination for the real exchange rate variance, I compute equation
(3.46) using the median estimates.38 The main result, reported in Table 9, is
that the variance term attributable to the international price discrimination explains 
around 56 per cent of the whole real exchange rate variance in the complete model, 
25 per cent in the L(JP model. Home bias is also not negligible, given that it weighs 
7.5 per cent in the complete model, 36 per cent in the LCP model. The covariance 
between home bias and international price discrimination terms plays a significant role 
in the first two models. The contribution of the internal real exchange rate is small, as 
shown by the variance and covariance terms in which they are involved. These results
37In Bayesian analysis the comparison among alternative models is typically carried out in terms of 
posterior odds ratio and we follow this approach. Let’s assume that we are given two models M\  and 
M2 and that we assign prior probabilities 7^0 and 7 ,^0 to the each of them, then the posterior odds 
ratio is defined as the product of the prior odds and the Bayes factor:
TTi.r _  7Ti£ p (Y t / M i )
*2,T  71"2,0 X P ( Y T/M 2)
B a y e s  fa c to r
where P  ( Y t /M i) is the marginal data density, obtained integrating the posterior kernel over all 
possible parameters values. We assume the models are a priori equally weighed and adopt Geweke’s 
(1999) harmonic mean approximation to evaluate P  (Y T/M i ).
38Variances and covariances, divided by the variance of the real exchange rate changes, are obtained 
simulating the models as in the section ‘Analysis of the moments’ (see later).
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axe in line with Chari et al. (2002). In our case, however, the importance of nontrad­
able goods cannot be entirely dismissed, given that nontradable goods are a source of 
international price discrimination through the distribution sector.
3.4.3.2. Forecast error variance decom position. To quantify the contribution of 
each shock to the variance of the real exchange rate, I compute the asymptotic forecast 
error variance decomposition of the three models. Tables 10-12 report the results. The 
UIP shock accounts for slightly more than three quarters of the real exchange rate 
yariance.~?The remaining part is explained ^^prefei^ce  shocks farbhnd ^O per cent). 
Technology and interest rate shocks are not relevant for the fluctuations of the real 
exchange rate.39 To the contrary, consumption and nominal interest rate fluctuations 
are mainly driven by domestic preference shocks, while inflation rates by domestic 
technology shocks (in particular by the domestic tradable technology shock). Wage 
shocks are not important, while monetary policy shocks are, to some extent, only 
relevant for their country interest rate fluctuations. They are not relevant for the 
fluctuations of the real exchange rate, a result also found by Rabanal and Tuesta (2006).
3.4.3.3. Im pulse Response Analysis. I show the qualitative implications of the 
main shocks determining the real exchange rate fluctuations by computing some impulse 
responses. I use the complete model, given that it has the better fit. Figure 2 reports 
the responses of the main variables of the model to a positive shock to the UIP. The 
size of the shock is one standard deviation. I report the mean response, the 5th and 
the 95 percentiles.
Following the shock, there is a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of the Home 
country (the euro area). Given the price stickiness, the correlation between nominal 
and real exchange rate is high. Hence, there is also a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate. The Home terms of trade at the border slightly improve on impact, due to the 
incompleteness pass-through and local currency pricing.40 At the consumer level, on 
impact the terms of trade deteriorate: the increase in the price of the Home distribution 
services, intensive in local nontradables, induce an increase in the relative price in the 
Home consumer price of the Foreign good. The Home output, relative to the Foreign 
one, increases, while the Home relative consumption decreases (the Home monetary 
authority increases the interest rate as the consumer price inflation increases). Home
39Rabanal and Tuesta (2006) find similar results. In their case both demand and technology shocks 
are important for the real exchange rate dynamics. To the contrary, monetary shocks play a minor 
role.
40The Home terms of trade at the border are defined as:
T =
At the consumer level, as:
P F , t
T t  =
agents accumulate assets against the Foreign country, and the Home trade balance 
improves.
Figure 3 considers a shock to the Home preferences. Home agents increase consump­
tion relative to Foreign agents. The nominal and real exchange rate appreciate. The 
reason is that the Home monetary authority increases the interest rate as the Home 
consumer price inflation increases. The Home terms of trade improve both at the bor­
der and at the consumer level. Home output also increases relatively to Foreign output, 
given the higher demand. The net foreign asset position and the trade balance of the 
Home country deteriorate.
Finally, Figure 4 considers a shock to the technology of the Home tradable sector. 
The Home nominal and real exchange rate depreciate, given that the Home monetary 
authority reduces the Home interest rate. The terms of trade deteriorate both at the 
border and at consumer level. Home consumption and output increase relative to 
Foreign correspondent quantities. As a result, there is on impact a slight improvement 
of the Home trade balance and net foreign asset position. These results do not support 
the idea of a strong wealth effect of technology shock (similar results are obtained when 
a shock to the U.S. tradable sector is considered). There is not an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate nor an improvement of the terms of trade after a technology shock 
to the Home tradable sector. However, if all the results I get are considered, the wealth 
effect a la Corsetti et al. (2004) cannot be entirely dismissed. First, the model with the 
distribution services, and hence with the lower intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
between tradable goods, has the best fitting. Second, all the estimates suggest that 
the degree of home bias is relatively high. The two elements are crucial for a positive 
and strong wealth effect of the technology shock to the tradable sector. Finally, I do 
not have investment in physical capital in the models I estimate. Capital accumulation 
is also an important element for producing an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(conditional to a shock to the technology of the tradable sector). I leave this issue for 
future research.
3.4.3.4. Analysis of th e  m om ents. Tables 13-15 report the results of the analysis 
of moments. I compute the moments drawing the parameters of the model from the 
posterior distribution. I performs 100 draws. For each draw, I simulate the model 20 
times. The length of each simulated time series is 89, the length of the data used in 
the estimation. For each moment, I compute the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile. The 
estimated models are able to replicate the main stylized facts of the real exchange. The 
relatively high volatility of the real exchange rate is always almost matched as well as its 
persistence. The models are also able to replicate the volatility and persistence of the 
other variables. Hence, they are able to replicate the exchange rate disconnect. There 
are some troubles in replicating the cross correlations of the observable variables. This 
is expected, given that the shocks are by assumption not cross-correlatated. However,
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the models are able to replicate the negative correlation between the real exchange rate 
and the relative consumption (the Backus-Smith puzzle).
Given the results of the variance decomposition analysis, it is interesting to analyze 
how the moments change when some shocks are switched off. I perform the exercises 
using the complete model, given that its goodness-of-fit of the data is better than that 
of the other two models.
Table 16 reports the results obtained when the UIP shock, the main determinant 
of the real exchange rate fluctuations, is absent. Consistently with the result of the 
variance decomposition, the absence of the UIP shock strongly limits the capability 
of the model to reproduce the volatility of real exchange rate. In fact, the simulated 
volatility is now much lower than the actual one and closer to the volatility of the other 
variables.
Table 16 also reports the results under the assumption that there is no UIP shock nor 
preference shocks. According to the forecast error variance decomposition, almost all 
the variance of the real exchange rate is explained by these three shocks. The simulated 
variance of the real exchange rate further decreases without them. The variances of the 
both consumption variables also decrease, given that the preference shock are their main 
determinants. The lack of consumption preferences has also another implication. In 
Table 17 show the cross-correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange 
rate. In absence of preference shocks, the capability of the model to replicate the 
negative sign of the cross-correlation decreases.
A clear message appear from all the reported results. Incomplete pass-through and 
the shocks to the UIP and preferences are essential ingredients to make empirical open 
economy models consistent with the data. The lack of at least one of these two features 
induces a worsening of the capability of the model to reproduce the real exchange rate 
dynamics.
3.5. Concluding rem arks
I have estimated three two-country NOEM models using euro area and U.S. data 
to replicate the high volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate. The models 
differ for assumption on degree of exchange rate pass-through into import prices. I 
find that the model that better fits the data is the one based on the local currency 
pricing and distribution services. The relevance of the UIP shock for the real exchange 
rate fluctuations is confirmed by the forecast error variance decomposition. Hence, 
incomplete pass-through and UIP shock can be thought as crucial features to reproduce 
the high exchange rate volatility without any implications for the volatility of other 
macroeconomic aggregates.
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The empirical relevance of the two estimated features suggests that the switching 
effect of changes in the nominal exchange rate is relatively low for consumer prices. 
However, the size of the effect can be higher at the border.
These results stimulate further work. In this paper, I have focused on the role 
of pass-through for the real exchange rate volatility and persistence. However, the 
capability of a model to replicate the persistence of real exchange rate could be improved 
by introducing physical capital. This feature should also improve the matching of the 
negative correlation between relative consumption and real exchange rate (the Backus 
Smith puzzle). More general preferences could be introduced to increase persistence. 
For example, translog preferences, or habit in consumption and in labor.
Finally, the empirical estimates could be used as a starting point for a microfounded 
two-country welfare analysis. Incomplete pass-through, in fact, modify the relative 
strength of substitution and wealth effect of a given change in the nominal exchange 
rate. The spillovers and the related welfare-improving policy measures could be not 
obvious.
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I firstly report the steady state of the model. Later, I illustrate the dynamic equi­
librium.
The Steady state equilibrium
I assume a symmetric steady state equilibrium, in which nominal wages are equal 
cross countries and where markups are equal cross country and cross sectors. Prices 
and wages are flexible, there is no inflation nor nominal exchange rate depreciation, 
the net foreign asset position is zero. In each country the consumer price index is the 
numeraire (P — P* =  1). The real exchange rate is one. There are no shocks.
In what follows, I report the equations of the complete model. The steady states of 
LCP and of the PCP model can be obtained by setting 77 =  0.
In the Home country, the steady state version of the optimal pricing conditions 
(3.29) and (3.30) imply (wage and all prices are expressed as a ratio to the consumer 
price index):
(SSI) pN =  --w
UN — 1
= g ~ T lw + (SS2)
$ T  77 0 N
+   r  "7-------- r  wQt — 1 $j> — 1 $n  — 1
The equality between sectoral markups implies that:
On  Qt  1  Qn
On — 1 Qt  — 1 Qt  — 1 Qn — 1 
After some algebra, the following markup equality condition can be obtained:
Qt  =  Qn { 1 +  77)
The common wage and markup imply that:
Ph = Pn
Give that Ph = Ph + VPn , the following equation is obtained:
Ph = ( I +77 )pN
Given the assumption of cross-country symmetry, pn = Pf , Pn — Pn  and hence, using 
the price index of the tradable goods, equation (3.13), Ph = Pf = Pt • Using the 
consumer price index (3.12) I get:
1 =  [otp'n * (1 +  77)1"0 +  (1 -  or) p1^ }
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which can be rewritten as:
Pn ax (1 +  77)1 ^ +  (1 — ax)
Hence the relative price of the nontradable good is function of the structural parameters 
of the model. Using equations (SSI) and (SS2) the real wage and the relative price of 
the tradable goods can be found.
Given the relative prices, the relative amounts of output can be found. The market 
clearing conditions (3.37) and (3.39) and the demand equations (3.9) and (3.10) imply 
that:
Yx =  anax Pt *C
+  (1 — an) ax Pt ’C
- p
Hence:
=  aT Pt ’C  =  aT P x^C
YN = (1 — ax) (Pn ) * C + rjaxPT*C
Yh a xP ^C
and:
Y t + Yn aTpT*C +  (1 — ax) (p n ) * C + r}aTpT*C
—4*=  ____________ a rP x ____________
a rP x *  +  (1 ~  o r )  (Pn )~*  +  W t Px *
Yn (1 -  ax) (pNy *  C +  7jaxPx^C
Yt  +  Yn  a x p T* C  -f- (1 — a x )  (p n ) * C +  r}axpT* C
_  __________ (1 — a x )  (p n ) *__________
aTPx* +  (1 ~  or) (Pn )-* +  VcltPt*
I define total output in the Home country as:
Y  =  YT + Yn
Given the assumption of linearity in labor for the production function, we also have:
Yx =  Lx, Yn — L n 
The total amount of labor can be written as:
1 — —  _i_ hn.
L L
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where:
Lt _  Yt Ln _  Yn 
T ~ Y ’ ~L ~~Y
Using the Euler equations, in steady state the following condition holds:
1 1 = P1 4- i 1 +  i"
From equation (3.44), using the assumption of zero net foreign asset position, we derive 
the steady state consumption (as a ratio of Yt  +  V/v):
c _ y* yn
Y  = PH~y+PN^Y
Given the assumption of country symmetry, Foreign relative prices and quantities are 
equal to their Home counterparts.
The dynamic equilibrium
1. Price indexes
(PR!) P h * =  P h * +  * H ,t -  *■<
(PR2) p F t  =  p F t  +  P F,t -  7T«
(P R 3 ) P h * =  P h *  +  * H *  -  K
(PR4) =  pFt +  w*Ft -  7rj
(PR5) P n * =  P n *  +  # w ,t -  w t
(PR6) p'N t  =  p ’N * +  H*N f  -
/Dt>7\ - PH'S , -(PR7) P //,t  =   p H t  + 7? PN,t
P h  P h
/ t > d q \  -* P h <?* . P n  **
(P R * ) P/f,t =  — PH ,t +  *?— PjV,t
Ph  Ph
n m n\ -*(PR9) pFt = — pFt +  rj— pN t
Ph  Ph
/ d t>  i n \  * P h ~  | P n  *.(PR-10) PF,t =  — P f *  +  P — PN,t
P h  P h
(PR11) pr,t =  aHpH,t + (1 — an) pF,t
(PR12) p*Tt = aHp*H,t + (l-aH) P*F,t
(PR13) 0 =  aTp}f~ppT1t + (1 -  aT) PlN PpN,t
(PR-14) 0 =  aTplT Pp*T)t + (1 -  aT) p]^pp*Nit
(PR15) wt =  wt_i + 7fw,t ~
(PR16) w* =  +  7r*mt -  n*t
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(PR17)
(PR18)
(PR19)
2. Inflation Rates 
(INF1)
R St = R S t +  A S t +  fit -  nt
Tt — T t- 1 + 7Tp,t — &St — i t  H,t 
f t  = f t- 1 + fiFyt- A S t - r Hit
Ph ~  . Pn  ~
ftH ,t =  7T/J t + T ) T T N  t
Ph  Ph
(INF2)
(INF3)
(INF4)
(INF5)
(INF6)
(INF7)
Ph ~  . Pn  .
7TF,t =   7TF t  +  T] 7TN,t
Ph  P h
7r Ph >^* Pnh .
Ph Ph
-*  P h ~ *  . P n  *
* F ,t — ~ n F,t + rl ~ ~ 7rN,t
P h  Ph
F r,t  =  Q>H^H,t +  (1  — O'H) TTF.t
^T,t ~  (1 “  aH) 7tH)t +  Q'H'FFxt
7Tt =  0,HKT,t +  (1  ~  0>h ) 7TN,t
(INF8)
3. Aggregate supply 
(AS1)
7rt =  aT7Tr  f +  (1 — Ut ) 71^
Fr.t — + Lr,t
(AS2)
(AS3)
y~r*   <7* i f *
T,t ~  * T ,t T" -^ T.t
FJv.t — ZN,t +
(AS4) A^T.i ~  ^N,t + L h
( a c c \  a  _  /3a (f/PAT +  , @t VP n  (.P h  ~ w ) ~  .
{ A b o ) 7THyt =  p7rH,t+i — ~—73—;--------^ P H , t + “—73— „"~~2'PN,t
kH (P h  +  7i p n ) ’ k H {p h  +  VPn ) ’ k H (p H +  r]pN )
wt
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(AS6)
-  OTpH(riPN +  w ) ~  , 0T r)PN (pH ~  w )  „ , 0 Tw  / , d ' o  \
n F,t =  /3nF,t+i ~  -r—r r  ZTPFt +  T - 7 1  ZTPN,t + 7— t = — ;- - - - - - x ( w t  +  i ? 5 t )
&f (Ph +  PPn) &f (p/j +  VPn ) k F (pH +  rjpN)
(AS7)
0 t P p  (pP iv  +  w ) *  Ot VPn  {Ph - w ) „  , 0 T w  ^
*7f,t =  P*H,t+1 -  ■ -71- , ^PF,t +  . -------^2 PN,t +  ITT^— — t ( ^  -  ^ t )
k H ( p f f  +  ^ P n )  k*H {p H  +  P P n )  k H {Ph  +  ?7Pjv)
/ACQ\ £*  _ * * *  Qt P h  {riPN +  w ) a* , Ot VPn  (pH -  w )  A.  Qt w
F,t F,t+1 k F  {pH  4- p p N ) 2 F,t k*F { p n  +  rjpN ) 2 N,t k*F {p H + r ] p N ) 1
(AS9) 7fNtt =  (3nN>t+1 -  -^T—-Pw,t +ktf Kjv
(asio) rKt =  prN>t+1 -  + &N~l -**
n  kjsr
■w
(ASH) * * , =  + g g (^ - 1}(?, -  +  (T - 1),(eiy- 1)Lt -  ^K\\r K\\r K\\r k\V
/ ao 1 o\ _  o+* < T c { 0 w -  1 ) a ,  ( 6 > ^ - l )  ( t - 1 ) ( ^ - 1 ) ^ % 1(Abl2) H — Gt -  w t H -  L>t ~  ~pr^L,t
Kyy fcw
(AS13) L( =  j -L t .l +  ^ L Nit
(AS 14) t t = ^ L ^ t + ^ L ' Nf
4. Aggregate Demand
(ADI) —(JcCt -f ZpR>t = —acCt+i +  Zprj+i +  (1 +  t^) — tt<+i
(AD2) (1 + 2*) — (1 +  2^ ) +  fco&F.t ~  =  A<St+i
(AD3) —vcC t +  ZpRt = —ocCl+\ +  ZpR,t+i +  (1 +  *?) — ^t+i
(AD4) Yn,t = —ppH,t +  (p ~  <t>) PT,t +  —Ct
(AD5) y^,t =  - p f i v  + (p-4>) v h  + y C ;
(AD6) Ypf  =  -p p F,t + (p~<P) Pr,t + yC,
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(AD7) %  = - f f o t  + (p-4>) P h  +  p<5?
(ADS) ^ Y N,t =  +  y C t +  t^ Y h +  r ) y Y F
(AD9) = -<Pph + ^ C ;  + n-±Y'H +  r i y n
(AD10) yV V  =  y Y „ , t +
(AD11) ^ Y f  = + ^ Y Kt
5. Flow of Funds
( F F 1 )  *  _
/3bFtt—bF,t-i =  Ph-^t ( p H , t  + YH,tj+p*H^ -  ( R S t +Pn,t +  Y i i t j + P N - y -  ( p N , t  +  F/v,*)—
(FF2) tbt = (3bFt -  bFtt- i
6. Monetary policies
(1 + i t ) =  p R( l  + i t - i) + (1 -  p R) p ^ t  + (1 -  Pr)  Py  (^ -y-Y H ,t +
+ (1 ~ Pr ) P A e^ S t  +  Z R>t
(1 + i^) =  Pr ( 1 + i t - i )  + (1 -  p*R) p ^ l  + (1 -  P*r ) Py  
-  (1 ~ Pr ) P l e & S t  + Z*R>t
7. Shock processes
(SHI) Zr,t =  pTZr,t-i +  £zT,t
(SH2) Z h  =  p\Z h_x +
(SH3) Z n , t =  Pn Z n ,i- i + t z Nit
(SH4) Z 'n j . =  P N ^ N . t - 1 +  e Z N i,
(SH5) •^rr = Pp r Z p r j - i +  ezPKi,
(SH6) =  P p R ^ P R , t-1 +  £ Z P P ,t
+ ^ % 3 )
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(SH7) ZUIP = pmpZuiP't-i +  £*zUIP,t
(SH8) eL>t =  ez*.t
(SH9) 0mLjt = e*ZLt
(SH10) Z n  = eZR>t
(SH11) Z*Rit = e*ZRt
The first block contains the price indexes. The first two equations are respectively the 
laws of motion of the Home and Foreign good producer price in the Home country. 
The third and fourth equations are the correspondent equations in the Foreign country. 
The fifth and the sixth equations are the laws of motion of the nontradable goods. 
Equations (PR7)-(PR10) axe the consumer prices of the Home and Foreign good in the 
Home and Foreign country Equations (PR11) and (PR12) are the consumer prices 
of the composite tradable good in the Home and in the Foreign country, respectively. 
Equations (PR13) and (PR14) define the numeraire (the consumption unit). Equations 
(PR15) and (PR16) are the laws of motion of the Home real wage and its Foreign 
counterpart. The last three equations are respectively the laws of motion of the Home 
country real exchange rate, terms of trade at the border and at the consumer level.
The second block contains the inflation rates. The first two equations are those of 
the Home and Foreign good in the Home country at the consumer level, respectively. 
The third and the fourth equations are the correspondent equations in the Foreign 
country. The fifth equation is the inflation rate of the composite tradable good. The 
sixth equation is its Foreign analogue. Finally, the last two equations of the block are 
the Home and Foreign consumer price Index inflation rates.
The third block contains the equations describing the supply-side of the economy. 
The first four equations are the technology constraints for the Home tradable, Foreign 
tradable, Home nontradable, Foreign nontradable. Equations (AS5)-(AS10) axe the 
Phillips curves of the Home and Foreign tradable good in the Home country, of the 
Home and Foreign good in the Foreign country, of the Home and Foreign nontradable 
goods. Equations (ASH) and (AS12) axe the Phillips curves of Home and Foreign labor. 
The last two equations axe the Home and Foreign labor maxket cleaxing conditions, 
respectively.
The fourth block contains the equations of the demand side of the economy. The first 
equation is the Euler equation of the Home agent. The second equation is the modified 
uncovered interest parity, holding for the Home agent. The third equation is the Euler 
equation of the Foreign agent. Equations (AD4) and (AD5) axe the maxket cleaxing
conditions of the Home tradable good in the Home and Foreign market. Equations 
(AD6) and (AD7) are the market clearing conditions of the Foreign tradable good in 
the Home and Foreign markets. Equations (AD8) and (AD9) axe the maxket cleaxing 
conditions of the Home and Foreign nontradable goods. The last two equations define 
the Home and Foreign tradable total outputs, respectively.
In the fifth block there axe the net foreign asset position of the Home agent and the 
Home trade balance. Given that in steady state both the net foreign asset position and 
the trade balance are zero, I cannot log-linearize the variables Bp and TB . Hence, I 
define: bpjtY  =  Bp,t and tbtY  =  T B t.
The sixth block contains the Home and Foreign monetary policy rules.
Finally, the last block contains the equations of the shock processes. The first 
two equations are respectively the processes of the technology shock in the Home and 
Foreign tradable sectors. The third and the fourth equations axe the processes of the 
technology shock in the Home and Foreign nontradable sectors, respectively. Equations 
(SH5) and (SH6) axe the process of the Home and Foreign preference shocks. Equation 
(SH7) is the process of the UIP shock. Finally, the last four equations axe the processes 
of the Home and Foreign markup shocks and of the Home and Foreign monetary policy 
shocks, respectively.
The LCP model is obtained by the above log-linear equations by setting rj =  0 
(hence there is not anymore the distinction between wholesale and consumer prices). 
The PCP model is obtained by setting 77 =  0 in the above system and imposing the law 
of one price (pt(h) =  Sp^(h) and Pt(f) =  Pt if) I  St). Equations (AS6) and (AS7) axe 
replaced respectively by:
7TF,t =  & S t  +  ^F,t 
^H,t ~  ^H,t ~  A St 
Equations (PR2) and (PR3) axe replaced respectively by:
Table 1. Estimated parameters (prior distribution)
par am ty p e m ean st. d ev
h Gamma 0.01 0.005
P Gamma 1.14 0.10
Gamma 0.74 0.10
<?c Gamma 2.0 0.20
PR Beta 0.80 0.10
Pn Gamma 1.50 0.10
Py Normal 0.0 0.10
Ps Normal 0.0 0.10
PR Beta 0.80 0.10
P*n Gamma 1.50 0.10
Py Normal 0.0 0.10
Ps Normal 0.0 0.10
kh Gamma 5.6 10.0
Kp Gamma 5.6 10.0
Kn Gamma 5.6 10.0
k*h Gamma 5.6 10.0
K*p Gamma 5.6 10.0
K*n Gamma 5.6 10.0
Kw Gamma 63.0 40.0
KW Gamma 63.0 40.0
PPR Beta 0.90 0.05
PPR Beta 0.90 0.05
Pu ip Beta 0.90 0.05
Pt Beta 0.90 0.05
Pn Beta 0.90 0.05
Pt Beta 0.90 0.05
Pn Beta 0.90 0.05
& PR Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
PR Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
&UIP Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
a R Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
a *R Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
—* Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
_ *& rp Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
**N Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
a w Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
v*w Uniform[0,l] 0.50 0.29
V Gamma 1.20 0.10
O-H Beta 0.80 0.10
CLT Beta 0.45 0.10
Table 2. Posterior distribution. Complete Model
b o tto m  2.5 m edian up 2.5 m ean std .d ev .
p 1.049 1.225 1.413 1.227 0.092
<t> 0.693 0.913 1.169 0.918 0.123
<?c 1.991 2.347 2.751 2.353 0.193
a-H 0.862 0.896 0.930 0.896 0.017
CLT 0.541 0.615 0.693 0.615 0.039
eta 0.917 1.082 1.266 1.084 0.088
kh 3.386 10.131 27.156 11.488 6.190
K p 1.609 3.268 6.982 3.535 1.409
k n 22.516 53.630 113.578 57.349 23.634
k*h 7.989 22.650 60.440 25.723 13.638
k*f 1.906 2.827 4.472 2.931 0.687
k*n 8.438 26.787 73.631 30.627 17.278
K w 162.114 283.881 491.341 295.885 84.554
K W 197.621 348.955 550.347 355.655 90.601
P r 0.832 0.869 0.900 0.868 0.017
P it 1.467 1.668 1.882 1.670 0.107
P y 0.104 0.195 0.289 0.195 0.047
P s -0.051 -0.017 0.020 -0.017 0.018
P r 0.862 0.899 0.933 0.899 0.018
Pn 1.334 1.518 1.717 1.520 0.098
P y -0.103 0.099 0.297 0.099 0.102
P s -0.062 -0.017 0.035 -0.016 0.024
h 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.004
P P R 0.888 0.923 0.953 0.922 0.016
P P R 0.889 0.925 0.956 0.925 0.017
P u i p 0.900 0.931 0.957 0.930 0.015
P t 0.850 0.917 0.961 0.914 0.029
P n 0.859 0.918 0.961 0.916 0.027
Pt 0.839 0.892 0.935 0.890 0.024
P n 0.896 0.943 0.972 0.940 0.020
O P R 0.023 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.004
a *PR 0.019 0.024 0.033 0.025 0.004
& U IP 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.001
° R 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
a R 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(Jj> 0.014 0.022 0.036 0.023 0.006
CTn 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.003
_* 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.002
° N 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.002
a w 0.094 0.461 1.156 0.504 0.279
_*
a w 0.075 0.413 1.096 0.458 0.269
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Table 3. Posterior distribution. LCP Model
b o tto m  2.5 m edian up 2.5 m ean std .d ev .
p 0.987
4> 0.568
& C 1.917
O-H 0.915
d'P 0.346
5.512
Kp 3.583
k n 41.112
k *h 1.753
Kp 3.276
k N 24.531
Kw 25.424
K W 23.712
P r 0.826
Pn 1.547
P y -0.080
Ps -0.040
P r 0.825
Pn 1.416
P y -0.108
Ps -0.042
Kq 0.005
P p r 0.901
P*PR 0.881
P u i p 0.937
P t 0.913
P n 0.899
P t 0.878
P n 0.900
& P R 0.019
P R 0.015
& U IP 0.003
<TR 0.001
a R 0.001
(Tj< 0.005
g n 0.008
O’ r p 0.006
°N 0.006
a w 0.011
_ *
a w 0.005
1.172 1.379
0.751 0.966
2.270 2.661
0.947 0.971
0.538 0.744
9.006 18.305
5.325 7.999
71.113 115.604
3.248 9.299
5.310 8.982
61.348 121.075
74.086 407.921
56.048 189.327
0.863 0.897
1.748 2.012
0.009 0.234
-0.005 0.036
0.867 0.911
1.596 1.788
0.093 0.286
-0.008 0.032
0.008 0.011
0.941 0.976
0.926 0.965
0.954 0.967
0.962 0.983
0.969 0.988
0.946 0.977
0.940 0.968
0.027 0.037
0.020 0.027
0.004 0.005
0.001 0.002
0.001 0.001
0.010 0.018
0.010 0.013
0.009 0.015
0.009 0.013
0.083 0.214
0.045 0.144
1.175 0.101
0.755 0.102
2.275 0.191
0.946 0.015
0.540 0.115
10.009 3.569
5.356 1.129
72.946 19.167
4.239 2.257
5.554 1.528
63.756 27.192
139.896 122.136
78.554 50.367
0.863 0.018
1.757 0.116
0.045 0.097
-0.004 0.020
0.868 0.022
1.597 0.095
0.092 0.100
-0.007 0.019
0.008 0.002
0.942 0.023
0.925 0.022
0.953 0.008
0.958 0.018
0.958 0.027
0.942 0.026
0.939 0.018
0.027 0.004
0.020 0.003
0.004 0.001
0.001 0.000
0.001 0.000
0.010 0.004
0.010 0.002
0.010 0.002
0.009 0.002
0.088 0.062
0.052 0.044
151
Table 4. Posterior distribution. PCP Model
bottom 2.5 median up 2.5 mean std.dev.
p 1.044
4> 0.563
1.835
a n 0.964
clt 0.504
* H 2.230
k n 10.922
K*p 1.603
k *n 0.701
K w 210.240
K W 252.806
P r 0.827
Pit 1.453
P y 0.147
Ps -0.054
P r 0.870
Pi 1.298
P y -0.093
Ps -0.061
h 0.003
P p r 0.882
P p r 0.871
P u i p 0.927
P t 0.921
P n 0.919
P t 0.860
P n 0.937
& P R 0.022
a P R 0.018
& U IP 0.003
V r 0.001
a R 0.001
CT t 0.004
<Tn 0.004
0.005
0.002
a w 0.179
° w 0.109
1.224 1.424
0.743 0.959
2.166 2.541
0.974 0.982
0.634 0.715
3.524 5.073
19.615 43.461
3.306 6.513
5.646 24.772
342.276 519.627
366.349 507.302
0.864 0.896
1.652 1.854
0.225 0.319
-0.021 0.013
0.910 0.946
1.486 1.687
0.100 0.297
-0.010 0.050
0.005 0.010
0.913 0.938
0.908 0.938
0.946 0.964
0.963 0.981
0.950 0.972
0.905 0.936
0.972 0.985
0.027 0.034
0.023 0.031
0.004 0.005
0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001
0.005 0.007
0.005 0.007
0.007 0.009
0.003 0.005
0.277 0.379
0.222 0.374
1.226 0.097
0.747 0.101
2.173 0.180
0.974 0.005
0.627 0.055
3.551 0.781
21.596 8.338
3.485 1.271
7.451 6.651
348.187 79.475
370.035 65.415
0.863 0.018
1.652 0.103
0.227 0.044
-0.021 0.017
0.910 0.020
1.488 0.099
0.100 0.099
-0.008 0.028
0.006 0.002
0.913 0.015
0.907 0.017
0.946 0.009
0.959 0.016
0.949 0.014
0.903 0.020
0.969 0.012
0.027 0.003
0.023 0.003
0.004 0.001
0.001 0.000
0.001 0.000
0.005 0.001
0.005 0.001
0.007 0.001
0.003 0.001
0.274 0.055
0.225 0.072
Table 5. Posterior median estimates. Models comparison
param eter C om plete m odel LCP P C P
V 1.08 - -
a n 0.90 0.95 0.97
CLj' 0.61 0.54 0.63
P 1.22 1.17 1.22
4> 0.91 0.75 0.74
k H 10.13 9.01 3.52
k F 3.27 5.32 -
k p f 53.63 71.11 19.62
lc*k h 22.65 3.25 -
k*F 2.83 5.31 3.31
lc*k n 26.79 61.35 5.65
k w 283.88 74.09 342.28
lc*Kw 348.96 56.05 366.35
0 C 2.35 2.27 2.17
P r 0.87 0.86 0.86
Pn 1.67 1.75 1.65
Py 0.20 0.01 0.23
Pe -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
Pr 0.90 0.87 0.91
P i 1.52 1.60 1.49
P y 0.10 0.09 0.10
Pt -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
6 b 0.01 0.01 0.01
P p r 0.92 0.94 0.91
P p r * 0.93 0.93 0.91
P u i p 0.93 0.95 0.95
P z t 0.92 0.96 0.96
P s n 0.92 0.97 0.95
Pzf 0.89 0.95 0.90
0.94 0.94 0.97
& P R 0.03 0.03 0.03
V  PR * 0.02 0.02 0.02
& U IP 0.00 0.00 0.00
(PR 0.00 0.00 0.00
a R 0.00 0.00 0.00
& Z t 0.02 0.01 0.01
<7Zn 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.01
<7 z*N 0.01 0.01 0.00
°Z W 0.46 0.08 0.28
a Z*w 0.41 0.04 0.22
Table 6. Nominal rigidities in the complete model
N om inal rigidities C om plete L C P P C P
E uro area
Import (border) 1.2/V 1.6/\
Domestic tradable (wholesale) 1.6 1.9 1.5
Nontradable 3.8 4.3 2.6
Wages 10.0 5.2 11.1
U.S.
Import (border) ( 2 .0  ) ¥
Domestic tradable (wholesale) \ L 2 y 1.6 1.4
Nontradable 2.9 4.2 1.9
Wages 11.1 4.8 11.1
Table 7. Nominal exchange rate pass-through into import prices (%)
C om plete M odel L C P M odel
at the:
Border euro area 42
Consumer euro area 20 32
Border U.S. 10
Consumer U.S. 5 44
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Table 8. Overall goodness of fit
M odel M arginal density
Complete 2977
LCP 2970
PCP 2974
N otes : The marginal density is computed using the harmonic mean estimator proposed by Geweke 
(1999).
Table 9. Real exchange rate fluctuations: economic decomposition 
(% of the real exchange rate variance)
Component Complete LCP PC P
Var(Internal real exchange rate) 0.2 0.7 0.2
Var(Home bias) 7.5 35.7 96.6
Var (International price discrimination) 55.9 24.9 0.0
cov(Internal real exchange rate, home bias) -0.1 1.7 3.1
cov(Internal real exchange rate, international price discrimimination) 2.2 1.9 0.0
cov(Hom e bias,international price discrimination) 34.0 34.6 0.0
Total 99.8 99.4 100.0
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Table 10. Variance decomposition: the complete model
Variable zT Zrp Zn ZN zr Z*R ZPR ZPR ZUIP @ L *L tot
UEM C 10.2 0.3 13.3 0 5.4 0 63.9 0.7 5.9 0.3 0 100
UEM tr 47.8 0.4 29.3 0 0.7 0.1 15.5 0.2 4.8 1.1 0 100
UEM 7Tn 14.8 0 59.7 0 0.8 0 21.6 0.2 1.7 1.2 0 100
UEM (1 +  i) 16.7 0.1 16.2 0 8.4 0 56.2 0.2 1.8 0.4 0 100
UEM RS 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 11.1 8 77.5 0 0 100
U. S. C* 0.8 3.8 0 8.3 0 13.1 1.4 64.2 8.2 0 0.2 100
U. S. 7T* 0.4 53 0 28 0 1.7 0.7 10.4 4.4 0 1.4 100
U. S. n*N 0.1 8.2 0 64.2 0 2.4 1.1 17.2 5.2 0 1.7 100
U. S. (1 +  i*) 0.1 7.6 0 14.2 0 18.2 1.1 53.1 5.4 0 0.3 100
Table 11. Variance decomposition: the LCP model
Variable zT Zj, zn z*N ZR ZR ZPR ZPR ZUIP <>L tot
UEM C 35.8 0.1 25.9 0.0 4.4 0.0 27.6 0.2 5.8 0.0 0.0 100
UEM 7r 38.8 0.2 12.4 0.0 2.9 0.0 41.4 0.1 4.0 0.1 0.0 100
UEM 7Ttv 8.4 0.0 46.2 0.0 2.3 0.0 42.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 100
UEM (1 +  i) 17.6 0.1 10.2 0.0 7.3 0.0 62.3 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 100
UEM R S 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 6.0 2.6 87.7 0.0 0.0 100
U. S. C* 0.3 36.3 0.0 19.4 0.0 6.4 0.8 27.1 9.6 0.0 0.0 100
U. S. 7T* 0.2 45.3 0.0 10.3 0.0 5.5 0.2 33.7 4.5 0.0 0.2 100
U. S. n*N 0.0 10.3 0.0 43.4 0.0 5.1 0.1 39.6 1.5 0.0 0.1 100
U. S. (1 +  **) 0.1 22.2 0.0 10.3 0.0 9.0 0.3 54.4 3.6 0.0 0.0 100
Table 12. Variance decomposition: the PCP model
Variable z T z ^ z n ZN zr ZR ZPR ZPR ZUIP 0 l n tot
UEM C 12.4 0.0 3.4 0.0 5.8 0.0 70.4 0.3 7.4 0.1 0.0 100
UEM 7T 59.2 0.0 11.7 0.0 1.0 0.1 19.2 0.2 7.4 1.1 0.0 100
UEM 7tn 21.1 0.1 51.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 21.7 0.1 3.9 0.7 0.0 100
UEM (1 +  *) 18.5 0.0 4.9 0.0 10.0 0.0 62.7 0.1 3.5 0.2 0.0 100
UEM RS 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 4.5 3.1 91.6 0.0 0.0 100
U. S. C* 0.1 4.9 0.0 1.4 0.0 15.8 0.6 65.5 11.6 0.0 0.1 100
U. S. 7T* 0.0 66.6 0.0 10.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 7.1 12.2 0.0 0.9 100
U. S. n*N 0.0 12.3 0.0 53.3 0.0 4.2 0.7 13.6 14.7 0.0 1.3 100
U. S. (1 +  **) 0.0 8.2 0.0 5.6 0.0 21.9 0.8 49.4 14.0 0.0 0.1 100
Table 13. Moments (Complete Model) 
________ Table 13a. Volatility________
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
R S 20.7 8.02 14.71 34.98
7T 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.70
7T* 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.62
7TN 0.55 0.29 0.42 0.64
7T*n 0.36 0.24 0.35 0.55
C 1.94 0.91 1.37 2.03
c* 1.78 0.81 1.17 1.81
(i +  0 0.77 0.27 0.48 0.85
(i +  O 0.55 0.22 0.36 0.70
Table 13.b Persistence
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
R S 0.97 0.79 0.93 0.98
7r 0.75 0.39 0.64 0.81
7T* 0.40 0.22 0.49 0.74
7Tn 0.85 0.58 0.78 0.90
7T*n 0.57 0.52 0.75 0.90
c 0.49 0.68 0.84 0.93
c* 0.96 0.68 0.84 0.93
( 1 + 0 0.98 0.86 0.95 0.98
( i  +  O 0.97 0.82 0.93 0.98
Table 13c. Cross-correlations
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
RS, C/C* -0.48 -0.80 -0.39 0.27
RS,ir 0.54 -0.59 -0.10 0.37
RS, 7T* 0.03 -0.34 0.10 0.57
RS, 7r jy 0.52 -0.68 -0.18 0.38
RS, n*N 0.38 -0.39 0.19 0.70
RS, 7T F -0.24 0.02 0.22 0.43
RS, n*H -0.11 -0.57 -0.29 -0.01
C,C* -0.10 -0.58 -0.08 0.41
tb,y -0.70 -0.37 0.17
Notes: 2.5 and 97.5 are percentiles.
Table 14. Moments (LCP model)
______ Table 14a. Volatility______
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
RS 20.7 8.0 14.2 26.6
7r 0.41 0.30 0.42 0.69
7T* 0.36 0.35 0.47 0.67
7Tjv 0.55 0.28 0.41 0.68
7T^ 0.36 0.29 0.41 0.62
C 1.94 1.00 1.70 3.91
c* 1.78 0.83 1.33 2.37
(i +  0 0.77 0.26 0.47 1.03
(i +  0 0.55 0.24 0.41 0.77
Tjible 14 ). Persistence
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
R S 0.97 0.80 0.93 0.98
7T 0.75 0.44 0.69 0.89
7r 0.40 0.39 0.61 0.80
7Tn 0.85 0.63 0.81 0.93
7T*n 0.57 0.64 0.80 0.91
c 0.49 0.72 0.89 0.98
c* 0.96 0.69 0.87 0.96
( 1 + 0 0.98 0.85 0.95 0.99
(i +  O 0.97 0.84 0.94 0.98
Table ! 4c, Cross-Correlations
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
RS, C/C* -0.48 -0.82 -0.36 0.57
RS, 7T 0.54 -0.56 -0.03 0.56
RS, it* 0.03 -0.52 -0.00 0.49
RS, 7T p j 0.52 -0.62 -0.08 0.54
RS, 7r*N 0.38 -0.53 0.05 0.59
RS, 7rF -0.24 0.06 0.25 0.46
RS, n*H -0.11 -0.44 -0.24 -0.06
C,C* -0.10 -0.68 -0.09 0.67
tb,y -0.67 -0.06 0.70
Notes: 2.5 and 97.5 are percentiles.
Table 15. Moments (PCP model)
______ Table 15a. Volatility______
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
RS 20.7 8.44 14.5 27.1
7T 0.41 0.29 0.39 0.59
7T* 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.53
7Tn 0.55 0.26 0.37 0.57
7T*n 0.36 0.21 0.30 0.47
c 1.94 0.91 1.31 1.96
c* 1.78 0.80 1.14 1.65
(i +  O 0.77 0.24 0.42 0.75
(i +  o 0.55 0.19 0.32 0.58
Ta Die 15b. Persistence
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
R S 0.97 0.80 0.93 0.97
7r 0.75 0.31 0.57 0.81
7T 0.40 0.17 0.43 0.69
7rN 0.85 0.53 0.74 0.89
tt*n 0.57 0.37 0.66 0.87
C 0.49 0.66 0.83 0.92
c* 0.96 0.65 0.81 0.91
(1 +  i) 0.98 0.85 0.94 0.98
(1 +  0 0.97 0.80 0.92 0.97
Table 5c. Cross-Correlations
Variable Data 2.5 Median 97.5
RS, C /C * -0.48 -0.82 -0.51 0.05
RS, 7T 0.54 -0.61 -0.14 0.37
R S ,* * 0.03 -0.29 0.10 0.52
RS, 7r jy 0.52 -0.66 -0.19 0.36
RS, n*N 0.38 -0.35 0.19 0.65
RS, 7T F -0.24 0.04 0.17 0.31
RS,n*H -0.11 -0.31 -0.17 -0.04
C,C* -0.10 -0.60 -0.16 0.35
tb,y -0.66 -0.21 0.41
Notes: 2.5 and 97.5 are percentiles.
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Table 16. Volatility in the complete model without UIP and preference shocks
NO U IP  shock N O  U IP  and  preference shock
Variable D ata 2.5 M edian 97.5 2.5 M edian 97.5
R S 20.7 3.36 6.77 35.50 1.61 2.98 12.60
7T 0.41 0.39 0.48 0.64 0.34 0.45 0.60
7T* 0.36 0.35 0.46 0.59 0.33 0.42 0.55
7Tn 0.55 0.30 0.43 0.58 0.26 0.37 0.53
71N 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.56 0.22 0.31 0.46
c 1.94 0.91 1.30 1.87 0.45 0.74 .127
c * 1.78 0.74 1.10 1.74 0.41 0.62 1.04
(1 +  i) 0.77 0.29 0.48 0.93 0.20 0.31 0.52
(1 +  t*) 0.55 0.19 0.35 0.65 0.16 0.24 0.40
Table 17. Cross-correlation between real exchange rate and relative consumption
NO U IP  shock NO U IP  shock, NO Preference Shocks
D ata 2.5 M edian 97.5 2.5 M edian 97.5
-0.48 -0.7400 -0.2624 0.3655 -0.2934 0.8763 0.9973
Notes: 2.5 and 97.5 are percentiles.
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Range: 1983:1-2005:2 (90 observations, quarterly data). The real exchange rate is SP*/P.  
S  is the euro price of a U.S. dollar, P* is the U.S. CPI, P  is the euro area CPI.
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Figure 2. UIP shock
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Notes: Solide line: median response; dashed lines: 5th - 95th percentiles. Ordinate: quarters.
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Trade balance and net foreign asset position
are % of steady state output. Size of the shock: one standard deviation.
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Figure 3. Shock to  the  Home preferences
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Notes: Solide line: median response; dashed lines: 5th - 95th percentiles. Ordinate: quarters.
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Trade balance and net foreign asset position
are % of steady state output. Size of the shock: one standard deviation.
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Figure 4. Shock to  the Home tradable  technology
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Notes: Solide line: median response; dashed lines: 5th - 95th percentiles. Ordinate: quarters.
Coordinate: percent deviation from steady state. Trade balance and net foreign asset position
are % of steady state output. Size of the shock: one standard deviation.
